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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between African traditional livestock regimes and state 
veterinary services in colonial Zimbabwe from the perspective of socio-environmental history. It 
offers a new direction both methodologically and empirically as few academic studies have used 
state veterinary services archives extensively as a lens to understanding the parameters of the 
interaction of veterinarians and African livestock owners during the colonial period. Though 
located in socio-environmental history, this study has applicability to the histories of medicine, 
conservation and land policy as it connects with the broader debate regarding the experiences of 
local healing practices under colonial administrations. It examines the complex, fluid and 
interactive interdependence of people, livestock and disease, and discusses how veterinary 
medicine, conservation policies, and introduced epizootics impacted on African traditional 
livestock regimes. It demonstrates how African livestock owners reacted to veterinary 
challenges, and how they understood veterinary and environmental arguments mobilized by the 
colonial state to justify segregation. It shows that state veterinary services were not limited to 
pharmacological drugs and the administration of inoculants but also extended to breeding and 
other livestock improvement activities such as pasture management. It argues that the provision 
of state veterinary services was largely influenced by the shifting, contradictory relationship 
involving the state, native commissioners and white settlers. Given the fractured nature of 
colonial administration in Southern Rhodesia, this thesis also discusses conflicts between 
colonial experts (veterinary and animal scientists) and African livestock owners over what type 
of cattle to rear, how they were to be pastured, and also how epizootics and enzootics could be 
eradicated or controlled.  
 
Key Words: conservation; African livestock regimes; veterinary medicine, local healing 
practices; dipping; therapeutics; acaricides; centralisation; socio-environmental history; 
liberation war; Zimbabwe; Southern Rhodesia; Rhodesia.  
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Opsomming  
 
Hierdie proefskrif ondersoek die verhouding tussen die beheer oor tradisionele Afrika veekuddes 
en die staatsveeartsenydienste in koloniale Zimbabwe vanuit die perspektief van sosio-
ekonomiese geskiedenis. Daar word gepoog om ‘n nuwe metodologiese sowel as empiriese 
rigting aan te dui aangesien weinig akademiese studies die staatsveeartsenydienste se argief 
uitputtend gebruik het as ’n lens om die begrensde interaksie tussen veeartse en swart 
veebesitters gedurende die koloniale tydperk beter te verstaan. Alhoewel gesetel in sosio-
omgewingsgeskiedenis, is die studie ook relevant vir die geskiedenis van medisyne, bewaring en 
grondbeleid aangesien dit aansluiting vind by die breër debat rondom die belewenis van plaaslike 
gesondheidspraktyke onder die koloniale administrasie. Die proefskrif ondersoek die komplekse, 
vloeibare en interaktiewe interafhanklikheid tussen mense, vee en siektes, en bespreek hoe die 
medisyne van veeartse asook bewaringsbeleide tot ongekende siekteplae gelei het en ‘n 
uitwerking op tradisonele veekuddes gehad het. Daar word gewys op hoe swart veebesitters op 
hierdie uitdagings gereageer het en hoe hulle veaartsenykundige en omgewingsgebaseerde 
argumente van die staat begryp het wat ten doel gehad het om segregasie te bevorder.  Die staat 
se veeartsenydienste was nie beperk tot farmakologiese middele en die administrasie van 
inentings nie, maar het ook verder gestrek en kwessies soos aanteling en die bestuur van weiding 
behels. Daar word geredeneer dat die voorsiening van staatsveeartsenydienste grootliks 
beïnvloed is deur die verskuiwende en by tye kontradiktoriese verhouding tussen die staat, 
naturellekomissarisse en wit setlaars. Gegee die gefragmenteerde aard van die administrasie in 
koloniale Zimbabwe, bespreek hierdie proefskrif ook die konflik tussen koloniale deskundiges 
(veeartse en wetenskaplikes oor diere) en swart veebesitters oor watter tipe vee geteel moes 
word, hoe die weiding daar moes uitsien, en hoe bekende en onbekende plae beheer of uitgewis 
moes word. 
Sleutelwoorde: bewaring;  veekuddes van swartmense; veekundige medisyne; plaaslike 
gesondheidsmiddele; veedip; terapeutiese middele; miet; sentralisasie; sosio-
omgewingsgeskiedenis; bevrydingsoorlog; Zimbabwe; Suidelike Rhodesië; Rhodesië.   
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Chapter One  
Introduction, literature review and methodology 
 
Since 2000, land reform policies in Zimbabwe and their overall impact on the country’s political 
and socio-economic fabric have attracted a lot of attention in global news. Participants and the 
major supporters of the land reform programme argue that they are exorcising one of the last 
vestiges of European colonialism through reclaiming lost ancestral lands. The ideology behind it 
is the purported attempt to recreate pre-colonial patterns of land ownership. The land reform 
programme was characterised by the uncontrolled movement of livestock and people from 
communal lands (formerly reserves) into commercial farming zones with critical impact for 
veterinary control measures. In the Lowveld, for instance, game reserves and conservancies were 
invaded by people establishing settlements and grazing lands for their livestock.
1
 Unsurprisingly, 
the land reform programme has received much scholarly attention.
2
 However, very few scholars 
have focused their attention on the effects of, to use Tropp’s phrase, this ‘untangling [of] 
colonialism’ on the veterinary landscape.3 Notable exceptions to the neglect of contemporary 
veterinary issues are works by Scoones and Wolmer, who provide a succinct description of what 
the reconfiguration of the Zimbabwean landscape in the wake of land reform entailed for 
livestock regimes and state veterinary disease control mechanisms: 
                                                 
1
 W. Wolmer, From wilderness vision to farm invasions: Conservation and development in Zimbabwe’s South East 
Lowveld, (Oxford: James Currey, 2007), 186. 
2
 T.K. Chitiyo, ‘Land Violence and Compensation: Re‐conceptualizing Zimbabwe’s War Veterans’ Debate,’ Track 
Two, 9, 1(2000), http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/archive/two/9_1/zimbabwe.html; S. Moyo, ‘The Political Economy of 
Land Acquisition and Redistribution in Zimbabwe, 1990-1999,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 26, 1 (2000), 
5-28; D. Moore, ‘Is the Land the Economy and the Economy the Land? Primitive Accumulation in Zimbabwe,’ 
Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 19, 2 (2001); J. McGregor, ‘The politics of disruption: War veterans and 
the state in Zimbabwe,’ African Affairs, 101 (2002), 9-37; J. Chaumba, ‘New Politics, New Livelihoods: Agrarian 
Change in Zimbabwe,’ Review of African Political Economy, 30, 98 (2003); W. H. Shaw, ‘‘They Stole Our Land’: 
debating the expropriation of white farms in Zimbabwe,’ Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 1 (2003), 75-89; E. 
Chitando, ‘‘In the Beginning Was the Land’: The Appropriation of Religious Themes in Political Discourses in 
Zimbabwe,’ Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 75, 2 (2005); J. Muzondidya, ‘Jambanja: 
Ideological Ambiguities in the Politics of Land and Resource Ownership in Zimbabwe,’ Journal of Southern African 
Studies, 33, 2 (2007), 325-341; N. Sibanda, ‘Where Zimbabwe got it wrong – lessons for South Africa: A 
comparative analysis of the politics of land reform in Zimbabwe and South Africa,’ Master of Arts (International 
Studies), Stellenbosch University, 2010; W.Z. Sadomba, War Veterans in Zimbabwe’s Land Occupations: 
Complexities of a Liberation Movement in an African Post-Colonial Settler Society, (London: James Currey, 2011). 
3
 J.A. Tropp, Natures of colonial change: Environmental relations in the making of the Transkei, (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2006), 2. 
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The spectre of disease running rife has been emblematic of a disrupted landscape of 
jambanja’ — the chaos and disorder which ostensibly swept aside Zimbabwe’s neatly 
organised spaces, as poaching, fire-starting, cattle theft and mutilation proliferated in the 
ranches; as people and cattle moved uncontrolled from ‘communal’ to ‘commercial’ 
areas, from red into green zones, and even into the buffalo-inhabited conservancies; and 
as miles of veterinary fencing disappeared to be recycled as snare wire.
4
 
 
Jambanja (a term denoting the lawlessness and anarchy which accompanied the Land Reform) 
disrupted the country’s beef export market.5 In particular, the land reform programme resulted in 
the suspension (sometimes total cessation) of veterinary control measures which emphasized the 
separation of cattle from wild animals (mainly buffalos and kudu) which are capable of 
spreading enzootics and epizootics. Thus, there was an increase of disease outbreaks especially 
Foot and Mouth Disease at the turn of the twenty first century. Indeed, in their study Scoones 
and Wolmer discuss the potential effect of increased movements between communal areas and 
former commercial farms and game reserves, and in some cases, the resettlement of people in 
national parks and game reserves. This contested terrain between state and citizens, between 
different settler interest groups, between Africans and settlers, between Africans and Africans, 
and between wildlife and domesticated animals has a long history. However, research is still 
needed into how the resettled farmers have dealt with veterinary challenges under conditions 
characterized by the absence of biomedical facilities. This thesis seeks to contribute to an 
understanding of the history of the veterinary landscape, and suggest – if not solutions to the 
current problems – then at least provide the context of understanding to inform those solutions. 
 
Although Southern Rhodesia was occupied in 1890, the first interaction between the settlers and 
Africans that had a direct impact on the cattle economy was necessitated by twin forces of 
plunder (confiscation of cattle as loot after the 1893-4 and 1896-7 wars of colonization) and 
epizootics
6
 (livestock diseases that broke out after colonisation). Trade in livestock between 
                                                 
4
 I. Scoones and W. Wolmer, ‘Land, Landscapes and Disease: The Case of Foot and Mouth in Southern Zimbabwe,’ 
South African Historical Journal, 58, 1 (2007), 58.  
5
 For more on how this term gained currency see J. Muzondindya, “‘Jambanja”: Ideological ambiguities in the 
politics of Land and resource ownership in Zimbabwe,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 33, 2 (2007), 325 – 
341. 
6
 Note: An epizootic is a disease that appears as new cases in a given animal population, during a given period, at a 
rate that substantially exceeds what is ‘expected’ based on recent experience. A panzootic is an epizootic that 
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Africans and European traders/explorers had been going on for generations but the looting of 
Ndebele cattle in 1894 after the Anglo-Ndebele War (1893-1894) marked the first act of state 
intrusion into the livestock regimes in African areas, while the Rinderpest epizootic (1896-1898) 
resulted in the formation of a state veterinary department and, thus, as shown in Chapter 3, 
widened opportunities for increased state interference in control of livestock. While the colonial 
state mobilised a variety of tools to recruit Africans into a western version of modernity, this 
thesis focus the lens specifically on state veterinary services and African livestock regimes 
(including diagnostic and prophylactic medicines).
7
 It investigates how state veterinarians 
interacted with African livestock regimes.  
 
In addition to discussing human relations over veterinary issues in a colonial context, this thesis 
explores the relationship between humans and non-humans (livestock, parasites, bacteria, 
viruses) in the local environmental contexts. In understanding this complex relationship, it 
centers on the cattle economy as it was very important to both whites and Africans. Thus, cattle 
were a significant point of contact between Africans and the state and, therefore, a useful tool to 
analyse veterinary interactions. The importance of cattle to the Southern Rhodesians (both white 
and black) was highlighted in the Rhodesian Advertiser in 1902:  
                                                                                                                                                             
spreads across a large region. An infection is said to be ‘enzootic’ in a population when the infection is maintained 
in the population without the need for external inputs. Thus, in a broad sense,  an enzootic is a disease that is 
prevalent in a particular geography, race, field, area, or environment.. 
7
 A note on terminology: In this study, the term African cattle management practices and African livestock regimes 
are used interchangeably to denote a body of knowledge, or bodies of veterinary knowledge and practices of black 
livestock owners who were already resident in Southern Rhodesia at the time of European colonisation. This 
knowledge, as this thesis will show, also underwent change due to, among other things, the impact of colonialism, 
biomedical developments and missionary education on local ways of knowing. Generally, there are a number of 
terms that are generally used to refer to this knowledge including the following: local knowledge, vernacular 
knowledge, indigenous technical knowledge, folk science, ethno-science, traditional knowledge, ethno-veterinary 
science, indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) and site specific bodies. Though there is a lot of controversy over the 
appropriateness of all these, in this study the term local healing practices and African traditional livestock regimes 
will be used interchangeably for convenience’s sake. See K. E. Flint, Healing traditions: African medicine, cultural 
exchange, and competition in South Africa, 1820 – 1948, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2008); D. Millar, 
‘Interfacing two knowledge systems: Local knowledge and science in Africa,’ Paper presented to the Bridging 
Scales and Epistemologies: Linking knowledge in Global Science in Multiscale Assessments Conference, 
Alexandria, March 2004; E.F. Gueye, ‘Ethno-veterinary medicine against poultry diseases in African villages,’ 
World’s Poultry Science Journal, 55, 2 (1999), 187-198; W.M. Kon and K. Kamanzi Atindehou, ‘Ethnobotanical 
inventory of medicinal plants used in traditional veterinary medicine in Northern Côte d'Ivoire (West Africa),’ South 
African Journal of Botany, 74 1 (2008)76-84; L.J. McGaw and J.N. Eloff, ‘Ethno-veterinary use of southern African 
plants and scientific evaluation of their medicinal properties,’ Journal of Ethno-pharmacology, 119, 3 (2008), 559-
574.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4 
 
 Cattle – to eat and trample down the long rank grass: cattle, to break the land and carry 
their transport: Cattle whose diseases and nature they understood better than those of any 
other animal tried in Africa. Cattle were the secret password which promised success in 
African agriculture to their children if not to themselves. No wonder therefore, if for ten 
years every shilling these farmers made has gone into the purchase of stock, and every 
other form of farming has been regarded as, for the present, a waste of time. Cattle have 
been to them the one thing worth putting money into and all the other methods of farming 
seen in their neighborhood has only provoked a smile from the quiet grim faces of these 
men whose forefathers have farmed in Africa for generations. Cattle first, wheat, corn, 
fruit afterwards.
8
 
 
Indeed, as will become clear in this thesis, cattle were not only important to Africans but also to 
European farmers.
9
 The colonial economy was severely affected whenever there were cattle 
epizootics. However, it challenges Jeater’s argument that the fortunes of both white and black 
African farmers ‘rose and fell together [my emphasis] both subject to rainfall, crop pests, and 
stock disease.’10 This analysis suggests perhaps too undifferentiated a society characterised by 
equal access to national resources and remedies. It ignores that livestock disease control facilities 
(which are at the centre of this study) were generally retrograde in African reserves, and that 
veterinary challenges in these areas were prioritized only when the danger for their spread to 
settler commercial farms was high – as this thesis will show. Equally Jeater’s model – although 
helpful in many ways – ignores differences (both real and perceived) between African and white 
owned cattle. It also ignores differences intra-group, as this thesis will show, among African 
livestock owners in the African reserves. 
 
The origins of Southern Rhodesia’s Veterinary Department were linked to the need to control 
cattle from the Rinderpest epizootic while the imposition of cattle dip tanks in 1904 represented 
an intensified, systematic, and physical control over African cattle, and also entailed a more 
intensive interaction involving colonial officials, Africans and livestock. The ‘acceptability’ of 
                                                 
8
 ‘Farming in Melsetter district: The cattle sickness, poverty and desolation,’ Rhodesian Advertiser, 3 July 1902 
cited in Jeater, Law, language, and science, 40. 
9
 For an in-depth discussion of the development of the white cattle industry in Southern Rhodesia see N.W. 
Samasuwo, “There is something about cattle’: Towards and economic history of the beef industry in colonial 
Zimbabwe, with special reference to the role of the state, 1939-1980,’ DPhil Thesis, University of Cape Town, 2000. 
10
 Jeater, Law, language, and science, 41. 
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these measures to Africans was enabled by the ability of Europeans to exert their control over 
Africans through overt physical force. However, the relationship of veterinary officials and 
African livestock regimes need not be simplified as different categories of Africans were 
impacted differently by the imposition of a state veterinary apparatus. Despite the paucity of 
studies into pre- and early colonial African class differences, we do know that African class 
divisions often intensified during colonisation as different groups of responded differently to the 
exploitation of imposition of the new state and capitalism.
11
 Although this thesis discusses the 
experiences of African livestock owners
12
 in general terms, its author is keenly aware that there 
were differences in, for example, the numbers of herds they owned; some possessed loan cattle 
only (under the mafisa or kuronzera systems); some had knowledge of traditional livestock 
management practices while others interacted with veterinary and colonial experts much earlier 
than others, while some were in regions that were relatively free from epizootics; some were able 
to deal with the demands of the capitalist society much better than others and, finally, some 
collaborated with the state (on a spectrum of accommodation) while some offered resistance in 
various forms (again on a continuum).
13
 These nuances are not captured in the colonial archives 
that tend to flatten difference and ignore class.  
Discussing the experiences of African livestock owners presents a number of challenges to the 
researcher. Firstly, no scholarly work from an historical or social anthropological perspective 
that traces this relationship even on a micro level exists. Secondly, the written evidence 
(including veterinary reports and memoranda), as is shown in the methodology section below, 
discusses African livestock regimes in general terms and yet, of course, there were different 
levels of social differentiation. Often in the veterinary reports no mention is made of the different 
subclasses of African livestock owners in the reserves beyond the fact that some had ‘larger 
                                                 
11
 See F. Cooper, ‘Peasants, capitalists, and historians: A review article,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 7, 2 
(1981), 284-314; J. Lewis, ‘The rise and fall of the South African peasantry: A critique and reassessment,’ Journal 
of Southern African Studies, 11, 1 (1984), 1-24. 
12
 Note: This term is used loosely as it also includes people who may not have owned cattle but had increased 
interaction with them sometimes more than their actual owners for instance cattle herders and those possessing 
mafisa (loaned) cattle.  
13
 For an in-depth analysis of the debate on the African ‘peasant’ class see R. Palmer and N. Parsons (eds), The roots 
of rural poverty in central and Southern Africa, (London: Heinemann, 1977); T. Ranger, ‘Growing from the Roots: 
Reflections on Peasant Research in Central and Southern Africa,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 5, 1, (1978), 
99-133; T. Ranger, Peasant consciousness and guerrilla war in Zimbabwe: A comparative study, (London: James 
Currey, 1985).  
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herds’ than others and that some were more ‘receptive’ to veterinary regulations than others. 
Neither does a continuous line of veterinary sources exist for geographic districts so using a case 
study approach to generalize more broadly is a fraught process.  A macro-level overview of the 
colony’s veterinary experiences is equally problematic as it raises questions about the uniform 
application of veterinary policies in different areas and how similar or different the impacts and 
responses were. Nonetheless, this thesis utilises a broad angle lens to investigate the response to 
veterinary policy by a bigger, more diverse group of people on a much wider scale since 
veterinary policy (at least from the 1930s) was implemented nationally. Furthermore, though 
acknowledging (and finding evidence of) African agency, this thesis has taken seriously Allina-
Pissano’s advice that we must ‘view the colonial experience as a field of negotiation rather than 
one of resistance, collaboration, or domination.’14 As in Kuruman15, Africans in Southern 
Rhodesia adjusted to veterinary challenges and pressure on African livestock regimes in diverse 
ways. 
 
The African Cattle Complex theory – an anthropological view that Africans kept large herds to 
the point of economic irrationality – reveals an early attempt to understand the social importance 
of cattle to Africans. Whereas the African Cattle Complex theory gained currency throughout the 
colonial era, in the late 1970s, when the Africanist
16
 argument was popular, the trajectory of 
Africanist writings focused on proving the economic and exchange value of African livestock at 
the expense of how African livestock regimes were impacted upon by ecological challenges and 
colonial policy. This thesis will not dwell on the economic importance of African-owned 
livestock
17
 but on the impact of colonial policy in general and veterinary interventions in 
particular on how they were reared, treated, and bred. 
                                                 
14
 E. Allina-Pisano, ‘Resistance and the social history of Africa,’ Journal of Social History 37, 1 (2003), 194. 
15
 N.J. Jacobs, Environment, power and injustice: A South African History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 207. 
16
 For more on Africanist writings see A. Temu and B. Swai, Historians and Africanist history: A critique; 
Postcoonial historiography examined, (London: Zed Press, 1981). 
17
 For more on the economic importance of African cattle and the African Cattle Complex theory see R.M.G. 
Mtetwa, ‘Myth or Reality: The ‘Cattle Complex’ in South East Africa, with specific reference to Rhodesia,’ 
Zambezia, VI, I (1978), 23-35; M.C. Steele, ‘The economic function of African-owned cattle in colonial 
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As this thesis will demonstrate, state veterinarians often cast their interventions as being 
‘scientific’ and, thus, were ‘superior’ while African modes of livestock management were 
perceived to be inherently flawed. Due to colonial racial and cultural ideologies of health, 
attempts were made to systematically substitute local healing and livestock management 
practices by biomedicine.
18
 In Kenya, a former settler economy and a related colonial context, 
Anderson brings out the conflicting nature of this relationship arguing, ‘this was a battle between 
the (so called) progressive, economic and sustainable methods of production advocated by the 
European settlers and the backward, uneconomic, and environmentally damaging practices of 
African herders.’19 The thinking that African traditional livestock regimes are flawed still 
persists. The effect is that in Zimbabwe, biomedical approaches are practiced in the public 
domain and enjoy state support while no official support has been extended to ideas African 
livestock regimes although a syncretic mixture is adopted widely.
20
 Nonetheless, historically 
biomedical and local livestock developed and co-existed as African livestock regimes often 
utilized both knowledge bodies in a syncretic manner. That African livestock owners straddled 
(and continue to) both sides of the veterinary divide is understandable since, as Jacobs has 
observed, ‘every generation inherited an understanding of how to live from its parents, and each 
faced new circumstances that forced it to innovate. Even those generations that were forced to 
innovate a lot for only a little return do not exist primarily as a degraded version of what went 
before. They exist as a testament to their own circumstances, values, and perseverance.’21 This 
thesis utilises a socio-environmental approach to explore the accuracy of the Manichean and 
rigidly divided ‘Western versus African’ livestock management model. This categorisation is 
simplistic as neither fell so neatly into hermetically sealed boxes: white society was heavily 
                                                                                                                                                             
Zimbabwe,’ Zambezia, IX, I (1981), 29-48; A. Shutt, ‘The Settlers’ Cattle Complex: The etiquette of culling cattle 
in colonial Zimbabwe, 1938,’ Journal of African History, 43 (2002), 263-86.  
18
 P.S. Woods, et al, ‘Path analysis of subsistence farmers’ use of veterinary services in Zimbabwe,’  Preventive 
Veterinary Medicine, 61 (2003). See also J. Ford, The role of trypanosomiases in African Ecology, (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1971). 
19
 D. Anderson, ‘Kenya’s cattle trade and the economies of empire, 1918-48,’ in  K. Brown and D. Gilfoyle (eds), 
Healing the Herds: Disease, Livestock Economies and the Globalisation of veterinary medicine, (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2010), 251. 
20
 G.L. Chavunduka, ‘Zinatha: The organisation of traditional medicine in Zimbabwe,’ in M. Last and G.L 
Chavunduka (eds), The Professionalization of African medicine, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986). 
21
 N.J. Jacobs, Environment, power and injustice: A South African History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 19. 
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divided, different state departments disagreed and there were changes over time as this thesis 
will demonstrate. 
Though veterinary medicine as it is known and practiced in Zimbabwe today is mainly 
concerned with the diagnostic and therapeutic side of animal health, this thesis will show that 
that has not always been the case. Historically, veterinary medicine was not limited to these 
concerns as it also involved livestock improvement activities – a practice presently carried out by 
animal scientists. For this reason, this thesis will not restrict itself to the Veterinary Department’s 
diagnostic and therapeutic roles but will also investigate colonial animal breeding and livestock 
‘improvement’ activities, and how these intersected with African livestock regimes. As this 
thesis will show, the Veterinary Department played a very important role in the transformation of 
livestock farming in Zimbabwe. Furthermore, it is important to note that in the colonial context 
which was characterized by the state’s attempts to solve the conundrum of how to integrate and 
also exclude Africans from colonial society, the interaction between veterinary officials and 
African livestock owners was not always direct. Most veterinary duties were administered by or 
involved (in one way or another as this thesis will explain) administrators from the Native 
Affairs Department (NAD) – who were neither trained animal scientists nor veterinarians. Thus, 
the term veterinary medicine is also used to denote the activities of both trained vets and NAD 
officials who performed quasi-veterinary duties. As Chapter 5 will show the meanings of 
veterinary policy often resulted in conflicts. For instance, this is demonstrated by the criticism of 
NAD officials by vets in the 1940s that they had merely focussed their effort in castrating 
African ‘scrub’ (cattle not saleable on the capitalist beef market) beasts under the illusion of 
livestock ‘improvement.’22 Veterinary arguments also related, albeit sometimes uneasily, with 
ideas of environmental conservation, improvement and development, and were thus mobilized to 
justify environment policies that sought to intensify African agriculture.
23
  
 
                                                 
22
 See Chapter 5. 
23
 W. Beinart, ‘Vets, viruses and environmentalism at the Cape,’ in T. Griffiths and L. Robin, Ecology and empire: 
Environmental history of settler societies, (Edinburgh: Keele University Press, 1997), 88. 
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Literature Review 
In light of Brown’s recent observation that there is a dearth of information on local healing 
practices and the hybridization of knowledge from a historical or ethnographic perspective in 
southern Africa, this thesis seeks to bolster existing knowledge that is currently inadequate.
24
 
Four different approaches related to the subject matter of this thesis can be delineated in African 
historiography in general and Zimbabwean historiography in particular. Firstly, there are studies 
that deal with the African response to the growing demands of the capitalist economy.  Secondly, 
there are studies that analyse ecological disasters that occurred after occupation. Thirdly, some 
historians examine the position of colonial experts in the state bureaucracy. Fourthly, recently 
some historians are preoccupied with the present veterinary challenges and the possible role of 
indigenous knowledge systems from a development studies perspective. Yet all these approaches 
mention colonial veterinary issues tangentially hence this thesis attempts to fill this gap. At 
present, there are isolated studies that trace how major cattle diseases such as East Coast Fever, 
Trypasonomiases and Foot and Mouth Disease affected the beef industry in particular and the 
economy at large.
25
 Agrarian studies by Machingaidze
26
, Phimister
27
 and Samasuwo,
28
 solely 
allude to the difficult circumstances that characterized the genesis of the beef cattle industry in 
Zimbabwe and the role played by the settler state in this process. Indeed, as Zeleza has noted, the 
African agricultural history continues to suffer from over-broad generalisations hence more 
fundamental aspects relating to the development of veterinary services and their relationship to 
colonialism have hardly been subjected to historical analysis.
29
 This reveals the need for strongly 
                                                 
24
 Brown, ‘Conclusion,’ in Brown and Gilfoyle (eds), Healing the Herds,  272. 
25
 For instance, I. Scoones and W. Wolmer, ‘Land, landscapes and disease: The case of Foot and Mouth in Southern 
Zimbabwe,’ South African Historical Journal, 58 (2007); M.K.K. Mutowo, ‘Animal diseases and human 
populations in Zimbabwe: The Rinderpest epidemic of 1898 - 1898,’ Zambezia, 28, 1 (2001). 
26
 V.E.M. Machingaidze, ‘The development of settler capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia with particular 
reference to the role of the state, 1908- 1939,’ PhD Thesis, University of London, 1980. 
27
 I.R. Phimister, ‘Meat and Monopolies: Beef Cattle in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1938,’ Journal of African History, 
19, 3 (1978). 
28
 N.W. Samasuwo, “There is something about cattle’: Towards and economic history of the beef industry in 
colonial Zimbabwe, with special reference to the role of the state, 1939-1980,’ DPhil Thesis, University of Cape 
Town, 2000; N. Samasuwo, ‘Food production and war supplies: Rhodesia’s beef industry during the Second World 
War, 1939 – 1945,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 29, 2 (2003). 
29
 P.T. Zeleza, A modern economic history of Africa Vol1: Nineteenth century, (Dakar: Codesria Book Series, 1993), 
6. 
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chronological regional studies because the story, as this thesis will argue, is neither Whiggish nor 
declensionist but rather nuanced, non-linear and idiographic. 
 
One of the most influential academic works is Ford’s pioneering ecological study of 
trypanosomiases in Africa.
30
 His study examines the political and epidemiological reasons for 
the spread of trypanosomiases during the colonial period hence it is of crucial importance when 
exploring the development of veterinary medicine in Zimbabwe. He traces how Africans in pre-
colonial Zimbabwe dealt with trypanosomiases and how European occupation interfered with 
their livestock disease management strategies.
31
 Ford’s main argument is that colonialism limited 
the extent to which Africans dealt with livestock diseases. Giblin has taken this argument further 
to posit that in Tanzania (a similar colonial context) preventive methods of disease control that 
had been adopted by Africans during the pre-colonial period became impossible after 
colonisation.
32
 Recently, Ford’s argument has been resuscitated in development studies. For 
instance, Millar argues that colonialism had a strong impact on indigenous cultures and peoples 
of Africa, limiting their capacity to solve their own problems and develop technologies that serve 
their own needs.
33
  However, not all those that have applied Ford’s framework have come to this 
conclusion. Despite centering on public health, Maynard’s exploratory study of Kedjom 
medicine analyses the impact of colonialism on local healing practices in Cameroon reveals that 
colonial attempts to dismantle local medicine were neither wholesale nor successful.
34
 Unlike 
these works, this thesis investigates specifically African reaction to invasion by new epizootics, 
and African attitudes towards hegemonic colonial veterinary regime.  
 
Partly drawing from Ford’s pioneering work, and partly motivated by the euphoria of 
independence from colonialism, in 1970s most historians wrote from an Africanist perspective in 
                                                 
30
 Ford, The role of trypanosomiases in African Ecology. 
31
 Ford, The role of trypanosomiases in African Ecology, 350. 
32
 J.L. Giblin, ‘The pre-colonial politics of disease control in the lowlands of North Eastern Tanzania,’ in G. 
Maddox, et al (eds), Custodians of the Land: Ecology and culture in the history of Tanzania, (London: James 
Currey, 1996). 
33
 D. Millar, ‘Interfacing two knowledge systems: Local knowledge and science in Africa,’ Conference Paper, 
Bridging scales and Epistemologies: Linking knowledge in Global Science in Multiscale Assessments Conference, 
Alexandria, March 2004. 
34
 K. Maynard, ‘European preoccupation and indigenous culture in Cameroon: British rule and the transformation of 
Kedjom medicine,’ Canadian Journal of African Studies, 36, 1 (2002), 79-117. 
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their examination of the position of colonial experts in the state bureaucracy.
35
 The Africanist 
paradigm is an essentially corrective and anti-colonial approach which emphasizes African 
initiative in the face of European conquest and capitalist exploitation. Those writing from this 
perspective often view the whole colonial experience in purely negative terms. A popular 
conclusion they reach is typified by the argument that, ‘the large body of Western experts in the 
third world is surely the worst plague of locusts ever to descend on the poor countries.’36 Thus, 
Africanists explain veterinary services in imperial terms as seeking to further goals of imperial 
hegemony. Writing specifically about the role of colonial experts (who were usually government 
employees) in the production of knowledge in colonies, McCracken argues that the biggest fault 
of these specialists was the assumption that ‘Africa had nothing to offer them.’37 Waller 
examines how East Coast Fever and bovine pleura-pneumonia (Lung Sickness) affected the 
Kenyan colonial society. His basic argument is that these diseases affected almost every aspect 
of Kenyan society and economy but that the threat posed was constructed and confronted 
differently by the various constituencies – official, settler and African.38  This theme is discussed 
extensively in Leach and Mearns’ The lie of the land, and Fairhead and Leach’s Misreading the 
African landscape which vilify the works of colonial experts in the colonies as amounting to 
both intentional and unintentional ‘misreading’ of African environmental protection regimes.39  
However, this approach, as this thesis will show, is limited, firstly, for its simple analysis of the 
relationship between colonial experts and the metropole, and secondly, for its narrow 
examination of the relationship between colonial experts and Africans. As Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrate this was much more complex than the Africanists realised.  
 
                                                 
35
 Studies which fit into this category include the following J. Ford, The role of trypanosomiases in African Ecology; 
J.L. Giblin, ‘The pre-colonial politics of disease control in the lowlands of North Eastern Tanzania; J. McCracken, 
‘Experts and expertise in colonial Malawi.’  
36
 J. McCracken, ‘Experts and expertise in colonial Malawi,’ African Affairs, 81, 322 (1982), 116. 
37
 McCracken, ‘Experts and expertise in colonial Malawi.’  
38
 R. Waller, ‘Clean’ and ‘Dirty’: Cattle disease and control policy in colonial Kenya, 1900 to 1940,’ Journal of 
African History, 45 (2004), 45. 
39
 M. Leach and R. Mearns (eds), The lie of the land: Challenging received wisdom on the African environment, 
(London: Heinemann, 1996); J. Fairhead and M. Leach, Misreading the African landscape: Society and ecology in a 
forest-savanna mosaic, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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The Africanist perspective has been heavily critiqued by environmental historians of Africa.
40
 
Environmental historians have sought new explanations to the rise of veterinary medicine in 
Africa and posit that veterinary science grew as an independent subject borne out of a ‘genuine’ 
need to eradicate livestock diseases. More specifically, Beinart, Brown and Gilfoyle bemoan 
what they consider to be an unfair treatment of the pioneering ‘colonial scientists’ in many works 
on African history.
41
 They argue that Africanists have failed to acknowledge how scientists in 
Africa grappled with ‘and sometimes, grasped, complex diseases, ecologies and natural 
phenomena.’42 Using examples drawn from South Africa where biomedical approaches 
developed side by side with local healing practices, Brown, in particular, has further developed 
this view in her individual works on the history of veterinary services in South Africa.
43
 She 
demonstrates how animal diseases prompted the growth of medical knowledge, especially in the 
field of colonial medicine and ecology.
 
Her fundamental argument is that before the arrival of 
Western scientists, Africans realized that tsetse flies and game contributed to the disease and that 
when they arrived, the Europeans experimented with a whole range of methods, including 
African veterinary remedies, to try and eliminate livestock diseases.
44
  
 
Notwithstanding its strong response to the Africanist view, the major flaw, as this thesis will 
show, in the Brown-Beinart-Gilfoyle model lies in the manner it downplays the fact that during 
colonialism veterinary policy was, ‘often autocratic, coercive and bound to an ideology of 
European superiority.’45 Colonial experts, including state vets, were used to oversee and 
                                                 
40
 See H. Tilley, ‘African environments and environmental science: The African Research Survey, ecological 
paradigms and British colonial development, 1920-1940,’ in W Beinart and J McGregor (eds), Social history and 
African environments, (Oxford: James Currey, 2003); W. Beinart, K. Brown, and D. Gilfoyle, ‘Experts and expertise 
in colonial Africa reconsidered: Science and the interpretation of knowledge,’ African Affairs, 108/432 (2009), 413–
433. 
41
 Beinart, Brown and Gilfoyle, ‘Experts and expertise in colonial Africa reconsidered.’ This study was a response to 
an earlier study written from an Africanist perspective: See McCracken, ‘Experts and expertise.’ 
42
 W. Beinart, ‘African history and environmental history,’ African Affairs, 99 (2000), 294. 
43
 K. Brown, ‘From Ubombo to Mkhuzi: Disease, colonial science and the control of nagana (Livestock 
trypanosomiases) in Zululand, South Africa, c.1894-1953,’ Journal of the History of  Medicine and Allied Sciences, 
63 (2008), 285-322. See also K. Brown, ‘Tropical medicine  and animal diseases: Ondersterpoort and the 
development of veterinary science in South Africa, 1908 to 1950,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 31, 33 
(2005). 
44
 For a fuller appraisal of Brown’s work see W. Mwatwara, ‘‘Mad Dogs and Meerkats: A History of Resurgent 
Rabies in Southern Africa, Karen Brown – book review,’ Historia, 57, 2 (2012), 470-474. 
45
 Tilley, ‘African environments and environmental science,’ 130. 
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‘legalize’ the appropriation of land for white farmers and mining corporations,  to designate 
African ‘reserves,’ to administer regulations concerning ‘correct’ methods of land and livestock 
husbandry and often performed paramilitary duties whenever  the state felt its power was under 
threat.
46
 There were disparities in the allocation of state veterinary officials between black and 
white farmers
47
, with the latter receiving almost exclusively all state veterinarians. 
Commonalities exist with other settler economies like colonial Kenya, in which ‘nine out of ten 
of the [Veterinary] department’s work consists of free preventive and curative treatment given to 
the property of the Europeans, who own only five per cent of stock in this country.’48  
 
In addition, though managing to demonstrate the complex position of ‘colonial science’ in the 
imperial fabric, the major weakness of this approach is its synecdochic treatment of sub-regional 
experiences, as Chapters 3 and 5 will demonstrate. As this thesis will contend, neither imperial 
hegemony nor philanthropy adequately explains the rise of veterinary medicine in Zimbabwe.  In 
fact, a recent book Cultivating the colonies: Colonial states and their environment legacies 
contends that imperial states ‘got their hands dirty’ in the business of empire.49 Although the 
connection between the creation of veterinary departments in Africa and the desire of the 
colonial state to promote white agricultural interests has been raised in a number of historical 
studies, this thesis seeks to push this argument further and examine how the marginalization of 
African livestock regimes impacted on African understanding of veterinary medicine, and also 
their modes of understanding livestock diseases.
50
 It restates the Africanist argument that 
                                                 
46
 M. Bratton, ‘Settler State, Guerrilla War and Rural Underdevelopment in Rhodesia,’ Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 
9,  1/2 (1979), 56. 
47
 Woods, et al, ‘Path analysis of subsistence farmers’ use of veterinary services in Zimbabwe.’ For studies that deal 
with other settler economies see K. Hughes, ‘‘They give me fever’ East Coast Fever and other environmental 
impacts of the Maasai moves,’ in K. Brown and D. Gilfoyle (eds), Healing the Herds: Disease, Livestock Economies 
and the Globalisation of veterinary medicine, (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2010); P. Phoofolo, ‘Epidemics and 
Revolutions: The Rinderpest Epidemic in the late nineteenth century Southern Africa,’ Past and Present, 138 
(1993). 
48
 Norman  Leys, a Kenyan medical doctor, cited by  K. Hughes, ‘‘They give me fever’ East Coast Fever and other 
environmental impacts of the Maasai moves,’ in K. Brown and D. Gilfoyle (eds), Healing the Herds, 156. 
49
 C.F. Ax, et al (eds), Cultivating the colonies: Colonial states and their environment legacies, (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 2011), 1-2. See chapter by J.M. Hodge, ‘Colonial experts, developmental and environmental 
doctrines, and the legacies of late British colonialism,’ in Ax, Cultivating the colonies, 300 – 326. 
50
 D. Anderson, ‘Kenya’s cattle trade and the economies of empire, 1918-48,’ in  K. Brown and D. Gilfoyle (eds), 
Healing the Herds. See V. Machingaidze, ‘The development of settler capitalist agriculture in Southern Rhodesia 
with particular reference to the role of the state, 1908- 1939,’ PhD Thesis, University of London, 1980. 
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veterinary services were integral to the colonial system and thus did not escape the trappings of 
segregatory politics.  
 
Though livestock have been mentioned in environmental studies, they appear as part of 
narratives that explain the predicament of their owners in the wake of colonisation and the 
development of the capitalist economy rather than being subjects of the studies themselves. 
However, socio-environmental historians are beginning to place species at the centre of their 
studies and to develop a deep investigation of livestock breeds and breeding in the colonies.
51
 
There is a new group of animals-sensitive historians who have enriched our historical 
understanding by focusing on social history from an animal perspective. Swart has written a 
number of animal-sensitive historical studies.
52
 For instance, her account of the history of horses 
traces the introduction of ‘breeding’ regimes in Southern Africa in an attempt to introduce a 
horse suited to the southern African environment.
53
 Jacobs’ study of the donkey massacres in 
Bophuthatswana offers a classic demonstration of the power/knowledge dynamic, and how it 
influenced attitudes towards certain species of domestic animals in the post-‘betterment’ era.54 In 
her book Environment, Power and Injustice, Jacobs also explores the biological, geological, and 
climatological forces in history of Kuruman.
55
 Others have examined how settlers strove to 
‘tame’ the local environment. For example, Beinart and Phimister have both studied the 
influence and impact of environmental ideas on soil conservation and animal husbandry.
56
 In 
focusing on official concern about soil conservation, Beinart makes an important observation 
that official thinking was not merely determined by the immediate needs of metropolitan or 
settler capital as it was rooted deeply into the colonial encounter, and also derived partly from 
older ideas about improvement and development. However, unlike Beinart who focused mainly 
                                                 
51
 See for instance Chapters 3, 11, 12 and 13 in Brown and Gilfoyle (eds), Healing the Herds. 
52
 See S. Swart, ‘Case Study of Writing Animals into Social History,’ International Review of Social History, 55 
(2010), 241–263; L. van Sittert and S. Swart, Canis Africanis: A dog history of Southern Africa, Leiden: Brill, 
2008). 
53
 S. Swart, Riding high: Horses, humans and history in South Africa, (Johannesburg: Wits University Press, 2010). 
54
 N. J. Jacobs, ‘The Great Bophuthatswana Donkey Massacre: Discourse on the Ass and the Politics of Class and 
Grass,’ The American Historical Review, 106, 2(2001), 485-507. 
55
 N.J. Jacobs, Environment, power and injustice: A South African History, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003). 
56
 W. Beinart, ‘Soil Erosion, Conservationism and Ideas about Development: A Southern African Exploration, 1900-
1960,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 11, 1 (1984), 52-83. 
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on South Africa, Phimister has shown that in Southern Rhodesia, ideas and prescriptions 
associated with conservationist thinking were first put into practice in relation to peasant 
agriculture, not settler farming.
57
 Conservationism and segregation, as this thesis shows in 
Chapters 5 and 6, were opposite sides of the same coin as they were both mobilised in justifying 
and buttressing practices and arguments that ensured that African traditional livestock regimes 
remained emasculated and offered no competition to the white commercial cattle interests. 
 
Whereas the initial focus by environmental historians was on how Africans were affected by 
conservation, Kwashirai and Musemwa have examined how the activities of white farmers and 
miners impacted negatively on the environment.
58
 Kwashirai notes that there was a 
contemptuous dismissal of indigenous knowledge by the colonial forestry personnel failed to 
‘build upon, or even to acknowledge, local practices and knowledge.’59 These issues especially 
the damage caused by mining operations were discussed in depth over a relatively bigger 
geographical area by Musemwa. Musemwa’s study provides an alternative way of looking at the 
creation of white identities in southern Rhodesia and represents an ecological narrative of settler 
colonisation and entrenchment in the colony.
60
 These studies reveal that the conservation 
discourse was victim to the conflict between miners and farmers as theirs was simply a conflict 
over unfettered access to natural resources both of which they were prepared to exploit without 
regard to protecting the environment. This is an important issue, as it is raised in Chapters 4 and 
5 of this thesis to demonstrate that segregation also played a part in the implementation of 
conservation policies in African reserves. 
 
Besides attracting the attention of Africanists and environmental historians, Ford’s work also 
drew the attention of professional veterinary and medical personnel as well as medical historians 
who examine the potential impact of local healing practices on the livestock economy. 
                                                 
57
 I. Phimister, ‘Discourse and the Discipline of Historical Context: Conservationism and Ideas about development 
in Southern Rhodesia 1930-1950,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 12, 2 (1986), 263-275. 
58
 V.C. Kwashirai, ‘Dilemmas in conservationism in colonial Zimbabwe, 1890-1930,’ Conservation and Society, 4, 
4 (2006), 541-561; M. Musemwa, ‘Contestation over resources: The farmer-miner dispute in colonial Zimbabwe, 
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59
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60
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Chavunduka, a veterinary scientist and also a botanist, is among the first researchers to identify 
some of the veterinary remedies used by Africans, including infusions, decoctions, powders, 
fumes and pastes.
61
 However, writing in the 1970s, he fell victim to the then popular notion 
among veterinary scientists that African livestock regimes were archaic and irrational. In 
dismissing African livestock regimes, Chavunduka declared that, ‘to the less sophisticated 
African mind, derangement of health is attributed to some supernatural powers and evil spirits 
which cannot be remedied by medical treatment alone.’62 While Chavunduka’s brand of 
scepticism stunted further research into local veterinary healing practices, local healing practices 
attracted the attention of public health professionals and medical historians during the 1980s and 
1990s. Work by Feierman
63
, Waite
64
, Ranger
65
, Turshen
66
, Orley
67
, Chavunduka
68
 and Gelfand
69
 
reveal bias towards public health issues.  
 
Though located in veterinary history, this thesis is in conversation with the histories of medicine 
and colonialism as it connects with the broader debate regarding the experiences of local healing 
practices under colonial regimes. Medical anthropologists and social historians have increased 
our understanding of the complexity of colonial rule, and how black people interacted with it 
(and under it) in diverse and shifting ways. Thus, works by Flint and White were particularly 
influential in helping to shape this study’s theoretical framework. Flint examines the changes in 
the medical, social, and political roles of healers in the Zulu Kingdom, and how these changed 
under white rule.
70
 White’s pioneering work on rumour and history in colonial Africa is of 
importance to this study, especially the two chapters which deal with the experience of colonial 
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medicine in East and Central Africa and debates on the control of sleeping sickness in colonial 
Northern Rhodesia.
71
 She discusses the context in which biomedicine was practiced, how 
biomedical technologies were believed to work as well as how much power was invested in their 
application. She also looks at the interaction of African ideas on diseases and imperial science 
and argues that the vampire accusations that emerged in Rhodesia involved local and colonial 
ideas about the relationship between wild animals, tsetse flies, authority and shifting cultivation 
practices.
72
 Since colonial stereotypes about the health of Africans were not different from those 
that existed in veterinary issues, these studies are crucial in giving a wider context to that which 
this study seeks to explore. 
 
Livestock and veterinary issues have also been discussed albeit tangentially in social history 
studies that deal with the African response to the growing demands of the capitalist economy. 
Most studies written from this vantage point argue that Africans responded positively to the 
growing demands of the capitalist economy.
73
 This perspective was partly a response to 
triumphalist history written by early colonial administrators and settlers depicting their 
‘successes in conquering the ‘Dark’ Continent.74 Arrighi’s ‘proletarianisation’75 theory and 
Phimister’s study of peasant production dealt with the early colonial interactions and the 
incorporation of the African agricultural economy into the international capitalist system. A 
number of themes and sub-themes (including peasantisation, proletarianisation, de-
peasantisation, peasant consciousness and the settler capitalist accumulation), which arose from 
Arrighi’s and Phimister’s works, motivated a number of scholarly studies subsequently. Most of 
these themes were captured in Palmer and Parson’s The roots of rural poverty in Southern and 
Central Africa which was concerned with the applicability of the underdevelopment or 
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dependency theory to the sub-region.
76
 Palmer and Parson’s book motivated a number of other 
studies including Ranger’s extensive study of the ‘peasantisation’ process and ‘peasant 
consciousness’ in colonial Zimbabwe.77 Closely related to these were studies that examined the 
development of settler agriculture in the colony whose main argument was that the 
impoverishment of the African peasantry was a deliberate state policy.
78
 What stands out in this 
perspective is the argument that the livestock economy fared relatively better than extensive 
farming and that a section of successful African farmers utilised revenue from cattle sales to 
purchase farms and to accumulate.
79
 Since this body of literature discusses the rise of a fledgling 
cattle economy in the aftermath of the Rinderpest epizootic and also to issues of destocking in 
passing, this thesis will utilise them to provide a nuanced understanding of the broader economic 
variables shaping African livestock regimes. 
 
Though not specifically rooted in the environmental history of the region, Africanist writings 
also invigorated interest in colonial conservation policies.
80
 Environmental historians have 
tapped into these writings to develop a rich body of literature on colonial conservation 
programmes. One the most significant historiographical debates raged between Beinart and 
Phimister.
81
 Beinart and Phimister were at loggerheads over the intention of the colonial state in 
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implementing the centralisation policy.
82
 Beinart argued that it was for conservation purposes 
whereas Phimister saw the application of these programmes as serving a segregatory purpose. 
Some scholars drew syncretically from these debates to argue that they served both purposes.
83
 
Overall, these historiographical approaches reveal a sustained state intrusion, among other 
things, into African livestock regimes especially through destocking through forced sales and 
centralization of lands into grazing and farming land. This thesis considers segregation and 
conservation arguments as two different parts of the same coin, and discusses the impact of state 
intrusion in general and veterinary activities in particular on African livestock regimes.  
 
While acknowledging and sometimes upholding the Africanist contention that increased 
interaction between people and animals from different environments in the wake of European 
colonisation resulted in outbreaks of new epizootics and enzootics, a number of studies have 
focused on how these were perceived and dealt with under colonial setups.
84
 Van Onselen has 
analysed the political effects of Rinderpest in Southern Africa, that is, how veterinary measures 
adopted by the colonial authorities led to rebellions by indigenous populations.
85
 Phoofolo has 
questioned why Rinderpest failed to precipitate a revolution in Southern Africa.
86
 Bundy argues 
that from the late 19
th 
Century and the early years of the 20
th
 Century developments in Eastern 
Griqualand were closely shaped by the disease environment, and that change in rural 
                                                                                                                                                             
Historical Context: Conservationism and Ideas about development in Southern Rhodesia 1930-1950,’ Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 12, 2 (1986), 263-275. 
82
 See Chapter 5 for more on centralisation policies. 
83
 J. McGregor, ‘Conservation, Control and Ecological Change: The Politics and Ecology of Colonial Conservation 
in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe,’ Environment and History, 1, 3, (1995), 257-279; W.A. Munro, The moral economy of the 
state: Conservation, community development, and state making in Zimbabwe, (Athens: Ohio Center for International 
Studies, 1998); G. Thompson, ‘“Pumpkins just got in there”: Gender and generational conflict and “improved” 
agriculture in colonial Zimbabwe,’ International Review of Social History, 55 (2010), 175-201. 
84
 D. Gilfoyle, ‘The Heartwater mystery: veterinary and popular ideas about tick-borne animal diseases at the Cape, 
c.1877 – 1910’, Kronos, 29 (2003), 139-160; D. Gilfoyle, ‘Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest 
epizootic: The Cape Colony, 1896-1898,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 29, 1 (2003); K. Brown, ‘Tropical 
medicine and animal diseases: Onderstepoort and the development of veterinary science in South Africa, 1908 to 
1950,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 31, 33 (2005); C.B. Andreas, ‘The Spread and Impact of the Lung 
sickness Epizootic of 1853-57 in the Cape Colony and the Xhosa Chiefdoms,’ South African Historical Journal, 53 
(2005), 50-72; K. Brown, ‘From Ubombo to Mkhuzi: Disease, colonial science and the control of nagana (Livestock 
trypanosomiases) in Zululand, south Africa, c.1894-1953,’ Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 
63 (2008), 285-322. 
85
 C. van Onselen, ‘Reactions to Rinderpest in Southern Africa, 1896-1897,’ Journal of African History, 13, 3, 
(1972). 
86
 P. Phoofolo, ‘Epidemics and Revolutions: The Rinderpest Epidemic in the late nineteenth century Southern 
Africa,’ Past and Present, 138 (1993). 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
20 
 
communities was increasingly forced upon Africans through veterinary interventions.
87
 
However, this thesis questions the translatability of Bundy’s model across the region since the 
enforcement of dipping (discussed in Chapter 3) among Africans in Southern Rhodesia may be 
an example of colonial intrusion that does not describe a straightforward process of colonial 
subjugation to which Africans responded simply in terms of either ‘collaboration’ or 
‘resistance’.88 
 
Cranefield’s study is a useful comparative history of the struggle against East Coast Fever in 
Rhodesia (colonial Zimbabwe) and the Transvaal. His main focus was the effort by colonial 
veterinary authorities to control the disease. He argues that the disease made relatively little 
progress among African-owned cattle compared to European cattle. The explanation given, 
especially for Southern Rhodesia (Colonial Zimbabwe), is that the remoteness of African owned 
cattle from main roads used by transport riders protected them from the new disease for a long 
time.
89
 This explanation will be challenged in Chapter 2 as it ignores evidence of African agency 
as it assumes that they were passive spectators to the devastation caused by the disease. It 
assumes that they were not using any local healing remedies and practices to heal or protect their 
cattle. Neither does it consider the possibility that colonial veterinary practices may have been 
adopted by African livestock owners. The evidence Cranefield provides is fragmentary and 
inadequate, obtained as it is from the reports of the chartered company then running the colony, 
native commissioners and cattle inspectors. The African voice is largely absent. Nevertheless, 
Cranefield’s study remains important in as far as it delineates the factors driving state veterinary 
policies in the Transvaal and Southern Rhodesia at the beginning of the twentieth century. This 
thesis addresses some of these weaknesses by taking a multidisciplinary approach to veterinary 
history. Like Cranefield, I have examined the struggle against East Coast Fever in colonial 
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Zimbabwe.
90
 Though this study attempted to fill the historiographical gap on veterinary history 
by analysing earliest forms of intercourse between veterinary medicine and tropical diseases, it 
dealt with one side of the equation which is ‘colonial science’ and European cattle breeds. It did 
not engage key issues to do with African livestock owners and their relationship with veterinary 
scientists. Thus, this thesis grapples with this lacuna in our understanding of Zimbabwe’s 
veterinary past. 
 
Whilst the rising challenges to biomedical approaches have, since the turn of the 21
st
 century, 
rekindled interest in local healing practices, this interest led as it is by sociologists, veterinary 
and animal scientists, is mainly from a development studies perspective – especially presentist 
concerns over how local healing practices can be preserved and applied. Matekaire and Bwakura, 
who examine community based solutions to farmers’ health problems in East, West and Central 
Mashonaland in post-colonial Zimbabwe, conclude that 95 per cent of their sample never availed 
themselves of the services offered by the veterinarians except for cattle dipping which was 
mandatory.
91
 Their findings are also similar to those of Gueye who has reviewed selected field 
experiences on the use of ethno-veterinary medicine in poultry husbandry systems in 
postcolonial Africa.
92
 Gueye argues that resource-poor village poultry farmers in Africa do not 
have money for or access to chemical medicines or to other cost effective control measures 
hence they rely on ancestral indigenous knowledge to control various poultry diseases. Post-
colonial Zimbabwe is among those countries said to be increasingly resorting to ethno-veterinary 
medicine. Unlike Matekaire and Bwakura, and Gueye, this thesis does not seek to reduce African 
preference of local healing practices to financial desperation but seeks to take into consideration 
other factors which shaped choice of veterinary medicine among African livestock owners. 
Furthermore, since these are all quantitative studies, this thesis draws on their approaches and 
proposes a qualitative approach that includes a strong focus on how livestock owners viewed 
their particular historical situations and experiences.  
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Presentist and forgivably ahistorical studies examine how local healing practices are faring in 
post-colonial contexts. McGaw and Eloff have collated the documented use of plants in South 
Africa for healing various ailments in domestic animals and argue that the livestock owners 
generally treat their own animals using medicinal plant knowledge that they themselves possess, 
instead of consulting traditional healers.
93
 A similar contention is offered by Davis who 
specifically dealt with the gender dimension to local healing practices, which will help sensitise 
this study to an inclusion of gender as a category of historical analysis.
94
 In her study, Davis 
contends that women continue to have a sizable role in the daily life of livestock. Some studies 
deal with efforts that have been made by nongovernmental organisations in the provision of 
veterinary services. In particular, Almond’s study on Southern Sudan describes Oxfam’s 
programme of rehabilitation among pastoralists with its emphasis on the use of locally trained 
para-vets and community participation in the management of animal health services.
95
 A study 
by Woods reveals that such an initiative was made in Zimbabwe but a historical account is still 
lacking hence little is known regarding its origin, impact and fate.
96
 Nonetheless, Woods’ 
identification of the relationships between variables affecting the demand and use of the various 
services offered by government employed veterinary livestock technicians in Zimbabwe, is an 
important foundation for this research. Unlike these studies, this thesis seeks a longer 
understanding of change over time, to contribute to filling the lacunae on the historical role and 
significance of African livestock regimes and their co-existence with western forms of medicine. 
Gaps in our understanding of Zimbabwe’s veterinary past reveal a pressing need for a more 
holistic understanding of the historical relationship between communal farmers and veterinary 
medicine. This is pertinent as such a study would provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
country’s veterinary past and, more importantly, suggest potential modes of state veterinary 
intervention in the present dispensation. It is in light of this, that this thesis seeks to contribute to 
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knowledge through an examination of the historical relationship between African cattle owners 
and the veterinary establishment in colonial Zimbabwe.  
 
Theoretical points of departure and research questions 
The literature review above reveals that a number of colonial technocratic policies which had a 
largely indirect impact on African livestock regimes have drawn significant attention from 
academics and that veterinary interactions in the reserves have hardly been subjected to historical 
analysis. However, it also confirms Carruthers’ observation that very little has been said about 
livestock regimes in Africa.
97
 Whereas colonial expansion, settler capitalist accumulation, rural 
politics have been discussed, veterinary practices have been restricted to what Tropp merely calls 
‘cameo appearances here and there.’98 Drawing on the model offered by Jeater, this thesis utilises 
the development of veterinary medicine to understand ‘what happens when humans encounter 
each other’s societies in circumstances where they each find the other’s behaviour strange and 
potentially threatening… [It] focuses on how white administrators tried to make sense of African 
societies, but it is also about how the local peoples tried to make sense of the white people’s 
interventions into their lives.’99 Indeed, among other things, this thesis is concerned with 
conflicts between colonial experts (veterinary and animal scientists) and African livestock 
owners over what type of cattle to rear, how they were to be pastured, and also how epizootics 
and enzootics could be eradicated or controlled. Thus, in approaching this topic from a veterinary 
perspective, this thesis offers a novel direction both methodologically and empirically as few, if 
any, academic studies have extensively utilised material generated by veterinarians as a lens to 
understanding the parameters of the interaction of vets and African livestock owners during the 
colonial period.  
 
Given the gaps that exist in literature, the following questions arise: What were the factors 
driving the establishment of veterinary services in Zimbabwe? What was the relationship 
between veterinary medicine and colonialism? How did colonial relations affect access to 
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veterinary services? Did the state use veterinary diseases as an excuse to justify, facilitate and 
consolidate its control over the local population as other studies have suggested in other 
contexts? How did veterinary policy relate to the science of veld management and the politics of 
African affairs? How did African livestock owners deal with new epizootics and enzootics that 
broke among their animals? What was the impact of state policies on African livestock regimes?  
 
This thesis is rooted in the field of socio-environmental history as local livestock management 
practices are located strongly in both their social and environmental context. However, since it is 
clearly about the complex interactive interdependence of people, livestock and disease – issues 
central to veterinary medicine, it does not limit itself to the trappings of a single grand theory. 
Instead, it draws upon (but does not limit itself to) ideas from political ecology, theory from the 
south, and subaltern studies coupled to a long tradition of social history to examine how those 
historically suppressed and disenfranchised from state veterinary policies reacted to or imagined 
the veterinary and environmental arguments mobilized by the state to justify segregation. These 
frameworks were pivotal in influencing the nature of questions (rather than the answers) which 
this thesis raises and seeks to address. Given Thompson’s observation that the history of the 
working class cannot be understood without also examining the history of their employers, this 
thesis disentangles state veterinary interactions with African livestock regimes through 
approaching the subject both from the bottom and from above.
100
 Subjugated knowledge – as is 
the case with African traditional livestock regimes which were (and still are) eclipsed by the 
hegemonic scientific and technocratic explanations of livestock disease control and management 
– is also better understood, as Scott argues, and approached from the bottom.101  
Both subaltern theory and ‘theory from the South’ are helpful tools of analysis for this type of 
study as they challenge one to explore the relationship between biomedicine and society, and the 
historical inadequacies of the science through the lens of those that were formerly colonized 
rather than through the lenses of their colonizers only.
102
 These epistemologies allow us to 
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explore and understand the complexity of the colonial experience through interrogating how 
Africans ‘flouted, reconstructed, repudiated and remade European life-ways,’ and also how they 
understood modernity so as to ‘fashion their own versions of it, even as they live with its 
constraints and contradictions.’103 Likewise African livestock owners interpreted veterinary 
policy in ways that differed with that of the vets. The net effect was the manufacture of a 
different modernity other than the one which was anticipated by the colonizers. This, as this 
thesis will show, resulted in a complex relationship characterised by the colonial state’s attempt 
to assert control over African livestock regimes on one hand and attempts by livestock owners to 
negotiate for space in a situation where their access to resources was constrained by the 
development of a capitalist economy, on the other hand. In this thesis, the south is understood to 
be a geographical expression. However, the crass reductionist assumption implicit in extreme 
Africanism that everything from the North is bad is to be questioned as veterinary medicine 
certainly played an important role in eradicating and controlling certain diseases. Political 
ecology recognises the complex linkages between social, political, and biophysical process at 
global, regional and local levels.
104
 This is an important framework to utilise when examining 
veterinary medicine and African livestock regimes as it affords us an opportunity to understand 
how this relationship has been shaped or reshaped by ecological and political factors. 
 
Research design and methodology 
This thesis makes use of archival material, supplemented with oral interviews where possible. It 
is informed by a secondary body of literature delineated in the literature survey above. Two 
methods and a range of historical sources were used to answer questions that have been raised. 
Owing to the paucity of historical works on the rise of veterinary medicine and livestock healing 
practices used by African livestock owners in Zimbabwe, initial focus was placed on reading and 
analysing secondary works such as books, theses, dissertations and articles in journals (scientific, 
anthropological and historical) to challenge conventional interpretations and fill gaps in 
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historiography. This was coupled to broader theoretical texts which pushed me to ask new 
questions too. Although this thesis intended to make extensive use of a variety of newspapers to 
capture the train of contemporary thought prevailing throughout the country at particular periods, 
access to these was very limited as the microfilm machine at the National Archives of Zimbabwe 
(NAZ) has not been repaired following its breakdown a few years ago. Nonetheless, a few hard 
copies were accessed at NAZ but as documentary sources, newspapers have their own biases and 
at times inaccuracies. This gap was solved through reading contemporary veterinary journals, 
legislative debates and letters sent to colonial veterinary officials about veterinary challenges and 
policy. 
 
Most of the primary material utilized in this thesis was obtained from the National Archives of 
Zimbabwe. This repository contains a great deal of  previously neglected material related to 
veterinary administration, policy, committee papers (mainly evidence to commissions of 
enquiry), memoranda, letters from the public, records of interviews with interest groups, 
clippings from newspapers and paper reports among others. Since veterinary issues were dealt 
with by several government ministries and departments, that is, the Prime Minister’s Office, 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Agriculture and Native Affairs Department, the 
researcher was aware of the importance of paying attention to more than one government 
department or ministry when searching for documentary evidence. Interdepartmental 
correspondence provided a very interesting dynamic to both state policy, and how livestock 
disease management and cattle improvement activities in the reserves were perceived by colonial 
officials. 
 
Whilst effort was made to access institutional records, such as those  belonging to the 
Commercial Farmers’ Union (CFU), no access was permitted as there was suspicion 
(understandably so given the political polarisation in Zimbabwe at the moment) that  the author 
was a government spy sent to monitor activities of the former white commercial farmers. A letter 
of introduction from Stellenbosch University increased the suspicion since the university now 
has a large number of presidential scholarship beneficiaries drawn from perceived sympathisers 
of the land reform programme. At the Zimbabwe National Traditional Healers Association of 
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Zimbabwe (ZINATHA) – the largest association representing traditional healers, herbalists and 
faith healers in Zimbabwe – there exist no database or repository of livestock diagnostic, 
prophylactic and therapeutic remedies as most traditional healers specialize on public health. 
Attempts to access personal archives belonging to influential former government officials 
particularly Dr Dexter Chavunduka (the first black veterinary surgeon in Zimbabwe), Prof 
Gordon Chavunduka (a Sociology professor and the founding president of ZINATHA) and Dr 
Stuart Hargreaves (Principal Director Livestock and Veterinary Services) were futile as these 
three officials could not speak to me as they were all unwell. Each of these three officials had a 
unique impact on livestock disease management. As head of ZINATHA, Prof Chavunduka had 
influence among traditional healers – many of whom referred to him as their ‘father’ – and for 
many years collated their therapeutic remedies. In fact, the ZINATHA archive was at his house 
due to financial constraints of running a library in Harare City Centre. As a result, this material 
remained inaccessible throughout his illness, and also after his death as officials at ZINATHA do 
not have a register of what exactly was kept at Prof Chavunduka’s house.105 Dr Chavunduka, 
being the first black veterinarian in the Zimbabwe’s veterinary services and also one time 
principal director in that department, no doubt would have provided a rich source of information 
both written and oral. Stuart, also a veterinary surgeon, who joined the Veterinary Services 
Department in 1970 and worked through the change of government from white minority rule to 
majority rule in 1980, rose through the ranks to become principal director, may also have 
provided useful data. Nonetheless, these avenues will be pursued in future studies.  
 
Although interviews with Prof Gordon Chavunduka were cancelled on account of his illness, he 
kindly referred me to a trusted official Mr George Kandiero (ZINATHA’s spokesperson) with 
whom I travelled to attend a series of meetings with traditional and faith healers in outlying 
districts. These journeys unearthed a rich seam of ethnographic material and oral history, which I 
also used together with interviews carried out with livestock owners in different parts of the 
country. I also travelled to Rusape (Manicaland Province) to attend an annual ZINATHA 
Conference addressed by a Mr Amon Ndhlovu – the Deputy President (ZINATHA).  
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Dr Chavunduka had relocated to Canada, while Dr Hargreaves was no longer coming to work 
due to illness. It was with sadness that I later learnt of the deaths of these three officials shortly 
after my return from fieldwork. Personal archives would have been important in illuminating 
individual contributions to public issues and as sources that provide important material on events 
and problems to which the person was involved as a witness.
106
 Furthermore, not all of the 
information needed could be accessed from the national archives partly due to loss of machinery 
and also due to lack of expert document retrievers. The Department of Veterinary Services 
Library in Harare proved to be a rich source of information especially veterinary and other 
technical reports. 
 
In addition, it is important to challenge the nature of the colonial archive. Important as they were 
to this thesis, they do not reflect popular thinking among Africans during the colonial period. 
Instead they reflect an ‘outsider’s’ perspective as they written by colonial officials who were 
partly blinded by prejudices against local veterinary practices, and partly by their inability to 
penetrate the local culture. Thus, in official reports and correspondence, Africans are generally 
portrayed as unintelligent, puerile and in need of guidance.
107
 Consequently, colonial records 
‘report the elaborate colonial attempt to record local space, local property and local ideas into 
imperial terms…’108 Despite this weakness, this thesis utilises the ‘reading against the grain’ 
technique (where necessary) to both retain some measure of historical objectivity and find what 
is hidden between the lines of official discourse.
109
 These archives enable one to study, for 
example, the nature of complaints lodged against local healing practices and livestock 
management practices by colonial officials, how Africans defended their veterinary practices and 
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whether there were any prosecutions. Furthermore, they are important sources of information 
especially for the pre-1930 period – for which interviews could not be done. 
 
The third source and second method were oral history sources. For a study dealing with people’s 
lived experiences, the view that, ‘human actions cannot be understood unless the meaning that 
human beings assign to them is understood’ is worth noting.110 As such, deeper perspectives into 
the thoughts, feelings, beliefs and values of African livestock owners, where possible, were 
obtained through oral history interviews.
111
 This is important given the point that ‘the words of 
the colonized simply describe their world with far greater detail and accuracy than any coloniser 
could.’112 However, where interviews were carried out with veterinary officials, traditional 
chiefs, district administrators, politicians and veterinary technical officials, they provided a good 
yield of data. When carrying out interviews, the researcher utilized the convenience sampling 
technique to get important connections and insights. After this initial stage, the snowball 
sampling technique was used. In areas, where it was not possible to personally hold interviews, 
research assistants native to those areas were utilised.  
 
More specifically, two types of oral history interviews were used: in-depth and focus group 
interviews. In-depth interviews are particularly useful when assessing subjugated knowledge, 
that is, they give access to peoples’ ideas, thoughts and memories in their own world.113 Focus 
group interviews are crucial given that they yield data more quickly as they give a group 
dynamic which is an important source of data that cannot be found in in-depth interviews.
114
 
Homogenous focus groups consisting of livestock owners and or people who have knowledge of 
livestock diseases, policy and or remedies were also utilised extensively since they give an 
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opportunity for a deeper understanding about a given issue.
115
 Focus group interviews produce ‘a 
happening’ that cannot be reproduced in any other group because participants ‘are not merely 
responding to questions posed by the researcher but are also responding to each other.’116 
Informants were asked to describe state veterinary practices, ethno-veterinary remedies, their 
conceptualization of both practices, the indigenous attitudes to animals and understanding of 
animal diseases. However, since interviewees may ‘lie a bit, cheat a bit,’117 their statements were 
examined for consistency through drawing information from as many different sources as 
possible, and reading against the grain of the archive.  
 
All interviews with black livestock owners were conducted in vernacular languages. However, 
these could not be carried in all provinces due to logistical, linguistic and security concerns as no 
funding for fieldwork was obtained. An opportunity to travel with two teams, led by Mr Choga 
(National Field Superintendent of the Department of Veterinary Department (Field services)), 
during their annual field inspections first to Mashonaland Province in March 2012 and then to 
Manicaland province in May 2012 enabled me to meet with livestock owners at their local dip 
tanks. Because it was important to understand how local veterinary knowledge was passed down 
from generation to generation, I had several interviews with different age-groups ranging from 
seven to ninety seven years old. These interviews unearthed a very rich body of indigenous 
healing remedies and livestock management practices. Most of the livestock owners interviewed 
during these field visits revealed that they have a large body of knowledge inherited from 
parents, relatives, neighbours and friends. However, because all the interviewees were born after 
the imposition of certain mandatory veterinary regulations, they had difficulties in recollecting 
how their ancestors initially reacted to veterinary medicine when it was first introduced. While 
most believed that European occupation resulted in the increase of disease outbreaks, they also 
thought that resistance to veterinary medicine and technocratic intervention was partly because 
of ignorance. Nonetheless, older informants usually capped their recollections of the colonial 
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veterinary policies with the poignant understatement ‘zvakange zvakaoma panguva iyoyo’ (life 
was difficult during that time).  
 
That there were few female informants at dip tanks where interviews took place is explained by 
the fact that herding livestock is culturally a male duty and thus more men take livestock to the 
dip tank. At times, I felt that informants were not willing to share some information they 
possessed. Furthermore, oral interviews sometimes did not yield data as some informants were 
either averse to being put on record or thought that I was a state veterinary official whose duty 
was to ‘sniff out’ violators of veterinary programmes. That they harboured such suspicions was 
not surprising – as this thesis reveals – as there has been an enduring legacy in both colonial and 
post-colonial contexts of state pressure into accepting policies whose motives locals neither 
understand nor who appeared to benefit from their effects. Some were clearly in a hurry to go 
back to their homesteads as soon as their cattle dipped, and thus did not have time to finish the 
interviews. Interviews carried out with informants in the comfort of their homes tended to 
produce much data as informants were more relaxed. Generally, there were uniformities in oral 
histories collected in different regions – something which gave me confidence that interviewees 
were not distorting or exaggerating their experiences – and it was also corroborated in official 
reports which sometimes had to be read against the grain. 
 
Although close to 100 interviews were carried out in different parts of the country, only a 
fraction has been utilised in this thesis. This was because most of the accounts were of recent 
experiences to be of value for this thesis (but will be useful in postdoctoral research) while some 
were biased towards public health. A case in point is that of the data collected on the side-lines 
of a conference organized by ZINATHA where over 100 traditional and faith healers attended. 
Most practitioners did not know much about livestock disease management practices but because 
they thought I could serve as a marketing tool for their services some made outrageous claims to 
possessing veterinary knowledge. Notable examples, are that of Obert Nkomo, a traditional 
healer from Rusape and also an ex-combatant, whose only evidence to possessing such 
knowledge was the fact that he survived the liberation war while Muneri Nehaka from Wedza 
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claimed to have lived with mermaid ‘under’ water in a pool for fifteen years and thus could treat 
any disease both animal and human alike.
118
 
Structure and layout  
The thesis is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter introduces the thesis, reviews the 
literature and discusses the theoretical as well as the methodological approaches employed. 
Chapter 2 discusses how the interaction with Europeans just before and after colonisation 
brought a variety of diseases which were unknown to Africans. It examines the 1861 contagious 
bovine pleuropneumonia (Lung Sickness) outbreak, Rinderpest Epidemic (1896-1898), and the 
1902 East Coast Fever outbreak. It argues that African livestock regimes were unable to deal 
with these epizootics, thus Africans largely linked them to colonisation and the expansion of 
capitalist production. It also contends that the distribution of veterinary facilities was highly 
racialised as there was no corresponding tendency by the administration to provide Africans with 
veterinary services in the reserves. It demonstrates that, regardless of their ingenuity in the face 
of adversity, there was an inadequacy and, in some cases, an absence of a wide pool of 
indigenous knowledge for some of the diseases because they simply never existed before. 
 
Whereas Chapter 2 discussed initial veterinary experiences in the territory, and the different 
bodies of veterinary knowledge, Chapter 3 explores the role played by East Coast Fever in the 
introduction of dipping tanks in the colony. While acknowledging that there was therapeutic 
pluralism, this chapter particularly concentrates on the processes, reactions, and results of 
dipping. It argues that though dip tanks were introduced as a tick control measure, in African 
reserves it was also a social control tool. Furthermore, it argues that dipping was also an integral 
part of the growth of the capitalist economy offering an opportunity for herds across the country 
to be enumerated for taxation purposes. Their distribution across the country offers a revealing 
portrait of the social relations in the territory. This chapter draws on but challenges Colin 
Bundy’s argument that  from the late 19th Century and the early years of the 20th Century 
developments in Eastern Griqualand, a similar colonial context to that in Southern Rhodesia, 
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were closely shaped by the disease environment, and that change in rural communities was 
increasingly forced upon Africans through veterinary interventions.  
 
Chapter 4 shifts the focus from therapeutic and prophylactic measures discussed in chapters 2 
and 3 to reproductive issues. It focuses the lens on how Africans grappled with livestock 
breeding issues in a changing economic and socio-political environment characterised by the 
imposition of a hegemonic veterinary regime. Contrary to general literature which suggests that 
livestock ‘improvement’ policies began in the 1930s, this chapter argues that attempts to reshape 
the African ideas of what good cattle entailed and African livestock management began much 
earlier than is generally assumed. Furthermore, it demonstrates that settler attempts at ‘taming’ 
the local environment through the introduction of better breeds were accompanied by virulent 
disease outbreaks, and that efforts to control these through either breeding or development of an 
inoculant made very slow progress. Thus, it discusses quarter evil and contagious abortion, and 
the role of state animal scientists in influencing opinion and creating conditions under which 
scientific livestock management could be imposed in both African and European areas. 
 
Chapter 5 examines, firstly, conservation policies and the various ways through which veterinary 
challenges and measures intersected with ‘betterment’ efforts, and, secondly, how these 
attempted to reshape African ideas on livestock improvement. It also explores African reaction to 
this intrusion. It contends that centralisation policies were at variance with the state’s own 
veterinary policies, and that the state’s failure in dealing with this contradiction added to 
increased soil degradation in the reserves. Using Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) control 
measures as a case study, it reveals that the concentration method intrinsic to efforts to eradicate 
FMD contributed to environmental degradation. It argues that myriad state-led intrusive 
measures had a significant impact on the African rural landscape in general and livestock 
management practices in particular such that by 1951, the livestock regime in the reserves had 
changed significantly. 
Chapter 6 discusses the changing nature of state veterinary and livestock policy from the passage 
of the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951) to independence from white minority rule in 1980. It 
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argues that by the 1950s, state intervention in the reserves had incubated rural political 
consciousness which began to adopt an increasingly nationalistic tone. It focuses on  the ways 
through which rural nationalism manifested itself as an ideology actively opposed to veterinary 
measures, and how avenues opened up for rural Africans to resuscitate, among other things, 
debates on veterinary issues. Furthermore, it examines how, faced with the prospect of being 
replaced by a certain version of African vernacular veterinary system, the state veterinary 
bureaucracy sought to assert its control over the rural populace.  
Chapter 7 wraps this thesis and suggests that by understanding its veterinary past, Zimbabwe can 
deal with some of the veterinary challenges it is currently facing. It argues that studies 
exclusively dedicated to colonial veterinary legislation may unearth useful information on how 
they (veterinary legislation) came into being and also how they compared with other regional 
contexts. Furthermore, it explores the need for further research both on the role played by 
women in African traditional livestock regimes, and how these women were affected by the 
veterinary policy pursued by both the colonial and post-colonial state. 
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Chapter Two  
‘Flying against the wind’: Local livestock healing practices 
and the emergence of a colonial order (c.1890-1902) 
 
In 1927, Eric Nobbs, the Director of Agriculture in Southern Rhodesia, observed that: 
The Mashona possess an intimate knowledge of the medicinal virtues of herbs, 
root and bark, and use these for their cattle. Generally speaking, these drugs are 
similar in action to corresponding materials known to us, and in use are in more 
convenient form whether it be as purgatives, laxatives, diuretics, emollients, as 
stringers and so on.
119
 
 
This statement offers rare evidence of official acknowledgement of the existence and even 
efficacy of local healing practices in Southern Rhodesia. Ironically, this statement was made by 
an official who, eleven years earlier, had declared that agricultural development in the territory 
was to be based strictly on his version of ‘Western scientific methods.’120 Indeed, Nobbs had, 
since 1908, presided over a system that resisted the residual use of vernacular healing 
practices.
121
 His startling admission notwithstanding, the history of veterinary services in the 
colony was largely characterised by attempts to exclude local therapeutic methods and ideas 
about disease. In exploring the development of veterinary services, this chapter will show that 
while there was shared (albeit limited) animal healing practices between European and Africans 
prior to 1902, veterinary services were founded in a highly racialised context.
122
 It will contend 
that livestock disease management also provided an opportunity for social control and 
‘performing’ the alleged superiority of the settler society. Moreover, as this chapter will 
demonstrate veterinary services were considered by Southern Rhodesian settlers as a barometer 
                                                 
119
 E. A. Nobbs, ‘The native cattle of Southern Rhodesia,’ South African Journal of Science, XXIV (1927), 337. See 
M.K.K. Mutowo, ‘Animal diseases and human populations in colonial Zimbabwe: the rinderpest epidemic 1896-
1898,’  Zambezia, 28, 1 (2001), 1-22. 
120
 National Archives of Zimbabwe (hereafter NAZ) G1/1/1 Nobbs, ‘Memorandum on the organisation of the 
Department of Agriculture and the Veterinary Department,’ 23/09/1916. 
121
 L.H. Gann, A history of Southern Rhodesia: Early days to 1934, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1965), 167. 
122
 D. Gilfoyle, ‘The heartwater mystery: veterinary and popular ideas about tick-borne animal diseases at the 
Cape, c. 1877 – 1910,’ Kronos, 29 (2003), 139. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
36 
 
for measuring the successes of colonial rule, since conquering livestock disease was integral in 
taming the local landscape.
123
  
Ethno-veterinary practices prior to colonisation 
Since this thesis analyses colonial interactions of African livestock regimes and veterinary 
medicine, this section offers an overview of pre-colonial animal husbandry and ethno-veterinary 
practices to challenge the historical stereotype that local healing practices in Africa consisted of 
magic, witchcraft, sorcery, and spirit possession, set against a background of throbbing drums. It 
utilises Edward Green’s ‘indigenous contagion theory’ to demonstrate that ethno-veterinary ideas 
were not entirely supernatural in character but involved a set of concepts which were not 
dissimilar from biomedicine.
124
 Green posits that African healing practices comprised of at least 
three interrelated types of etiological belief: ‘naturalistic contagion’ or what has been called folk 
germ theory; ‘mystical contagion’ more often called pollution; and environmental dangers.125 
This categorisation is important, as will be shown in this chapter, in as far as it demonstrates the 
diversity of ideas and practices existing in Africa on the eve of colonisation.  
 
It is important to understand that African livestock regimes were neither static nor generalised 
geographically. They, like the diseases themselves, mutated periodically, among other things, as 
a result of new disease outbreaks and, after colonisation, due to contact with biomedical 
approaches to disease eradication. Nineteenth century Southern Africa was characterised by huge 
population movements mainly as a result of the Mfecane. Two groups of people, the Ndebele 
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and Shangaan, fleeing Shaka, settled in the 
area of Southern Rhodesia, and another, the 
Ngoni, passed through the region.
 126
 Their 
movements are shown in the Fig 2.1.
127
  
No doubt these population movements 
increased interaction with European 
explorers and missionaries from the 1850s, 
coupled to outbreaks of new livestock 
diseases such as Lung Sickness among 
Ndebele cattle in 1861. This arguably 
resulted in the cross-pollination of ideas 
which helped to reshape African livestock 
regimes. Although the Nguni migrations, as 
shown elsewhere in this section, facilitated 
the dissemination of certain Zulu 
environmental control methods against 
Trypanosomiasis to Southern Rhodesia, in 
the absence of reliable data, the extent to 
which all mentioned factors influenced the development of therapeutic remedies during this time 
remains subject to debate.
128
 Nevertheless, it is clear that pre-colonial ethnic groups (Shona, 
Ndebele, Shangaan / Hlengwe, Kalanga and Tonga) possessed a variety of domestic animals 
including indigenous fowl, pigs, dogs, goats, sheep and cattle for which they had developed 
therapeutic remedies.
129
 Oral traditions suggest that these animal species were well adapted to 
the local environment, with disease outbreaks being infrequent. Interviews carried out by native 
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commissioners with African elders and herbalists, between 1919 and 1923, revealed that 
epizootics became frequent only after colonisation.
130
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Even though cattle will be at the centre of this discussion, given their relative importance in the 
everyday lives of the local people, ethno-veterinary ideas under discussion also apply to all types 
of livestock. Cattle were particularly important for their social, economic and religious uses 
which included their role as a store of wealth, their use in lobola (bride-wealth) transactions, 
ploughing and transport, and as suppliers of milk and manure. Regardless of these 
commonalities, there were clear differences in the types of cattle possessed by the major ethnic 
groups (the Shona and the Ndebele). A self-consciously scientific study by Nobbs offers an 
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important source of contemporary information on cattle held by the Shona and Ndebele at the 
time of colonisation.
131
 The hardy Mashona type (also known among the Ndebele as 
Amanjanja/Njanja) was predominant in Mashonaland areas (Melsetter, Chipinga, Chimanimani, 
Umtali, Inyanga, Mrewa, Makoni, Darwin, Mazoe, Lomagundi, Goromonzi, Marandellas, 
Charter, Chilimanzi, Selukwe), Gwanda and parts of Insiza (see Fig 2.2
132
 above).
133
 In 
Matabeleland, the Matabele type, probably the result of a rigorous process of selection through 
raiding, predominated. This ‘breed’ was mostly of a mixed type merging blood traits from the 
Zansi cattle brought from the south, when Mzilikazi fled from Zululand, the Amabula (Boer) 
cattle which were Devon-Afrikander crosses (captured on the northward journey), the Kavuvu 
cattle captured from Mashukulumbu people across the Zambesi, and Amabowe (Mangwato) 
cattle captured during raids on the Ngwato.
134
 Nobbs contended that these animals suffered far 
less than imported breeds from Redwater and Gall sickness, and epizootics lost their virulence 
sooner.
135
 Counter-intuitively, they also appeared to acquire immunity to introduced diseases 
more rapidly than introduced breeds.
136
 
 
To avoid the reductionist trap of the extreme Africanist argument which blames everything on 
the colonisation process, it is important to acknowledge that the occurrence of disease among 
even these well adapted animals was experienced by livestock owners long before the 1890s. 
Indeed, one of the earliest written accounts pointing to the existence of the Cattle 
Trypanosomiasis in the area appears in a 1569 Portuguese account of life in the Mutapa 
Empire.
137
 In fact, familiarity with diseases as well as the availability of a large body of ideas on 
how a number of livestock diseases could be treated, suggests the local environment was in no 
way disease free. Ethnographic research carried out by Dexter Chavunduka (1934-2012), 
Southern Rhodesia’s first black veterinary surgeon and botanist, revealed that at the time of 
colonisation in 1890, local people had already developed remedies and practised home-grown 
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environmental control measures with the twin objectives of improving animal health and 
productivity.
138
 Through lived experience and observation over a long period of time, the locals 
became acquainted with the veterinary diseases prevalent in their areas and herbal remedies to 
them.
139
 Traditional healing remedies (mishonga yechivanhu) were either prepared from a whole 
plant or from parts of the plant such as roots, bulb, bark, leaves or the fruit.
140
 The reproductive 
potential of their herds was improved through the use of certain herbs which were believed to 
convert the sex of the unborn foetus from male to female. Milk production was increased by 
drenching milking cows with an extract from the Vlei lily (crinum macowanii) whose roots were 
pounded and the juice smeared on the cows’ teats.141 The Aloe plant (aloe barbadensis) was, and 
in some places continues to be, used as preventive medicine for New Castle disease in chickens. 
Among the Manyika, the mumwahuku plant’s leaves (cassia didymobotrya) were pounded and 
mixed with water to prevent chickens from being affected by chitosi (Coccidiosis).
142
 Africans 
may not have had the same scientific explanations as to how these remedies purged diseases but 
scientific analysis has demonstrated that some of these were of pharmacological value. For 
instance, Clausena anisata (muvengahonye) leaves which were and are still used to expel 
maggots from wounds contains high percentage (1, 2% - 1, 7%) of volatile oils which make them 
an effective remedy.
143
  
 
However, the major flaw, indeed methodological naivety, in Chavunduka’s work is that of 
generalising African therapeutic knowledge across the territory. Understandably, as a scientist 
his major motive was to develop a catalogue of medicinal plants used by Africans and subject 
these to scientific analysis. Environmental and ecological differences in African areas and the 
way these affected African livestock regimes were, therefore, outside his scope. Despite the 
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overwhelming similarities in therapeutic methods, it would be a miscarriage of historical justice 
to suggest that ideas about veterinary diseases were homogenous – that a set ‘body of thinking’ 
existed. A series of interviews carried out by native commissioners with African elders between 
1919 and 1921 dispelled Chavunduka’s teleological imposition of uniformity.  
 
Contagious abortion in cattle and screw worm are intriguing examples that demonstrate both 
differences and similarities in livestock therapeutic practices in the pre-colonial period. Most of 
the replies from elders all over the country suggested that the disease never occurred in severe 
epidemic form before occupation, and that it occurred when there were droughts or prolonged 
dry spell. However, in some areas where it was prevalent, Africans did not have any effective 
remedy. For instance, pre-colonial livestock owners in what is now Plumtree (see Fig 2.2) knew 
this disease but did not look upon it as serious enough to demand a remedy.
144
 The Native 
Commissioner for Inyati reported: ‘I have carefully questioned Chief Sikokobo, who, before the 
occupation, had charge of all Lobengula’s cattle in this district. He states that only a few cases of 
abortion were known, and that these generally occurred when the cattle were low in condition. 
Losses from this cause were so few that the matter never called for any attention.’145 Contrary to 
these examples of pre-colonial experiences in the south-western areas, the disease appears to 
have been serious in the east where it occurred frequently. The NC Inyanga reported: 
I am informed by older natives that contagious abortion in cattle frequently 
occurred among the cattle before the Rinderpest. It seems to have disappeared 
about the time of the occupation by the BSA Company… No herd appeared to be 
immune from it. It occurred all over this district. Sometimes it was very severe 
and large numbers of abortions occurred. In these days there are several native 
doctors who claimed to have remedies for this disease.
146
  
 
The Victoria, Shamva and Mtoko districts seem not to have known the disease except as abortion 
which occurred occasionally in healthy herds due to accidents or other non-contagious causes.
147
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There were local variations to the treatment of Screwworm (Cochliomyia hominivorax). While 
the disease occurred frequently in Fort Rixon with salt being the only remedy used,
148
 in Umtali 
it came at intervals of some years usually after or during wet seasons. The Shona in Umtali 
considered knifing to be the only way of removing the maggots.
149
 In Umzingwane
150
, 
Nyamandlovu
151
, and Charter
152
, Africans used the crushed leaves of the Acacia macrothyrsa 
plant (mhlahlampethu [Ndebele]/ Muwengahonye [Manyika]/mutandahonye/muvhunambezo 
[Zezuru/Karanga]) which on being applied to the wound either caused the maggots to come to 
the surface or killed them. It was also effectively used as a preventative measure against flies 
settling on a wound and laying their eggs. This remedy continued to be used in colonial times 
and, in some instances, attracted interest from colonial administrators. Certainly, Nobbs was not 
the only white administrator who developed a keen interest in African therapeutics. In 1919, for 
example, the NC Charter was so positive about the efficacy of Muwengahonye that he wrote, ‘I 
have seen this remedy used and can verify as to its efficacy in cleaning a wound. The shrub 
grows near here and I could send some leaves should they be required.’153  
 
Furthermore, despite acknowledging the extent and efficacy of local veterinary knowledge in the 
nineteenth century, Chavunduka’s work does not provide particular instances in which 
environmental control practices were utilised to curtail outbreaks of certain epizootics. 
Entomological work by James Ford partly solves this problem. Unlike Chavunduka’s synchronic 
‘timeless’ perspective, Ford provides an in-depth understanding of ethno-veterinary control 
practices of vector-borne diseases by demonstrating how pre-colonial people inhabiting the 
tsetse-fly belt in the south-eastern areas controlled Cattle Trypanosomiasis.
154
 The Shangaan 
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(Gaza-Nguni / Shangani / Changana / Hlengwe) led by Soshangane, a fugitive running away 
from Tshaka, first settled in the south-east in the 1830s, and returned later for an extended 
occupation from 1862 to 1889 during which time they demonstrated environmental ingenuity by 
avoiding certain environments.
155
 Areas with butterfly trees (Colophospermum mopane) were 
avoided because they were considered harbingers of sleeping sickness.
156
 From the 1860s, the 
Shangaan developed methods of tsetse control that did not involve wholesale slaughter of wild 
game – a policy taken by the settlers during the colonial era.157 One notable example was the 
settling by Mzila and his Shangaan subjects in the tsetse prone Msilizwe Valley. Through his 
sondela enkosini ‘draw nigh to the king’ decree, Mzila created cattle concentration areas away 
from the bushes while deliberately leaving other portions unsettled to act as ‘game reserves’ 
especially the area between the Sitatonga Hills and the Buzi River.
158
 What is interesting about 
this decree is that it exposes the fact that the locals were already aware that certain epizootics 
spread from wild to domestic animals. For this reason, the Shangaan kept a standing army whose 
sole purpose was to slaughter any game, buffaloes, baboons, and pigs, which trespassed into 
areas inhabited by livestock.
159
 Evidence that these practices were useful is not hard to find. By 
the late 1880s when Gungunyana, Mzila’s successor, was under colonial pressure from the 
Portuguese in the east and the British from the south, and could no longer maintain the 
ecological balance in the region, there was the resurgence of Cattle Trypanosomiasis.
160
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At the time Mzila was controlling Trypanosomiasis
161
 with success in the south-eastern region, 
other Zulu fugitives, Mzilikazi and his Ndebele subjects were fighting Lung Sickness 
(contagious bovine pleuropneumonia) in the south-west. Lungsickness, a contagious cattle 
disease which was accidentally imported with infected animals from its enzootic hotbed in 
Europe into the Cape Colony in mid-1853
162
, was brought by Christian missionaries led by 
Robert Moffat into the Ndebele state. This outbreak, which occurred in 1861, is important for 
two reasons. Firstly, it was possibly the first highly contagious disease of European origin to 
occur among local livestock in pre-colonial times. Secondly, it occurred in a highly polarised 
political environment. As has been shown by Gatsheni-Ndlovu, the late 1850s were characterised 
by cut-throat competition for adherents and converts between traditional healers and missionaries 
respectively.
163
 Realising that missionaries sought to change the traditional way of life, Ndebele 
traditional religious practitioners blamed them for ‘upsetting’ the ancestors hence outbreaks of 
epizootics.  
 
Shortly after their arrival in the Ndebele state, the missionaries observed signs and symptoms of 
Lungsickness among their draught oxen and immediately reported these to Mzilikazi. Mzilikazi’s 
response was not only to quarantine the diseased animals, but he also arranged for his traditional 
religious practitioners to administer medical treatment to the missionaries themselves.
164
 A 
number of questions arise from the scanty details that are available. In the first instance, was the 
idea to quarantine locally inspired or it was suggested by the missionaries? While McCorkle and 
Mathias-Mundy
165
 have argued that there was a general policy among pre-colonial people of 
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separating sick from healthy animals, it is not clear whether ideas informing the control of 1861 
outbreak were entirely local given that Mzilikazi had been in close contact with Robert Moffat. 
Moffat was a European missionary who was presumably aware of the 1853-7 outbreak in the 
Cape, and the measures taken to combat it.
166
 The possibility of this cannot be dismissed because 
when the disease broke out in parts of what later became South West Africa in 1859; 
missionaries played a pivotal role in its containment by adopting quarantine measures.
167
 
However, contemporary accounts suggest that Mzilikazi initiated this.  
 
Secondly, how effective were these methods? While one may celebrate the attempt to separate 
infected from disease free animals, circumstantial evidence suggests that the Ndebele 
nevertheless lost a significant number of cattle to this disease.
168
 Therefore, these losses 
demonstrate two major weaknesses of African livestock regimes, that is, their inadequacy in 
dealing with highly infectious diseases, and that while cattle management measures such as 
avoidance, quarantine, and herd dispersion were helpful when the disease was intermittent or 
localised, they could not halt epidemics.
169
 One can assume that since Lung Sickness is not 
mentioned in missionary accounts after the 1861 outbreak or in colonial records until 1895, the 
disease’s further spread must have been halted by the dying of infected herds.170  
 
Mzilikazi allegedly sprinkled traditional medicine on the missionaries soon after this outbreak. 
This raises another question: Does the administration of medicine on the missionaries suggest 
that they were suspected to have carried the disease into the area, and, therefore, needed to be 
disinfected? Ndlovu-Gatsheni has argued that the ritual was an important process meant to chase 
away ‘bad spirits’ coming with these white people and causing diseases and other misfortunes.171 
More importantly, these actions demonstrate yet another facet of ethno-veterinary medicines, 
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that is, supernatural practices often accompanied natural ones.
172
 It is, therefore, safe to argue 
that by 1890, the fundamental principles surrounding the treatment of diseases among Africans 
hinged on environmental factors, natural infection as well as supernatural explanations. African 
livestock regimes were suited to both the livestock they possessed and environments in which 
they lived.  
The making of a colonial order in the 1890s 
If, as shown in the previous section, Africans thought that certain diseases were contagious and 
that certain environments were undesirable for livestock, why then did these ideas became 
controversial especially when they seemingly appear to resonate with germ theories of the late 
nineteenth century? It is in the political development that one can find the process through which 
local modes of thinking were supplanted. A number of studies have been produced in an attempt 
to account for colonialism and imperialism, with a gamut ranging from strategic, economic, 
political and psycho-social reasons being advanced.
173
 Although historians have convincingly 
demonstrated how these factors motivated colonialists and influenced the way colonies were 
administered, Daniel Headrick is among the few to argue compellingly about a technological 
dimension to imperialism and colonialism. Veterinary medicine, as this chapter will show, fits 
into Headrick’s argument that imperialism was a direct result of technological changes which in 
turn determined the economic relations of colonialism.
174
 As a ‘tool of empire,’ veterinary 
medicine made it possible for colonial farmers to overcome constraints on livestock production 
as well as to hold competition from African producers at bay. In the sub-regional context, Ian 
Scoones, William Wolmer and Jane Carruthers have strongly argued that the development of 
veterinary medicine in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was linked to the protection of the 
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settler beef industries.
175
 Indeed, the Southern Rhodesian Veterinary Services Department grew 
as an attempt to deal with recurrent disease that hampered the growth of a beef industry but this 
process occurred, sometimes deliberately, and sometimes inadvertently, at the expense of 
African livestock owners.
176
 White farmers benefitted from racial laws such as the Land 
Apportionment Act which enabled the white landowners to segregate their pedigree beasts from 
communal herds, which they regarded as reservoirs of disease, and also prevented competition 
from African farmers.
177
  
 
While it is possible that in the introduction of veterinary medicine the original idea of benefitting 
the settlers mutated, it is difficult to allow complete autonomy to the ‘Beinart-Brown-Gilfoyle’ 
thesis which states, rather unconvincingly, that tropical veterinary medicine was an independent 
subject borne out of a genuine need to eradicate livestock diseases.
178
 This contention, as this 
section will show, not only ignores the fact that a fundamental choice was made at the very 
beginning that the colony’s development to be made on the basis of western scientific 
approaches
179
 but also neglects that during colonialism, ‘external imperial control… was still 
often autocratic, coercive and bound to an ideology of European superiority.’180 State efforts in 
agriculture and veterinary research were directed to the benefit of the settlers at a time when 
there existed little, if any, development policy for Africans.
181
 Having extremely limited political 
power, Africans, as will be shown, could not countervail these developments.  
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The British South Africa Company (BSAC), a private company owned by British capitalist Cecil 
John Rhodes, occupied Southern Rhodesia in 1890 in the belief that there was abundant gold (a 
Second Rand).
182
 By 1893, it was clear that such gold was not in Mashonaland hence a process 
which led to the occupation Matabeleland in 1894 was begun. Hope that gold could only be 
found in Lobengula’s capital at Bulawayo was ubiquitous but this also turned out to be a 
chimera. Despite these frustrations, the BSAC went on to set up an administrative system based 
on Victorian industrial principles and Christian values which reflected the power and interests of 
the settler community.
183
 The government was organised around particular economic sectors and 
general services like health and education, but African affairs were a separate part of the 
governmental system. To placate the British government which feared that African interests may 
not be upheld if left entirely in the hands of the BSAC, two institutions were put in place to 
represent what were regarded as the true interests of the Africans.  
 
Besides having administrative and judicial roles, the Native Affairs Department (NAD) was 
given the duty of safeguarding the perceived interests of Africans and making known their 
wishes and needs. Safeguarding African interests, as Murray correctly argues, involved 
maintaining the framework of ‘traditional life’ or rather maintaining such features of it as were 
permissible given the context of a settled colony.’184 During this time, Africans did not consider 
the NAD to be the protector of their interests. Although without official mandate, missionaries 
were given an important role in decision making because of their relatively intimate knowledge 
of the Africans. However, the latter had their own interests of changing rather than preserving 
the established way of life of what they regarded as the ‘heathen’ masses.185 Diana Jeater has 
argued persuasively that Southern Rhodesian ‘native policy’ was the product of arguments, 
debates, and profoundly conflicting interests among the whites − administrators, missionaries, 
and settlers − who interacted with Africans on a daily basis.186 
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Pervasive populist social Darwinism buttressed the belief that the African was a lesser being, and 
therefore, not expected to be treated at the same level as settlers were mobilised to explain and 
justify inequalities. Mobilising the notion that societies evolve at their own pace, settlers argued 
that whites were at the pinnacle of the human racial hierarchy in terms of mental, physical, 
cultural, and political attributes.
187
 As Sauer noted, ‘neither in mental capacity nor in physical 
fitness could the aborigine ever become the equal of the European….The average brain weight of 
the native is three ounces less than that of the European.’188 Sauer contended, ‘Africans were 
only at the best of times children, and they must be dealt with as children.’189 Indeed, as Jeater 
has convincingly shown, this was a useful metaphor which allowed for the possibility of 
Africans ‘catching up’ with the demands of an industrial society, but insisted that whites remain 
paternalistically responsible for African welfare.
190
 These alleged deficiencies, it was argued, 
could be ameliorated through conversion to Christianity and also adoption of western modes of 
thinking.   
 
Missionaries were particularly intolerant of local medico-religious ideas. Father A. Burbridge, a 
Catholic priest based at Chishawasha Mission, voiced a general view among missionaries when 
he said, ‘the witchdoctor is an unwholesome charlatan, and from the crown of his head to the 
sole of his foot there is no soundness in him….[It] is necessary that the whole spirit system of 
medicine be thrown off doors.’191 These attitudes explain why in the 1890s, traditional healers 
and herbalists such as Mnyenyezi of Matabeleland, ‘who knew  all the grasses by name and the 
trees which cattle browsed on in times of drought and likewise many native cures for stock 
diseases’192 were not permitted to contribute their knowledge to public health and veterinary 
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policy even in a limited way. However, throughout the 1890s local Africans resisted the 
encroachment of western values and norms by remaining mainly indifferent to Christianity and 
other symbols of western values.
193
 Behind their public display of conformity lay an African 
whose beliefs remained largely rooted on local modes of thinking, which simultaneously 
frustrated the objective of transforming Africans into colonial subjects. One of the first Native 
Commissioners wrote of this passive resistance, ‘the native in his own home, in his own 
surroundings, is a totally different person to him we meet in the office.’194 This exposes the 
inability of the native commissioners to penetrate into the lives of the people they were supposed 
to represent.
195
 
 
Besides these socio-religious considerations, economic factors played an important role in 
colonial policy formulation. Regardless of their purported racial superiority, settlers often 
contradicted themselves as they sometimes unwittingly acknowledged that the African was 
indeed a rational being capable of making rational decisions and could, in a just society, out-
compete the European. For this reason, they occasionally demanded that mechanisms be 
established to make sure that the African remained:  
A hewer of wood, and drawer of water for his master. If we educate him to 
plough, sow and reap in the white man’s way, we will very soon make him quite 
independent of the incentive to work…our country will become a second India 
where there is no room for the white farmer or white man except as a civil 
servant… with his simple mode of life and his easily satisfied wants the 
agriculturally educated native will be able easily to undersell the white 
farmer…196 
 
 It was upon these racial and economic considerations that the government made a fundamental 
choice that the settlers, and not the Africans, were to be the agents of agrarian and pastoral 
development. Concomitantly, veterinary facilities were distributed along racial lines. The fear of 
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competition from blacks among the settlers was not peculiar to Southern Rhodesia as it also 
existed in other settler colonies.
197
 
 
The segregationist land policy pursued by the administration came to determine access to 
veterinary resources. African settlements were predominantly in the periphery – far away from 
areas where the biomedical facilities were established. The local environment was imagined by 
colonial adventurers as ‘a landscape of adventure, mystique and danger… disease ridden, 
drought ravaged, barren and fearful landscape to be battled and tamed,’ and these imaginations 
influenced veterinary policy as African-owned livestock were generally considered diseased, 
and, therefore, to be kept separate from pedigree breeds owned by white farmers.
198
 Nonetheless, 
it is important to underscore the fact that veterinary reasons were simply one among many 
reasons for segregation.  
 
The idea of setting aside separate land for Africans was first enforced by the 1902 Native 
Reserve Act which designated 25.5 million acres for African reserves.
199
 Land division by 
legislation was further supported by ancillary regulations such as the Private Location Ordinance 
(1908), which aimed to regulate Africans who resided on farms owned by absentee white 
landlords, and the Native Urban Location Ordinance (1906) which provided for land designated 
for Europeans to be used to accommodate Africans working in the industrial commercial 
sector.
200
 Out of these considerations arose a system of land ownership and resource distribution 
favourable to the settlers. These considerations crystallized and were later to be delineated in the 
report of the 1925 Morris Carter Commission, which was the pre-cursor to the Land 
Apportionment Act (1930).The Morris Carter Commission reported in favour of a policy of 
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separate land purchase areas for Africans and Europeans arguing, among other reasons, that if 
Africans were interspersed with Europeans on farms the value of land would depreciate and, 
more importantly, that stock thefts would increase while African livestock would spread disease 
to European stock.
201
 As such, constructions of nature were political as the shift of blame for 
veterinary disease transmission to African livestock ‘vectors’ enabled the depopulation of certain 
areas and the expansion of commercial ranches.
202
 The new areas to which African livestock 
were driven were environmentally unfriendly as they were prone to diseases.  
 
After their lands were confiscated in the 1890s, Africans had three options: to become rent 
paying tenants without legal leases on land taken over by white farmers; secondly, to reside on 
land alienated by the government and pay hut tax or, thirdly, to move to the uninviting new 
reserves.
203
 The creation of reserves in tsetse fly infested areas (Gwaai and Shangani) in 1895 is 
a telling example of how Africans were removed from environments where disease outbreaks 
were manageable as they usually occurred in a mild form. Hughes, who discusses a related 
matter but with specific reference to Maasai experiences in colonial Kenya, has persuasively 
argued that the Maasai were aware of the environmental dangers lurking in the areas they were 
forced to settle, hence the thinking that they were deliberately sent into these areas so that they 
would lose their livestock to diseases.
204
 In Southern Rhodesia, Africans often drew comparisons 
between reserves and their ancestral lands with the latter being considered habitable and disease 
free. Recently, the process through which white administrators abandoned their image of 
Shangani as desolate and began to view it as the ‘Ndebele Homeland’ has been analysed.205 The 
Ndebele never considered Shangani as a good place for habitation but referred to it as ‘amagusu 
amnyama’ (dark forests).206 These areas were regarded as ‘thickets to be afraid of’, as ‘dark and 
fearful’, full of lions, spirits and other scary things, places of tall, crowded trees and no people, 
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places where outcasts and witches were made to live.
207
 In this place, the Africans and their 
livestock had to go through a very difficult process of acclimatization involving the development 
of livestock regimes best suited to that environment. 
 
The origins of state veterinary services in colonial Zimbabwe, c.1890-6 
The previous section has shown that European modes of thinking and living were promoted at 
the expense of local ideas. This section provides a discussion of the origins of veterinary services 
in this racialised socio-political context. Located between latitudes 15° and 23°S, and longitudes 
25° and 34°E in the tropics, Southern Rhodesia presented veterinary challenges that were quite 
different from those experienced in Europe, and, thus, alien to most of the settlers in general and 
veterinarians in particular. L.E.W. Bevan, the first and until the 1920s the only bacteriologist in 
the colony, reminisced that during the 1890s, ‘Southern Rhodesia was always a source of 
veterinary surprises – as it is today.’208 One such ‘surprise’ was a mysterious disease in which 
animals appeared to be stiff in one or more limbs or the muscles of the throat hence they called it 
‘stiff sickness’  and another which  Bevan admitted, ‘because we veterinarians knew nothing 
whatever about it, we gave it the more dignified title of ‘ephemeral fever.’209 These recollections 
are helpful in demonstrating the inadequacies of orthodox veterinary medicine in the colonies 
where veterinary services were introduced as a by-product of the colonisation process. 
 
One of the first veterinary measures to be taken in the 1890s was the publication in December 
1891 of a regulation in connection with Lung Sickness by the BSAC, and also the appointment 
of an inspector of cattle. This notice announced steps to be taken to prevent the spread, and 
promote the eradication of Lung Sickness including an embargo on the importation of sick or un-
inoculated cattle.
210
 Close connections between the Southern Rhodesian state and the Cape 
Colony were heavily exploited as most of the regulations applied during the 1890s by the former 
were derived from the laws of the Cape Colony, particularly the Animal Diseases Act, 1881- 
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which made provisions for the isolation of livestock suffering from contagious and infectious 
diseases.
211
 Ordinance No. 1 of 1893 announced the incorporation of the Cattle Removal Act 
(1870) and the Cattle Removal Amendment Act (1889) as well as its usage in Mashonaland as 
the Cattle Removal Amendment Ordinance (1893).
212
 Similarities also extended to the unequal 
provision of veterinary services, with African areas being assigned a lower priority status.
213
 
 
The veterinary regulations passed between 1890 and 1893 were simply a declaration of good 
intent because, in practice, beyond settler towns modern quasi-veterinary services were almost 
non-existent. Moreover in areas where such services were available, cattle inspectors, under 
whose command the administration of veterinary regulations was, were mainly preoccupied with 
controlling the importation of livestock into the colony rather than local disease management and 
control.
214
 The administration’s obsession with the procurement of gold, and the seeming 
absence of epizootics militated against the early establishment of a veterinary services 
department.
215
 In the spirit of fiscal saving, veterinary duties for the settler population were 
simply superintended by cattle inspectors who operated under the Surveyor General’s 
Department. In fact, C.E. Gray, the first qualified veterinary surgeon in the country  came with 
the Pioneer Column in 1890 but, for lack of a job, was employed in the ranks of the Post Office 
at Fort Victoria until 1896 when he was ‘unearthed like Cincinnatus from the plough, and called 
upon to form a veterinary department to control Rinderpest.’216  
 
The provision of veterinary services to Africans was an entirely different affair. Prior to 1896, 
the administration preferred western control methods to local remedies, and, therefore, attempted 
to disseminate these to Africans via field cornets, missionaries and Native Commissioners. 
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Before the formation of the Native Affairs Department in 1894, and the appointment of Native 
Commissioners in that year, African affairs were in the hands of a field cornet who was usually a 
member of the settler community residing in an outlying district. Such officials were expected to 
report as well as deal with livestock diseases on an ad hoc basis. However, an amicable way of 
bringing the African livestock owner to use the western approach and technical knowledge for 
livestock production and healthcare was not found.  
 
Writing in the mid-1960s, Chavunduka, who wanted to understand why biomedical practices had 
not gained widespread acceptance among Africans, concluded that it was because veterinary 
medicine was not introduced in a way that was understandable and acceptable to blacks.
217
 
Indeed, from the 1890s, the official policy (as pursued by missionaries and native 
commissioners) was to eliminate African livestock regimes and replace them with ‘scientific’ 
methods. Having inadequate knowledge of the social background of the people amongst whom 
they worked, the activities of these officials often resulted in conflict with the Shona and 
Ndebele. In spite of the pressure brought to bear upon Africans to adopt biomedical approaches, 
there was nothing really veterinary about early interactions between colonial officials and 
Africans as these were, in the main, tax collection expeditions and exploratory journeys. Limited 
veterinary contact between Africans and settlers inadvertently affected the rate at which the 
supposed superior biomedical ideas could be diffused to African livestock owners. As long as 
livestock disease control remained a mere auxiliary task of Native Commissioners, knowledge 
about the new forms of veterinary ideas remained exclusive to the whites. An undesirable by-
product of this scenario to the government was that African livestock regimes continued to 
thrive. 
 
Considering that African livestock regimes were undermined after colonisation on the basis of 
their ‘unscientific nature’ it is ironic that the colonial administration did not place veterinary 
issues under qualified scientists but Native Commissioners. Most Native Commissioners had 
hardly received formal education (worse still veterinary instruction) and, therefore, knew little, if 
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anything, about the scientific basis of veterinary diseases. To illustrate this paucity of education, 
it is important to quote some of the Native Commissioners’ recollections of these early days. 
M.E. Weale (1871-1947), who was appointed to the Native Department in 1894 as Native 
Commissioner for Chilimanzi, wrote:  
There was scant means of obtaining books on anthropology and primitive 
customs. Some were stocked by the government for our guidance as none of us 
had been trained for administrative work or had studied law. I was probably the 
only public school boy in the Department and from the Administrator downwards 
none took much interest in the natives except in collecting taxes from them… the 
only answer I could get to any questions I might ask as to very official duties was 
to use my own discretion as the Chief of the Department was a rough, illiterate 
young man.
218
  
 
Moreover, Jeater has demonstrated that the Native Affairs Department Annual (NADA), which 
began publication in 1923, and the ethnographic texts produced by members of the department, 
indicated how white official perceptions of the local population poorly equipped the NAD to 
understand growing African engagement with the modern world.
219
 
 
 Native Commissioners were also laden with non-veterinary responsibilities. Besides veterinary 
tasks, a native commissioner’s duties included tax collection (by far their most important 
activity), issuing a variety of passes which Africans were obliged to carry, acting as arbitrators in 
cases involving Africans, enquiring into complaints brought by Africans, registration of dogs, 
rifles, brands, births and deaths, issuing cattle permits, inspecting farms whenever reports were 
called from headquarters, acting as locust officers and vaccinators, and labour recruiters.
220
 
Under the Hut Tax Ordinance (1894), Native Commissioners were mandated to collect 10 
shillings hut tax from every African male. The ordinance, however, provided for other kinds of 
payment: ‘Hut tax shall be payable in sterling coin, but in cases where the Administrator or the 
Collector has no alternative it may be accepted in grain or stock, the value of such grain or stock 
being taken to be the price current at the nearest market at which such grain or stock can be 
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disposed of, and in all such cases the reasonable cost of carriage or driving.’221 Because they 
operated in a largely cashless economy, the activities of these officials often entailed the 
confiscation of local livestock, and therein lay their dilemma. Their various functions in the 
colonial economy were not always clear to the Africans hence African suspicion of even well-
meant initiatives of NCs. Generally, blacks viewed native commissioners not as veterinary 
officials, but as, ‘nothing but a collector of debts they owed.’222   
 
Although taxation was a way through which the administration raised revenue for the day to day 
administration of the colony, it also created opportunities for settler capitalist accumulation. 
Livestock taken from Africans under the tax system found its way into settler hands by way of 
auctions occasionally organised by native commissioners. Settler farmers had access to the so-
called Hut Tax Cattle on easy terms as the rule was that:  
25 per cent of the cattle brought in by the Native Commissioner at any of his 
expedition be sold to bona-fide farmers before the rest of the stock is put up to 
auction the terms being: half payment down, and one quarter payment at any time 
in each of the two succeeding months.
223
 
 
Given the above, the role played by Native Commissioners in the provision of veterinary 
services was compromised severely. Their confiscation of livestock belonging to Hut Tax 
defaulters compromised their acceptability to Africans in the Reserves. Throughout the territory, 
Africans hid their livestock each time these officials appeared in their localities.
224
 In some 
districts, the appearance of a white man was considered an ominous sign for loss of cattle. For 
instance, in December 1894, just two months after the passage of the Hut Tax Ordinance, the 
Native Commissioner for Victoria, which had the largest cattle population in the colony, and, 
therefore, subject to many cattle raids (both official and unofficial) by white settlers, reported 
that, ‘the Mashonas have a habit of clearing away from their villages on the approach of any 
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white man.’225 The Native Commissioner complained that cattle, sheep and goats were being 
taken from Africans in that district by white constables who falsely claimed that the district had 
not disarmed after the Anglo-Ndebele War (1893-4).
226
  
 
Besides the tax demands for which they had to meet by selling their livestock, African livestock 
owners had to contend with the abuse of power especially by policemen. In 1895, several cases 
involving African policemen who were seizing livestock from Africans were reported. The NC 
for Hartley reported that African constables had killed a goat belonging to an African.
227
 Just a 
fortnight later, he was reporting that a white constable had confiscated four cattle belonging to a 
peasant in the same district.
228
 These incidents increasingly made tax collection very difficult 
such that it had to be accompanied by force. So pervasive was the abuse of power by tax 
collectors-cum-veterinary officials that within a decade (1897-1907) most had become prolific 
livestock owners – large enough to threaten European cattle traders.229 By 1907, even European 
cattle traders were complaining that NCs ‘were in such a position that they could practically 
purchase what they required, and also influence the sale of cattle in their respective districts to 
various farmers and traders.’230 Resistance to taxation was varied with some Africans fighting 
the tax collectors while others chose to run away. For example, in Mtoko, one chief relocated 
together with his people to Portuguese East Africa,
231
 while another, Chief Gurupira, was 
punished for allowing his people to attack the Native Commissioner and policemen.
232
 Livestock 
movements arising out of these tax collection skirmishes perpetuated the spread of animal 
diseases.  
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So far this discussion has shown that in the absence of adequate veterinary services, Africans, 
who were on the margins on the nascent colonial economy, were victims of a parasitic 
relationship with Native Commissioners who were supposed to be their veterinary officials. 
Thus, out of both choice and necessity by Africans, by 1896 African livestock continued to 
thrive despite them being discouraged.
233
 Even reporting veterinary diseases to veterinary 
officials was eschewed by Africans. In fact, the first real veterinary interaction between Africans 
and veterinary officials had occurred by accident in 1895 when cases of Lung Sickness among 
African cattle were detected by a Native Commissioner (NC) in Umfuli District while collecting 
tax.
234
 The NC reported, ‘The lot I have here are affected, one case showing unmistakeably and 
as the boys tell me several cattle have died at Inyamweda’s kraals from the same disease.’235 
Clearly this outbreak had not been reported to the authorities as the African livestock owners 
sometimes hid them and chose to use their own remedies.
236
  
 
The marginalisation of African livestock regimes, and the shortages of veterinary facilities in the  
1890s, not only perpetuated, but also gave rise, as Weale’s memoirs suggest, to a thriving body 
of local therapeutic knowledge which was exploited by both settler and African livestock 
owners.
237
 An interesting case of therapeutic pluralism during the 1890s is that of Col. Napier, 
manager of the Willoughby’s Ranch and a very close friend of Mnyenyezi (a local herbalist), 
who, after the occupation of Matabeleland in 1894, made extensive use of Mnyenyezi’s 
veterinary remedies.
238
 Col. Napier actions show, as argued by Karen Flint, the belief among 
some European travellers, traders, and biomedical doctors (at times) within the colonies that 
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nature provided local remedies for local diseases.
239
 This suggests that biomedical ideas which 
the veterinarians were championing were also a subject of debate among whites, and that while 
African livestock regimes were not recognised at an official level, experiences of pragmatic 
white farmers in the countryside demanded that they sometimes adopted these.  
 
In the absence of veterinary officials, some settler farmers also used knowledge garnered from 
practical experience to develop therapeutic remedies. For instance, contagious poultry diseases 
that broke out among imported chickens from 1890 had by 1895 been brought under control by 
settler home remedies – salt, tobacco, and water being the most popular concoction.240 These 
therapeutic exchanges are important as they demonstrate that outside the official discourse that 
disparaged African livestock regimes, settler farmers and African livestock owners shared herbal 
knowledge in a reciprocal manner. This extended elsewhere in the sub-continent, as Swart has 
demonstrated that ordinary blacks and Afrikaners in rural South Africa shared therapeutic 
knowledge much more often than was assumed.
241
 The crisis of acceptance which veterinary 
scientists faced during this time betrays a far bigger problem. Indeed as Woods has argued, the 
incredulity of farmers was reasonable because until 1934 in Britain where some of Southern 
Rhodesia’s vets had received training, the veterinary curriculum focused on the horse leaving 
those who entered agricultural practice ‘to learn from their colleagues or from bitter experience 
… [hence] many farmers used veterinarians as a “fire-brigade” service, summoning them only as 
a last resort, by which time animals were often past the point of recovery.’242 
The 1896-8 Rinderpest Epidemic  
The outbreak of Rinderpest in March 1896 brought to the fore the need for regular veterinary 
services. Rinderpest, which has a mortality of over 90 per cent in affected herds,  is an acute to 
sub-acute contagious viral disease of cattle characterised by necrosis and erosions in the 
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gastrointestinal tract that result in severe diarrhoea and dehydration.
243
 The disease made its first 
appearance in Africa in around 1887 after infected Indian or Arabian cattle were introduced to 
Massawa in Eritrea by the Italian army.
244
 From this area, it spread all the way down to the Cape, 
helped, as it was, by the inefficient attempt to use prophylactic and therapeutic control rather 
than slaughter and quarantine.
245
 It finally crossed the Zambezi, its largest natural barrier, in 
February 1896 before making its first appearance in Bulawayo from which it spread very fast to 
Palapye (Botswana), Kimberley, the Cape, Natal, Lesotho, and Namibia. 
  
The Rinderpest outbreak offers a good lens into how Africans in Southern Rhodesia reacted to 
veterinary medicine in the mid-1890s. The Ndebele who were still smarting from the 1894 
‘Company Cattle Scandal’ were the first to experience Rinderpest as it spread first in 
Matabeleland and then onto other areas.
246
 Administratively, at first, little was known about the 
prevention or cure of this disease. So fast was its spread such that within a period of 25 days of 
the first reported occurrence in Southern Rhodesia, it travelled southwards at a rate of 20 miles a 
day reaching a point 16 miles north of the borders of the Cape Colony on the 3Ist March.
247
 The 
disease set the stage, as Rossiter succinctly argues, for ‘one of the keenest competitions medical 
science has ever seen.’248 In South African colonies, the competition was between two teams; 
one, including Drs Arnold Theiler, of the Transvaal, and Herbert Watkins-Pitchford of Natal and, 
another, led by Dr Robert Koch, a German microbiologist who worked in Kimberley at the Cape 
government’s expense.249 Theiler and Watkins-Pitchford developed a technique for immunizing 
cattle with simultaneous but separate inoculations of immune serum and infectious disease. 
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However, their method did not become very popular since immune serum was in desperate short 
supply and time-consuming to produce. Robert Koch’s method of prevention, which involved the 
injection of bile from infected animals into uninfected animals, was successful at the laboratory. 
Even though this conferred some degree of immunity, the main bone of contention was that it did 
not set up immunity until the end of eight days during which time animals could become 
naturally infected.
250
 Controversy arose from its hasty introduction throughout the affected areas 
in the Cape Colony.   
 
Southern Rhodesia, not having enough financial resources to run a full scale scientific research 
into the disease, followed veterinary developments in the neighbouring, wealthier South African 
colonies with keen interest. In March 1897, Dr George Turner, who was conducting a series of 
experiments at the Kimberley Rinderpest Station on behalf of the Cape Government, visited 
Bulawayo, and, on his advice, a system of compulsory inoculation against Rinderpest was 
established in the province.
251
 At the time of the adoption of Turner’s advice the scientific 
community had not yet produced a standard vaccine. This, notwithstanding the ‘crisis of 
knowledge’ did not stop the Southern Rhodesia from adopting British veterinary methods of 
containment: slaughtering infected cattle and those merely suspected of infection as well as the 
creation of cordons to restrict the movement of cattle from infected areas.
252
 However, Southern 
Rhodesia was not the only colony to gamble with the inoculation method as the Cape Colony 
also indulged in a similar act of desperation.
253
 Inoculating stations were quickly established at 
Bulawayo, Ramaquabane, Gwelo, Manzinyama, Tuli, Khami, and Queen's Kraal.
254
 In 
Mashonaland, the work of inoculating cattle was started much later. However, after a few 
months, the double method of inoculation had to be discontinued owing to the impossibility, 
under the existing conditions, of obtaining virulent Rinderpest blood from the organisms of other 
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diseases such as gall-sickness.
255
 These methods, as will be shown below, turned out to be 
impractical, expensive and politically controversial.
256
 So disastrous was Rinderpest such that by 
the end of 1897, there were less than 14 000 head of cattle left in African possession throughout 
the colony.
257
 Unfortunately, there are no pre-Rinderpest figures of cattle owned by Africans but 
the stated number is a much reduced figure from their perceived pre-Rinderpest holdings. 
 
On their part, Africans did not understand the slaughter of healthy and, in other instances, 
seemingly healthy cattle, and their attempts to move cattle to avoid destruction actually resulted 
in a more rapid spread of infection.
258
 Mbangwa Ngomambi’s account of this disease gives us an 
insight into what transpired and how Africans reacted to this menace. Mbangwa was working at 
a mine when he saw cattle dying in their numbers but like many other people, he did not know 
what it was. He recalled that, ‘cattle fell ill and we had plenty of meat. We would cut up what we 
wanted and leave the rest. The choice was ours. People now said, ‘cattle should be released from 
their kraals, they should sleep outside’ but the next morning you still find them dead.’259 This 
testimony provides us with a new reading of the Rinderpest epidemic and how people sought to 
deal with it. It affords us an opportunity to ask questions: What was the logic behind unkraaling 
them? Was it because people thought the disease was in the kraals? Was it because they thought 
the disease was contagious?  
 
It is difficult to find answers to these questions, but they show that Africans were not simply 
resigned to their fate. More importantly, the disease demonstrated, beyond any reasonable doubt, 
the ineffectiveness of African livestock regimes against a fast spreading viral disease. Africans 
were, nevertheless, quick to discover just as in South Africa that, ‘meat left in the wake of 
Rinderpest could be dried for biltong or eaten at once without ill effects.’260 This also suggests a 
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re-orientation of people’s ideas about livestock diseases. However, while Africans were 
contemplating their next move, Mbangwa recalled that the NC for Gwanda District, C.G. Fynn,  
went to Bulawayo to collect bullets and then started killing the sick cattle… you 
know if cattle fall ill Europeans kill them. They do not eat the meat. We herded all 
the cattle and drove them to some hidden area and there they were shot. When 
they tried to run away we surrounded them and they were gunned down.
261
 
 
Africans in Gwanda were not the only ones suffering from indecision. Correspondence between 
the NC Hartley and the CNC reveal that when cattle started dying from what later turned out to 
be Rinderpest in early 1896, the former was not sure what this was after having tested some of 
the dead cattle for diseases without finding any evidence of sickness.
262
 Nevertheless, he was 
sure that it was not Trypanosomiasis, for he wrote: ‘The only symptom I noticed in the sick oxen 
was [sic] violent purging [diarrhoea] and a running from the nose. Nobody here has any idea of 
what the disease may be but they are sure that it is not the fly.’263 Given that he did not know 
what this was, all he could do was to ask, ‘Have I any duties in connection with cattle diseases? 
Will you please let me know by return of post if I have, and what they are, that I may perform 
them.’264 This exchange is indicative of the inadequacy of veterinary services offered to Africans 
during the time, that is, Native Commissioners, under whom control over African livestock fell 
directly, did not have the requisite expertise to offer advice to African livestock owners in times 
of need. 
 
In as far as the depredations of the disease are concerned, Mbangwa’s account tallies with that of 
Francois Coillard – a white European missionary and explorer.  Coillard narrates the devastation 
that followed Rinderpest as follows:   
It mowed down the whole bovine race in its passage. Hundreds of carcasses lay 
here and there, on the roadside or piled up in the fields. In vain did the native 
gorge themselves, careless of the consequence. In vain did legions of vultures and 
beasts of prey gather to devour them. They could not overtake the quantity…265 
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However, Mbangwa’s attitude towards the sanitary cordons and the slaughter policy differs 
sharply with Francois Coillard’s. While acknowledging that the disease pursued its course 
relentlessly in spite of preventive measures, Coillard wrote apologetically arguing that the 
government ‘grasped’ the situation right from the beginning.266 Coillard spiritualized the disease 
as he advised, ‘Let us draw nigh to God, and he will draw nigh to us. Let us cleanse our hands 
and purify our hearts. Let us humble ourselves in the sight of God, and he shall lift us up.’267 As 
a missionary, Coillard could afford to straddle both lines of science and spirituality without 
getting the stern rebuke Africans gained by being labelled ‘superstitious’. The inequalities 
existing at the time can then be fully appreciated if one considers that the African could not walk 
the tight rope separating natural laws and the spiritual world without being chastised as discussed 
below. 
 
Having failed to find neither remedies nor answers to this mysterious disease, Africans sought 
spiritual assistance.
268
 Many Africans looked to their political and religious leaders for answers. 
The religious oracle spread from the Umlimo High Priest in the Matopos to Mkwati who was 
stationed at Ntaba Zika Mambo then to Kaguvi in the Chishawasha area, and to Nehanda in the 
Mazoe area. All these were national spirits and next in seniority to the national spirit (Murenga). 
These in turn took the word to lesser spirit mediums (mhondoro) spread throughout the country. 
The Rinderpest outbreak and other ecological disasters of the 1890s also propelled into 
prominence individuals who, unlike the majority of local people which remained unprovoked by 
the presence of the white settlers, were adamantly opposed to the idea of allowing the Europeans 
to settle in their areas. In this category, were Mapondera in Northern Mashonaland, 
Mashayamombe in Hartley, Kaguvi in Chinamhora, Nehanda in Mazowe, and Muchemwa in 
eastern-central Mashonaland. By pointing to the government’s slaughter and inoculation policies, 
these individuals heightened the anti-colonial and anti-white phobia already prevalent in the 
colony.
269
 Their speeches made sense to the ordinary people since the slaughtering of local cattle 
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was done by veterinarians who were long suspected of spreading the disease. Dead beasts or 
their carcasses were either burned or buried hence they wondered, ‘Whoever had heard of food 
being destroyed like this? If our cattle die well, we could eat them but these people bury and 
burn them, and grain is scarce. They want us to die of famine.’270 Death tolls arising from 
inoculation trials carried out before the adoption of Koch’s inoculation method in late 1896 
strengthened the arguments of sceptics who believed that whites were out to exterminate them.
271
  
 
The branding of cattle increased black people’s fears and suspicions of the white man’s designs 
for their livestock. Some Africans saw the branding of their cattle as some weird form of 
sorcery.
272
 At the height of the slaughter policy, one African chief asked, ‘They tell me that you 
are a doctor, and that you are a great doctor, but can you do nothing but kill?’273 As in other 
colonies affected by Rinderpest, it was rumoured that the disease was a deliberate poisoning of 
African cattle by the whites with the intention of impoverishing Africans, and facilitate their co-
option into the settler economy.
274
 So strong was the anti-colonial feeling that in Southern 
Rhodesia, an African missionary, Bernard Mizeki, who, among other things, tried to explain 
measures taken to deal with Rinderpest, was murdered.
275
 Mizeki’s explanation that brands were 
designed to control stock thefts and epidemics was dismissed.  
 
The vendetta against Mizeki in 1896 had a history to it. His relations with the Nhowe people first 
deteriorated in 1895 when he received smallpox vaccine from Llewellyn Meredith, the NC for 
Makoni, which he administered on the populace.
276
 Vaccination had its own side effects. Some 
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people worsened after they were vaccinated and some developed sores on their arms hence when 
cattle were being vaccinated in 1896, one traditional healer rhetorically asked, ‘Did he (Mizeki) 
not cut our flesh with a sharp instrument and rub in poison? Did he not say this was to save us 
from sickness and yet some people had ugly sores and could not move their arms?’277 
Furthermore, because Mizeki was an African of foreign origin, and had actively assisted 
missionaries in 1895 in vaccinating locals against smallpox, Muchemwa, a political leader who 
was against the presence of Europeans in the country, argued that he was not really a black man 
but had been reared by the white men with an evil purpose of ‘changing all the Mashona people 
into Europeans by witchcraft.’278 Such was the local reaction to Rinderpest but it is imperative to 
acknowledge the universality of reaction to this epizootic and explain it as human nature, that in 
times of social stress in general conspiratorial explanations of events find fertile ground 
irrespective of culture, race or historical epoch.
279
 It was not that they were superstitious but their 
actions reveal an attempt to explain the disasters that followed one after another. Indeed, the 
areas that were not affected by the Rinderpest disease, the Chipinga-Melsetter area and the 
Umtali region, did not take part in the 1896 uprising.  
 
Some Africans believed that ‘something’ that had gone grossly amiss in the territory after white 
occupation, and could, in their view, only be rectified by means of a drastic measure.
280
 The 
spiritual leaders blamed the disease on the Europeans because the BSAC and settlers seized land 
and started to use it without any reference to the owners of that land, the most important of 
whom were the spiritual forces.
281
 Indeed, the Company seized cattle, goats, and sheep for hut 
tax and some of them were dedicated to the ancestors, the company introduced forced labour and 
in that way disrupted the normal lives of the African community, the Europeans and their agents 
in general introduced a new religion and condemned the African ancestors as evil spirits and 
demons that should be abandoned.
282
 Even though they seemingly dismissed the belief among 
Africans that the disease was not a natural one, missionaries also tended to explain the series of 
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climatic and ecological crises of the 1890s as meaning that God had ‘turned his countenance 
away from the land.’283 Prayer requests were also sent by some whites whenever diseases broke 
out. 
 
It is clear that supernatural beliefs played a crucial role in the construction and imagination of 
Rinderpest amongst Africans but it will be myopic to suggest, as the settlers did at the time, that 
Africans viewed livestock diseases through spiritual lens only. In fact, what happened during the 
Rinderpest outbreak can be explained by the politicization of troubles in general, and disease in 
particular, by religious and political leaders who were desperate to keep pre-colonial modes of 
life in place. As has been shown by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, competition between traditional healers 
and missionaries began as early as the late 1850s when Mzilikazi invited missionaries into his 
state. In the 1860s, Ndebele traditional religious practitioners began to blame the white people 
for having come with such animal diseases as lung sickness which claimed a lot of Ndebele 
cattle.
284
 In the 1890s, this competition between western and local ideas reached its peak during 
the Rinderpest outbreak. That some Africans viewed Rinderpest spiritually does not mean that all 
Africans viewed epizootics in this way. Even so, attempts by some Africans to deal with this 
disease using therapeutic methods suggest otherwise. Quarantining and slaughter, which were at 
epicentre of the conflict, were not totally incompatible with the local worldview but the fact that 
they were constructed and tainted with contextual western historical experiences and 
understanding revealed their imperialistic texture.
285
  
 
Two eye witness accounts, one on the outbreak of smallpox among Lobengula’s soldiers and 
another on the rabies outbreak among dogs in Bulawayo in 1893 give us a window through 
which we can analyse African ideas about disease during the early colonial period. Mbangwa 
Ngomambi revealed that Lobengula quarantined the infected soldiers in the forests and that 
people developed immunity to the disease by voluntarily infecting themselves.
286
 Coillard, who 
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passed through Bulawayo during a rabies outbreak, reported that the Ndebele enforced a 
slaughter policy on all dogs showing signs of infection.
287
 A 1902 ethnographic study by Charles 
Edmonds, a British veterinarian, corroborates this. Interviews carried out by Edmonds with 
Ndebele and Shona elders revealed that canine rabies (chimbwamupengo / chimbwambwambwa / 
ubhova) had existed in pre-colonial times, and that as a rule the locals combatted it by 
slaughtering all infected dogs.
288
 These revelations, therefore, challenge the idea that, in 1896, 
Africans resisted slaughter and inoculation because these were alien to them. The slaughter of 
rabid dogs demonstrates that some African ideas about diseases were not entirely at variance 
with those widespread in Europe at the time. It remains, however, to be questioned whether the 
willingness to slaughter dogs in cases of rabies was because of their perceived smaller socio–
economic value relative to cattle? This concern is dispelled by the fact that a slaughter policy 
was also pursued with regard to contagious abortion in cattle.
289
 It seems plausible to argue that 
Africans opposed these moves because veterinary medicine was integral to an exploitative 
system they rejected. When they moved their cattle away from the Administration's reach, 
therefore, they were safeguarding their livestock against what they considered to be yet another 
round of cattle confiscation by the settler Administration.
290
 
 
The Veterinary Department, 1898 -1902 
The vastness of Rinderpest’s sweep and the rapidity of its spread left an indelible mark on the 
history of Southern Rhodesia. So devastating was the disease that it resulted in a major 
reorientation of both western and local world views. Its only positive outcome was the 
disappearance of Cattle Trypanosomiasis as a result of the decimation of cattle and wildlife.
291
 
After running its full course, this disease demonstrated two things to the administration; one, that 
the religious leaders had a strong influence upon the Africans; two, the vulnerability of livestock 
to diseases in the absence of an effective veterinary services department. The first concern was 
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dealt with legislatively. Regarding the role played by the spiritual leaders, Father Boos, a 
Catholic priest, wrote:  
Now it is well known that superstition holds the native mind in complete thraldom 
… whole tribes of kaffirs destroyed all their cattle and provisions at the word of a 
prophetess … engaged in a war of extermination with the white colonists and 
even though defeated again and again they continued their stubborn resistance … 
buoyed up with their unwavering belief in the promises of the witch doctors.
292
  
 
This statement underlines the settler consensus to obliterate any vestiges of local therapeutic 
practices and ideas about diseases (both human and animal).  
 
With regards to the second challenge, the state buttressed structures formed in 1896.  Despite 
Rinderpest being brought under control by 1898, the situation did not improve as the following 
diseases broke out amongst livestock in quick succession between 1898 and 1902: glanders 
(1898), contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (1900), ulcerative lymphaginitis and ECF (1902).
293
 
Against this backdrop, the turn of the nineteenth century saw the introduction of new veterinary 
measures for the twin purposes of dealing with these epizootics and plugging loopholes on legal 
measures that had been pushed through in the 1890s. The following instructions were issued for 
the guidance of all officers charged with the administration of the Animal Diseases Ordinance 
(1901), Lung Sickness Ordinance No.5 (1900) and Glanders: in the Native Reserves livestock 
belonging to Africans issues were to be dealt by NCs or any other authorised officials of the 
Native Department.
294
 This arrangement, a continuation of pre-Rinderpest veterinary policy, 
differed starkly with what was happening in European areas where veterinary surgeons and 
inspectors in charge of European stock reported directly to the Chief Veterinary Surgeon 
(C.V.S). However, a new development was that in addition to their principal work in European 
areas, cattle inspectors could assist (my emphasis) the Native Department, if called upon, in 
carrying out veterinary duties in African areas.
295
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The prescriptive nature of the regulations is evident especially when one considers how scab was 
to be treated among sheep and goats. The possibility that Africans may have had their own 
remedies was never entertained as veterinary officials and NAD officers were instructed to:  
Teach natives within their districts, the proper methods of curing scab, and to 
personally superintend a number of operations conducted for such purposes in 
different parts of the district, as object lessons for natives. Native Commissioners 
should obtain the cooperation of missionaries, farmers and traders in teaching, 
inducing and aiding natives to take proper steps to eradicate scab.
296
(my 
emphasis) 
 
This statement displays an attempt by the veterinary hierarchy to slot Africans into their world 
view. In the ensuing years, this ambition becomes much visible in the manner regulations were 
crafted. For instance, under the Animal Diseases Ordinance (1902), stock-owners were obliged 
under law to report the presence of any disease among their herds to veterinary officers in their 
districts, police and NCs. In 1904, it became the Animal Diseases Consolidation Ordinance – 
providing cattle inspectors with more powers to inspect and detect diseases among livestock in 
their districts as well as to inspect transport animals and issue permits to transport riders and 
those in charge of travelling stock. 
 
The Veterinary Services Department was intended to favour the literate, and those 
knowledgeable to the workings of a European form of administration. Although there is nowhere 
in the regulations where it was stated that Africans were to be excluded from accessing 
veterinary services, whites became its major beneficiaries.
297
 Services allegedly made available 
to the ‘public’ were listed as follows: attending and giving professional advice in connection 
with the following diseases; Anthrax, Contagious abortion, East Coast Fever, Epizootic 
Lymphangitis, Foot and Mouth, Farcy, Foot-rot, Heartwater, Glanders, intestinal parasites among 
sheep and goats, Liver Disease, Lung Sickness, Osteoporosis, Malarial catarrhal fever (Blue 
Tongue), Rabies, Rinderpest, Scabies, Quarter Evil, Swine Fever.
298
 The following charges were 
to be made and payable for services rendered by the Government Veterinary Surgeon (GVS): a) 
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for every professional visit within three miles of his office or residence: 5s. b) for every 
professional visit beyond such distance plus an additional charge of 2/6 per hour whilst engaged 
in such activities or £2 3s 6d a day. c) for advice given at the Veterinary Surgeon’s office: 2s 
6d.
299
 Applicants for services of the GVS had, at their own cost, to provide the necessary 
transport for the conveyance of these officers to and from their stations.
300
 In all cases where 
veterinary advice was required, the owner was supposed to telegraph to “Veterinary,” Salisbury, 
with prepaid reply, the nature of the complaint that the animal is suffering from, giving a full 
description of the symptoms. This, it was argued, was to enable the CVS to telegraph advice at 
once and state whether he was able to arrange for veterinary attendance on the case or not.
301
 A 
1909 Enquiry into the Public Service of Rhodesia succinctly summarized their duties as 
providing advice in veterinary matters to all farmers requiring their assistance.
302
 These 
provisions had the resultant effect of conveniently disenfranchising African livestock owners 
who, at the time, were largely illiterate, with an economy run largely along barter trade, and not 
included in the category of ‘farmers.’ Furthermore, having been settled further away from the 
means of communication, it meant that those that Africans who may have desired this medicine 
needed to pay more. By 1902, therefore, veterinary services were skewed in favour of settler 
farmers who, unlike African livestock owners, had the political power to force through 
legislation that protected their interests.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has, firstly, shown that Nobbs’ contention that black people in Southern Rhodesia 
possessed a large body of effective veterinary remedies was justified. It has demonstrated that 
interaction with Europeans before and after colonisation brought a variety of diseases which, 
prior to the advent of European occupation, were unknown to Africans. Notable examples are 
contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, a bacterial disease, which was brought by missionaries 
from South Africa into Matabeleland in 1861
303
, Rinderpest in the 1890s and tick-borne East 
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Coast Fever in the early twentieth century.
304
 In cases where African livestock regimes were 
unable to deal with these epizootics, Africans correctly linked such diseases with colonialism and 
the expansion of capitalist production. The administration was during this period mainly 
preoccupied with the search for gold that no major investment in veterinary infrastructure was 
made before 1896. This deficiency, notwithstanding, the distribution of veterinary facilities was 
highly racialised as there was no corresponding tendency by the administration to provide 
Africans with veterinary services in the reserves. Despite providing a very large proportion of the 
revenue, both in direct and indirect taxation, little, if any, was spent for the benefit of African 
livestock which, like their owners, were driven to unfriendly environments. Since veterinary 
tasks pertaining to African livestock were in the hands of Native Commissioners, who were not 
veterinary specialists by training, the envisaged diffusion of western ideas about disease did not 
occur at the desired pace as Africans kept their socio-cultural views of what constituted diseased 
and ‘clean’ animals. However, regardless of their ingenuity in the face of adversity, one has to 
acknowledge the inadequacy or even absence of a wide pool of indigenous knowledge for some 
of the diseases because they simply never existed before. Rinderpest is one disease that 
demonstrated that local therapeutics were not sophisticated enough to deal with viral diseases. 
New diseases may have resulted in the development of new ideas or reshaping of old ones in a 
way that one may not be easily explainable as such ideas were not recorded. If land 
dispossession, imposition of a battery of taxes after 1894, and the visitation of new animal 
diseases are computed, it is justifiable to conclude that the period 1890-1902 saw a rapid 
deterioration in the local disease situation. 
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Chapter Three 
‘Even the calves must dip’: Africans and the imposition of 
dipping tanks in Southern Rhodesia, c.1902 – 1930. 
 
 
The previous chapter established that the Southern Rhodesian state preferred biomedical 
veterinary approaches to alternative African livestock therapeutic practices in its effort to control 
epizootics and enzootics. While diverse state veterinary regulations passed in the aftermath of the 
Rinderpest outbreak were still seeping into the colony’s socio-economic fabric, the unease 
relationship between state veterinary services and African livestock regimes persisted. African 
livestock regimes, especially veterinary therapeutics, endured partly because of the practical 
inadequacies of state veterinary services, African aversion to veterinary medicine, and were 
reshaped by new epizootics which brought another dynamic into the veterinary equation. The 
outbreak of East Coast Fever (ECF) and Rabies in 1902, when the country was still recovering 
from the outbreak of Rinderpest, further stretched the colony’s embryonic state veterinary 
services, and precipitated change in the veterinary scene. In particular,  ECF – a tick-borne 
disease which spreads among bovines –, as this chapter will show, resulted in conflicts between 
African livestock owners and the state, white farmers and vets, and between entomologists and 
vets over both the role of ticks in spreading epizootics, and how they could be controlled. These 
differences, notwithstanding, the devastation caused by ECF resulted in the systematic dipping of 
livestock – a development which (as this chapter shows) reshaped the nature of veterinary 
interactions in the country in general, and the African reserves in particular.  
 
Moving from a broad discussion of the interaction of African livestock regimes and state 
veterinary services (discussed in Chapter 2), this chapter focuses the lens on tick-borne 
epizootics to explore the impact of dipping tanks in African reserves. It builds upon studies by 
Jamu and Hombarume on the growth of African herds, and diseases that affected African 
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livestock respectively.
305
 Though touching on issues that had an important impact on African 
livestock regimes these studies were not particulary interested in examining the interctiones of 
tick-borne livestock diseases, the colonial state and African livestock regimes. Thus, issues 
pertaining to dipping tanks were discussed tangentially. Thus, this chapter draws on but 
challenges Colin Bundy’s argument that  from the late 19th Century and the early years of the 20th 
Century developments in Eastern Griqualand, a similar colonial context to that in Southern 
Rhodesia, were closely shaped by the disease environment, and that change in rural communities 
was increasingly forced upon Africans through veterinary interventions.
306
 Bundy’s study of the 
enforcement of dipping in the Transkei and its political consequences remains an interesting case 
of the interplay of socio-political and veterinary forces in a rural setting. In Southern Rhodesia, 
the process through which African livestock owners negotiated for space within a highly 
racialised context, as this chapter shows, questions the oft made argument that political 
consciousness found in the reserves was brought by migrant labourers from mines, urban areas 
and farms.
307
 Unlike Bundy, Gilfoyle centres on the influence of veterinary scientists as benign 
veterinary care givers not influenced by colonial intentions of cultivating a culture of consent 
among livestock owners.
308
 Yet Gilfoyle does not discuss how these ‘well-intentioned’ 
veterinary policies were imagined by African livestock owners whose prior knowledge of 
livestock therapeutics sometimes ran contrary to biomedical practice.  
 
On the other hand, the translatability of Bundy’s model across the region is to be questioned 
since the enforcement of dipping among Africans in Southern Rhodesia may be an example of 
colonial intrusion that does not describe a straightforward process of colonial subjugation to 
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which Africans responded simply in terms of either ‘collaboration’ or ‘resistance’.309 But it is 
true that dip tanks, just as Brooks has argued about fencing, were an ‘important signifier of 
change … and a revealing point of tension between ruler and ruled.’310 Interestingly, a very 
intriguing case on African overt reaction to dipping in Southern Rhodesia, almost similar to 
Bundy’s findings, is offered by Norval whose study centres on the liberation war in the 1970s.311  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dilapidated dip tanks in modern-day Zimbabwe’s countryside are testament to both the hubris of 
a long fallen power, and their on-going neglect (See Figure 3.1).
312
 Norval adheres to the 
orthodox colonial view which suggests that veterinary war-time experiences were a negation of 
the harmony emanating from a close working relationship between veterinary officials and 
livestock owners, and that liberation fighters were forcing livestock owners to shun dipping. 
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Figure 3.1: Mavhaire Dip Tank, Buhera, Manicaland 
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Although Norma Kriger
313
 partly collaborates this, Norval’s view obfuscates a long history of 
calculated ‘obedience’ and ‘negotiation’ with veterinary regulations. Although war-time 
experiences by livestock owners tally with Bundy’s findings, this chapter argues that the early 
history of dip tanks in Southern Rhodesia between 1902 and 1930 was not characterised by 
vandalism nor was resistance as overt, armed and organised.
314
 Nonetheless, this chapter will 
show that, as in other Southern African contexts, Africans came to understand that technological 
intervention was not politically neutral, and, therefore, resisted these mostly through covert 
means. The numerous pressures which dipping placed upon African livestock regimes meant that 
the dip tank assumed a new meaning other than that offered by colonial officials. 
The veterinary context, 1902-04 
The imposition of dipping tanks occurred in a specific veterinary context mainly shaped by the 
outbreak of East Coast Fever in 1902. This outbreak particularly threatened the hegemonic 
ambitions of the colonial administration as it retarded the rate at which the penetration of the 
countryside took place. As a hindrance to the colonial project, livestock diseases, therefore, 
necessitated the expansion of the hitherto embryonic veterinary services. The connection between 
the consolidation of colonial control and veterinary challenges is not hard to prove. For instance, 
reports from Native Commissioners detail their complaints of how horses supplied to them for 
their everyday use in administering their districts succumbed to horse sickness, and that diseases 
tampered with their vision of making the colony in general and the African society in particular, 
governable and exploitable.
315
 East Coast Fever was directly responsible for the introduction of 
dipping tanks, and by extension the increased interaction between colonial veterinary officials and 
African livestock regimes since tick eradication became a very important veterinary activity after 
1902 following the failure of Koch’s inoculation methods.316   
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Administratively, Southern Rhodesia suffered from a dearth of financial resources necessary to 
mount a sustained campaign against ECF. The shareholders of the BSAC in London were 
reluctant to commit resources to a colony whose financial prospects were uncertain.
317
 Therefore, 
numerous letters written by colonial administrators to the BSAC Directors yielded no financial 
rewards. Cost minimisation and profit maximisation policies that were pursued by the company 
government for ‘colonial development’ meant that funds were either unavailable or inadequate. 
This scenario had implications on African livestock regimes as Africans were exposed to heavy 
taxation payable both in livestock and cash. 
  
For financial reasons, the initial stance taken by the BSAC was that ECF ‘did not exist.’ This 
was because admittance would have compromised the value of the Company’s shares on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE).
318
 While this shows the role played by financial considerations 
on the way the Southern Rhodesian state reacted to epizootics, it also exposes imperial ties that 
linked Southern Rhodesia to Great Britain. Thus, the manner in which ECF were dealt with 
offers an opportunity to explore the complicated relationship between colonies and the 
metropole, between white and black people, and also within the white community itself.
319
 State 
veterinary intervention in the reserves in a polarised environment resulted in the emergence, as 
also shown in Chapter 2, of competing narratives about otherwise progressive colonial policies. 
Amidst widespread repugnance, the Veterinary Department took a two-pronged approach 
involving immunological measures centring on the development of a vaccine, and regulatory 
policies of quarantines and slaughter of infected animals. It imposed restrictions on cattle 
movement in several districts, and periodically threatened to call for a general ban throughout the 
country in clean and unclean areas alike.
320
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Cattle quarantines were unpopular among many Africans who trusted their long standing practice 
of outpacing (strategic withdrawal from the area) livestock epizootics. For African livestock 
owners moving cattle became both a disease avoidance method and security measure against 
state interference in the livestock economy. Thus, they moved possibly already infected herds to 
‘green fields and new pastures afar from the madding crowd’ of veterinary officials.321 A former 
colonial veterinary officer, R.F. Stifling, argued that coping mechanisms by African livestock 
owners created fresh foci of disease at considerable distance from the main outbreak but this 
view has been challenged convincingly. Cranefield has exposed the contradictions in statements 
given by colonial officials regarding the supposed irrationality of African livestock owners in the 
face of veterinary calamity. He notes that statements that Africans would have nothing to do with 
dipping cattle are contradicted by reports that they did cooperate in dipping.
322
 Cranefield 
dismisses the assumption that Africans refused help and spread the disease when and if they 
chose to move cattle.
323
 However, this does not mean that outpacing the disease was a fool proof 
stratagem. What is being challenged is the insinuation that Africans ‘irrationally’ moved 
livestock. In fact, African responses, and experiences during the early ECF outbreaks were not 
typical as other racial groups in the territory reacted in a seemingly similar manner. Some settler 
farmers and traders concealed the disease, and hindered the work of veterinarians ‘in every way’ 
they could.
324
 An array of white home-made remedies also proved ineffective. Perhaps a more 
telling example of the devastation amidst therapeutic experimentation is that of Stanley Hyatt, an 
ox transport owner operating in the colony between 1899 and 1904, who was left with one beast 
out of a 450 herd.
325
 Across the territory, therapeutics ranging from Bluestone mixed with 
tobacco and ‘Dop’ (Cape impure spirit) to Methyl-Arsenate of Sodium and Trypan-Blau as well 
as the administration of carbolic acid, quinine and calomel were tried but without success.
326
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State veterinary intervention, notwithstanding, ECF wreaked havoc especially among European-
owned herds in routes traversed by infected oxen used by transport riders. By March 1903, the 
following cattle losses (See Figure 3.2) had been incurred: 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Cattle losses from African Coast Fever, 1903 
It is important to acknowledge that the figure only shows reported cases and losses but these 
were probably significantly greater. Outbreaks and losses were particularly high among 
European-owned cattle in relatively big commercial and urban centres such as Bulawayo and 
Salisbury. 
 
Continued losses to the disease amidst the deployment of conventional veterinary disease control 
measures, and the outcry they generated forced the Southern Rhodesian state to look beyond its 
borders for veterinary expertise. So important was the eradication of this disease to the state that 
it took the unconventional route of appointing Robert Koch, a German bacteriologist, to lead the 
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ECF campaign ahead of British Crown’s preferred candidate, a Major Bruce.327 In fact, in a 
telegram to the Administrator of Southern Rhodesia, the British High Commissioner wrote that 
the Committee of the Royal Society ‘recommend that investigation be entrusted to Bruce who 
discovered the curse of Tsetse fly disease … I am inclined to think it would be well to accept this 
opinion and ask Bruce to come out at once.’328 Despite, its willingness to pool resources together 
with the Cape, Orange Free State and Natal for the appointment of a veterinary official to study 
the 1902 outbreak, Koch was clearly Southern Rhodesia’s preferred candidate. Koch’s 
availability was going to be expensive but the Southern Rhodesian government was prepared to 
contribute two-fifths of the £10 000 annual pay demanded by Koch.  Southern Rhodesia made it 
clear that, ‘if anyone else was employed it will bear only an equal share with other 
governments.’329 Koch was eventually appointed on the basis of his previous experience with the 
same disease in German East Africa while Bruce was rejected because he was not a ‘renowned’ 
bacteriologist despite having done some ‘excellent’ work with Tsetse Fly diseases.330  
 
Koch’s first move upon arrival in Southern Rhodesia was to dispel W. Robertson’s (a Cape 
Government expert) findings that the disease was known as Texas Fever in the United States, 
Tick Fever in Australia, and Redwater in the Cape Colony.
331
 Koch argued that it was a distinctly 
different disease hence he called it African Coast Fever.
332
 He, therefore, recommended, and 
developed an inoculant. His recommendations had a direct impact on African livestock regimes 
in the reserves since the Southern Rhodesian government decided to test the efficacy of his 
vaccine, firstly, among infected ‘native’ cattle in Victoria and Chibi Districts, and later among a 
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few ‘European’ cattle in Bulawayo.333 Figure 3.3334 below illustrates the full extent of Koch’s 
activities. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: List of cattle immunised by Koch in 1903-4 
 
Victoria and Chibi were predominantly African areas hence this graph demonstrates how 
rigorous Koch’s controversial method was experimented among African-owned livestock. Figure 
3.3 particularly revealed that major losses from ECF had occurred in major towns among 
European owned herds. The decision to target African herds which had remained disease free for 
nearly eighteen months after the first outbreak in Umtali and for a year after it had spread to 
Bulawayo for testing Koch’s drug reveals the preparedness by veterinarians to experiment with 
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African livestock.
335
 In fact, the decision to do this potentially dangerous experiment in an area 
hitherto deprived of other state veterinary services put the issue into proper context, and 
challenges the thinking that veterinary services were politically neutral.  
 
An official report about this intrusion simply stated that it was done in ‘peace’ allegedly because 
Africans were ‘anxious’ to have their animals treated, and that white farmers were equally 
‘unanimous’ in their desire to give the inoculation method a trial.336 However, this was not true. 
Koch’s report betrays both the general ignorance among colonial officials about African 
livestock regimes, and the comforting myth of the intruder who wishes to believe that Africans 
are pleased with the intrusion. At present, some historians have convincingly argued that this 
period was characterised by acute opposition to veterinary measures both among whites and 
Africans in Southern Africa.
337
 For instance, B.N. Lawrance, E.L Osborn and R.L. Roberts have 
argued convincingly that very few Europeans learned African languages and that with the 
exception of some British officials in Nigeria and Kenya, few European administrators remained 
in one posting long enough to develop sufficient linguistic and cultural familiarity to 
communicate independently, and understand their colonial subjects.
338
 In the Southern 
Rhodesian context, Jeater has compellingly shown the limited knowledge which these officials 
had about African culture and behaviour.
339
 As the previous chapter demonstrated, there was 
widespread resistance to inoculation against Rinderpest, thus, it is questionable, as the states vets 
alleged, that the same method was ‘welcomed’ barely a decade later. It is plausible that state 
veterinary coercion forced African livestock owners to resort to what Scott describes as, ‘the 
normal tendency of the dependent individual is to reveal only part of his or her full transcript in 
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encounters with the powerful that is both safe and appropriate to reveal.’340 African livestock 
owners could not challenge Koch’s intrusion overtly given their weakened position as the 
subjects. 
 
Interestingly, before Koch had finished carrying out his experiments, he already had a number of 
sceptics both among white farmers and scientists. White farmers, in particular, were vocal given 
that they had political power to channel their grievances. Some placed their faith on home 
remedies, and, as the previous chapter revealed, some African therapeutic methods. However, 
their main grievance, which could also capture the voice of the Africans whose livestock were 
inoculated, was that Koch’s vaccine did not have any noticeable results in infected herds, and 
that it had the effect of killing the calves.
341
 In fact, some interested whites mobilised the 
unsatisfactory results among the following ‘native’ cattle herds to destroy the government’s 
confidence in Koch’s inoculation method: in Mangwendi’s herd, which originally consisted of 
seventy-three cattle, three died at the time of inoculation, thirteen died within the first two weeks 
of inoculation and twelve more died in the third month after commencement of inoculation.
342
 At 
Fingo location near Bulawayo, the following deaths occurred: eighteen in October, fourteen in 
November, four in December, and thirteen in January.
343
 Furthermore, between September 1904 
and 1905 there were nineteen outbreaks in two reserves in Matabeleland Districts (Bubi and 
Insiza).
344
  
 
Questions over the efficacy of Koch’s method also extended to other scientists. When it became 
clear that the inoculation method had failed to stop the disease entomologists came to lead the 
struggle against tick-borne diseases. Experiments by Charles Lounsbury, the head of the Cape 
Entomology Department, revealed that the brown tick (Rhipicephalous Appendiculatus) was the 
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important vector in the spread of ECF.
345
 It was on the basis of Lounsbury’s findings that 
Southern Rhodesian state shifted its search for a vaccine to tick destruction through dipping in 
arsenic solution. Even though dipping of livestock was not an entirely new phenomenon as it had 
been practiced in the USA and Australia since the 1890s
346
, it was adopted in Southern Rhodesia 
after experiments by Watkins-Pitchford (a Government Bacteriologist in Natal) demonstrated 
that ECF could be controlled, and eradicated by dipping cattle at intervals of 72 hours.
347
 
 
The introduction of dipping, 1904-1914  
The previous section has revealed the inadequacy of veterinary science in the fight against 
epizootics, and also the conflict between and among scientists. Furthermore, it also revealed how 
lowly African-owned cattle were rated in the veterinary hierarchy, and how the decision to adopt 
dipping as a tick control method came into being. This section discusses the operationalization of 
dipping. The passage of the Animal Diseases Consolidation Ordinance (later amended by 
Ordinances No. 2 of 1910, No. 2 of 1911, No. 2 of 1913 and No. 1 of 1918) in 1904 marked the 
official beginning of livestock dipping. Although it became popular as a result of its enforcement 
during ECF outbreaks, the new ordinance actually applied to a number of diseases: Anthrax, 
Foot and Mouth, Glanders, Heartwater, Lung Sickness, Pyaemia, Redwater, Rinderpest, Swine 
fever, Quarter Evil, Tuberculosis, enzootic abortion, Liver rot, Trypanosomiasis, Scabies in 
sheep and goats and rabies in dogs and other animals.
348
 With its passage, administrative officials 
made frantic efforts to enforce it but, as will be shown, fell into financial difficulties. Following 
Southern Rhodesia’s resolution to adopt dipping as a tick control method, the Administrator 
(BSAC) wrote to the Secretary (BSAC London) requesting funds amounting to £3 000 for use in 
the construction of dip tanks.
349
 However, despite agreeing to compulsory dipping, the Board of 
Directors could not authorise expenditure. Instead, they encouraged the Administrator to 
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consider farmers making their own tanks, and that unless cattle were dipped they were supposed 
to be isolated.
350
 This resolution, as will be shown, impacted negatively on African livestock 
regimes as livestock owners paid a relatively exorbitant dipping fee. 
 
While the administrator was grappling with his financial woes and pondered how dip tanks could 
be constructed in the country without the assistance of the BSAC’s London financiers, dipping 
was not received by livestock owners with unanimity. Some white livestock owners argued 
vociferously that it was costly, time consuming and also represented an unwelcome state 
intervention into livestock management.
351
 Some appreciated its efficacy in tick destruction but 
detested the opportunity it gave to the authorities to inspect and count their livestock.  They 
argued, as their counterparts in the Cape
352
, that it was detrimental to their cattle and they, 
therefore, refused to dip. White livestock owners reported an immediate rise in mortality in ECF-
infected herds when dipped for the first time, and the irritation caused by the solution.
353
 One 
cattle inspector confirmed it thus, ‘Cattle seem to feel the effects of the dip. Transport riders 
particularly say that their oxen are not able to pull their loads for a couple of days. In the 
Salisbury tank, beasts were burned [sic] and were not able to pull their loads for a week.’354 
Similar concerns were raised by African cattle owners in the reserves.  
 
Resentment largely emanated from the manner in which the dipping ordinance was implemented. 
Like in other colonial activities involving Africans, coercion became a standard method of 
implementing veterinary regulations as colonial veterinary officials seldom considered how some 
of their policies negatively impacted on certain aspects of African livelihoods. In fact, NCs rarely 
bothered to explain to Africans what dipping was supposed to accomplish. Instead they just told 
Africans what to do, when to have it done, and what would happen to them if they failed to meet 
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the deadline.
355
 Their mistaken belief was that Africans would come to appreciate the project’s 
worth once they were in place.
356
 Despite the fact that by 1914 there existed no law that 
compelled livestock owners (both black and white) to dip, in African reserves NCs gave the 
impression that everyone was mandated to. In fact, legislative efforts to make dipping mandatory 
across the territory started with the Animal Disease Amendment Ordinance (1911) but came to 
fruition with passage of the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance (1914). The former called for the 
construction of more dip tanks, and for the first time introduced a penalty for illegal cattle 
movement. The latter made dipping compulsory in certain parts of the colony. All African 
livestock owners were asked to obtain dipping cards in order to access dipping tanks. The 
registration of African cattle (book system) helped vets and other public officials to ascertain the 
number of African-owned cattle. With this knowledge the provision of dipping tanks, 
supervisors, dip tanks attendants and others was planned. Vets could also assess the approximate 
number of cattle in various districts, map strategies for enforcing dipping regulations, and 
enforce payment of dipping fees. At each dipping, dipping cards were checked against the 
number of cattle brought to the tank.   
 
With their 1896-7 defeat still engraved in their memory, Africans complied with the ‘law’ 
because they believed that they had no choice. Their ‘resistance’ mainly manifested through 
holding onto certain vernacular ideas about livestock diseases, and by refusing to accept the 
colonial government’s explanations and goals.357 From its inception in 1904, dipping was 
characterised by the use of force such that 1914 it had become established as the key to tick 
eradication in certain parts of Southern Rhodesia.  
 
However, dipping was not smooth as its propagation was precluded by lack of resources, and 
strong legal instruments to buttress it. The government started by providing public tanks at 
trading centres where livestock owners paid a fee for the service. The dipping charge had the 
negative effect of discouraging both poor African and white livestock owners from utilising the 
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facility. To encourage everyone to dip the government scrapped dipping charges on public tanks 
in 1910, and also actively supported the construction of public tanks throughout the country. In 
that year alone, public tanks were constructed at Marandellas, Old Umtali, Gatooma, and 
Victoria. Over a three year period the number of dip tanks rose from 100 in 1910 to 215 in 1911 
(25 of which were public)
358
 before reaching 325 at the end of 1913.
359
 
 
Yet it is important to state that despite the controversy surrounding the introduction of dipping 
tanks, what had been a precarious position in 1902 had, by 1906, changed somewhat for the 
better amidst new outbreaks. Paradoxically, the period 1902-06, which was characterised by 
incessant outbreaks, was fruitful for many livestock owners as can be shown in Fig. 3.4
360
 below: 
 
Figure 3.4 Human and livestock census (1906) 
Figure 3.4 shows results of a human and livestock census carried in 1906. Impressive cattle 
statistics shown in the figure are particularly important to this discussion as the colonial officials 
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attributed them to dipping. In their writings, they generally acknowledged progress made among 
African livestock owners. For instance, in his 1905-6 report, the Administrator stated, ‘The 
natives are gradually seeing the benefits to be derived from dipping their small stock and keeping 
them clean, and I am pleased to say that scab is gradually being stamped out of their herds.’361 
By 1910, Africans were being commended for their obedience to veterinary regulations. That 
year the CVS exonerated Africans from the long held view that they were responsible for the 
spread of East Coast Fever. He stated that, ‘as a matter of fact, I think 80 per cent of the 
outbreaks have been done [sic] by the Europeans and not native cattle.’362 Native 
Commissioners’ reports also revealed that a large number of African-owned cattle were dipping, 
especially those on settler farms and in areas where dip tanks were available.  The NC Victoria 
stated unequivocally, ‘if the natives had not complied with the regulations, it is certain that the 
disease would never have been stamped out of Victoria.’363 Victoria had the country’s largest 
African cattle population and therefore, the disease was supposed to have become uncontrollable 
there but there were only two outbreaks in 1906 and 1907 with no reoccurrence. The probability 
of this being the result of the increase cannot be dismissed entirely but one needs to treat the 
impact of dipping tanks on the growth of African herds with caution. For a number of years after 
the Rinderpest outbreak, the colonial administration did not have adequate statistical data on 
African herds hence the reported increase may simply have been because the administration 
began to have stricter control over herds after the imposition of dipping and other ECF measures, 
and therefore got opportunity to update its books.
364
 In fact, in his 1904 Report the Chief Native 
Commissioner (Mashonaland) explained success in enforcing a number of laws including 
livestock disease control in outlying districts and their counting for taxation purpose. Or one may 
explain this increase to the fact that, as Cranefield has argued, African herds being remote from 
major transport routes avoided the disease between 1902 and 1906, and that Africans had drawn 
back from the Europeans.
365
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However, the shortage and in some cases total absence of dip tanks in certain reserves and farms  
precluded vets from enforcing dipping regulations, and this placed them in a conflict situation 
with certain white farmers who believed that African-owned livestock were essentially 
pathogenic.
366
 This was not entirely true as the disease tended to be prevalent in European-
owned herds. In fact, the disease did not hinder at all the natural increase of African herds which 
was estimated at 26.2 per cent per annum at a national level.
367
 Notwithstanding this impressive 
growth, there were differences across the colony’s ecological zones as some Africans, especially 
in Sebungwe, Gwelo, Wankie, Lomagundi, Urungwe, Chirundu, Hartley, Mtoko, Chipinga, 
Mazoe and Sabi Valley, did not have a noticeable increase until after 1910 on account of Tsetse 
fly.
368
 The national growth of cattle holdings is shown in Fig. 3.5
369
 below.   
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Figure 3.5: Estimated cattle holdings in Southern Rhodesia, 1901-1941 
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Thus, by 1910 a significant percentage of Africans were dipping was indeed great. However, this 
came about as a result of a careful and pragmatic implementation of the dipping ordinance. At 
first, dipping was not enforced in the reserves chiefly because of the fear that if forced to dip 
Africans could take it as another step towards dispossession of their cattle as had happened after 
the Anglo-Ndebele war of 1893-4 and the Chimurenga uprising of 1896-7(as discussed in 
Chapter 2). 
 
Compulsory dipping: Implications for African livestock owners (1914 -1930) 
By 1914, dipping had been practiced in the territory for a decade, and the following negative 
effects had been confirmed: a) poisoning due to the dipping fluid being over strength, death 
being caused by absorption of the arsenic through the skin and from thirsty cattle drinking the 
fluid. b) Injuries: calves dipped with the fully grown were liable to be drowned or hurt. c) Loss 
of immunity to Redwater through constant dipping.
370
 In fact, in 1913 these dangers were spelt 
out at the 1913 Bulawayo Veterinary Conference which was attended by Chief Veterinary 
Officers from Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, Mozambique Territory, Nyasaland, 
Portuguese East Africa, Bechuanaland, Belgian Congo, Swaziland, Basutoland and South Africa. 
Nonetheless, hardly a year later Southern Rhodesia passed the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance 
(1914). The chief motivator was that despite its side effects dipping reduced losses incurred due 
to ECF, liver disease, white scour, and other tick borne diseases in calves by up to 90 per cent.
371
 
These advantages were believed to extend to all animals on the farm: horses, mules, pigs, sheep, 
goats and dogs.
372
 This law made dipping mandatory in certain parts of the colony as it could 
only be applied in a district or area on the application of a majority of landowners in such a 
district or area.
373
 Even so, its enforcement in areas where it was compulsory was piecemeal as 
the prevalence of ticks was the dominating variable. For instance, the ordinance was enforced in 
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Victoria and Nyamandlovu Districts from 1916 and 1917 respectively. This meant that some 
areas began to dip much later than others.  
 
Nonetheless, its impact on dipping was immediate. In its first year of operation it was applied to 
78 per cent of the farms resulting in the rise of the number of dip tanks to 450 and it was in 
course for adoption over a further 20 per cent. By the end of 1918, when the cattle population 
had reached 1 200 000, compulsory dipping was in force throughout the country and 1 263 
dipping tanks were in regular use, a figure which had increased to over 2000 by 1921.
374
 These 
impressive results, however, need to be placed in their proper context if one is to get a clear 
picture of the local veterinary situation. They were impressive in the sense that they were 
accomplished when Southern Rhodesia faced a critical shortage of veterinary officials as local 
veterinary surgeons were recruited into the Cavalry Corps of the Allied armies. While Lawrence 
has lauded these developments as concrete achievements of white rule in African reserves, it is 
noteworthy that only 25 of these were public tanks.
375
 This meant that the majority of African 
livestock were being dipped on private tanks owned by settler farmers.  
 
Given the vigour with which this ordinance was applied from 1914, many Africans, for the first 
time, had to dip their cattle. However, this project immediately faced problems which other 
veterinary measures had confronted previously. African livestock owners who relied on 
government dip tanks paid one shilling per annum per beast dip fees, out of which was paid the 
total cost of running the service, including the purchase of dip fluid, pumps, and all wages and 
salaries.
376
 Some owners who were convinced of the benefit of dipping their cattle, were either 
unwilling or unable to pay the fees simply alternated their herd, bringing some one week and 
others the next week. The problem of ghost herds became a cause for concern for administrators 
as it resulted in the loss of revenue, and, more importantly, allowed certain species of ticks to 
survive. This problem was tackled in various ways but the most effective was to saturate the area 
served by one dip tank with dipping staff from other areas and district assistants who waited until 
all the herds were on their way to the dip tank, and then swooped on the remaining cattle found 
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in the kraals and in the grazing areas, marked them and then demanded an explanation from the 
owners who were fined if their excuse was not satisfactory.
377
  
 
Though exhibiting interest in meeting the demands of the ordinance, some Africans also had 
logistical reservations. The major problems associated with the shortage of dip tanks in the 
reserves included having to travel long distances, loss of stock through fatigue and through 
mingling with cattle from different areas, and inadvertently spreading diseases.
378
  Before a roster 
was put in place for different villages to dip on different days, people grazed their cattle around 
the tank while waiting for their turn. Sometimes this had disastrous results in that deaths occurred 
as a result of some cattle drinking the dip.
379
 In Salisbury District, Africans were not happy with 
dipping regulations in view of their work on land hence their NC reported, ‘It seems a pity that a 
risk should be run of making the dipping of cattle unpopular amongst the natives by, to the native 
mind, unnecessarily frequent dipping [sic].’380 In a letter to the Superintendent of Natives 
(Salisbury), the NC Goromonzi similarly reported that Africans in Seke Reserve expressed great 
dissatisfaction with the stipulation that dipping was to take place at intervals not exceeding seven 
days arguing that it would be impossible to attend to their cultivated lands if such was the case 
since their ‘whole time would be occupied in driving their cattle about.’381  He suggested that:  
As there has never been a known case of East Coast Fever in the Seki [sic] 
Reserve, and the cattle are exceptionally free from ticks, I would strongly urge 
that the interval of dipping be extended to once a month.  Some of the natives 
have to drive their cattle a distance of ten to twelve miles to reach the dip. If the 
dipping is to take place more often than once a month, I would recommend that 
the erection of a second dip in the vicinity of M’sungu’s kraal be considered.382  
 
While agreeing that Africans had a genuine grievance, the Acting CVS, C. Edmonds did not see 
how possible it was for them to be excluded from weekly dipping because they were included in 
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the Act hence, ‘The only satisfactory solution to this appears to be to give the natives further 
facilities for dipping.’383 This reveals the balance which those in the Native Department had to 
strike when dealing with Africans. On one hand, they had to enforce regulations that were blind to 
the deprived status of the black community, and on the other, ensure that the rights of the Africans 
were not impinged upon in the process. As this exchange shows, NCs generally sympathised with 
the Africans. Since the state was not prepared to meet the expense for the construction of a second 
dip tank in Seki Reserve, it was suggested that the natives raise the funds themselves
384
 to which 
the NC Goromonzi responded negatively.
385
   
 
Attempts to apply the ordinance in Matabeleland also faced resistance from both Africans and 
native commissioners. In 1916, the NC Wankie wrote to the Superintendent of Natives 
(Bulawayo) arguing that proposals necessitated by the Compulsory Dipping Ordinance (1914) 
were impracticable because:  
Natives own a considerable number of cattle, scattered over a wide area of the 
district. Even if several tanks were erected for native stock, regular and 
compulsory dipping cannot be undertaken. Certain stock would have to travel 50-
100 miles on occasion of dipping. In the rainy season, when rivers are flooded, 
stock could not be sent to the tanks.
386
  
 
So prevalent was resistance that the Superintendent of Natives (Bulawayo) wrote to the CNC 
explaining that, ‘in normal times, the prejudices and opposition of the natives in this area should 
be over-ruled for their good, but under present conditions and circumstances I doubt the wisdom 
of a sudden extension of compulsory dipping.’387 As an official mandated to deal with the social 
welfare of Africans, the Superintendent of Natives was convinced that since many Africans had,  
not come into contact with civilisation, they are inconceivably suspicious. 
Undoubtedly the introduction of dipping will meet with strong opposition. While 
such opposition will probably be passive, it is also quite possible that more or less 
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wholesale slaughter of stock will take place. You will remember what happened 
in 1901 and on other occasions. The present time is hardly opportune for the 
introduction into a remote district of a measure which, to say the least of it, might 
have a disturbing effect.
388
  
 
The construction of dip tanks for the use of Africans in Wankie continued to attract so much 
debate in government circles because of that district’s exceptionalities. Ideally, the cost of the 
construction of such dip tanks was achieved with fees collected from livestock owners but 
Wankie presented difficulties. In 1917, unlike in 1916, the Superintendent of Natives explained in 
a detailed manner:  
Conditions in Wankie District differ from those generally obtaining in the 
following respects:  1. The new tick is a special source of danger to cattle in that 
district and possibly to those of the whole district. 2. That owing to successive 
droughts and the normal scarcity of water there, Wankie presents great difficulties 
in the way of the application of the Ordinance in addition to which 3. The native 
population and native cattle are sparse and widely scattered over a large area, so 
much so that I doubt the financial ability of the owners to meet the expense.
389
  
 
The concentration of cattle in certain localities was suggested with the cost of such measures 
being borne by Africans but this did not have sufficient support due to the scarcity of water and 
grazing pasture.
390
 The case of Wankie revealed, in a telling way, that the provision of dip tanks 
in the reserves was indelibly linked to the ability of livestock owners to make contributions. With 
the company’s continuous failure to meet the colony’s budgetary needs, Native Commissioners 
were mandated to collect money from African cattle owners for the construction of dip tanks. At 
times, the Ministry of Lands and Agriculture through the NC assisted in financing the 
construction of some tanks. The discrepancy was that responsibility for the construction of 
dipping tanks was left to each NC.
391
 Many dip tanks were constructed from subscriptions by 
cattle owners. This was started in Mrewa District in 1915 and, by 1920 it was already in general 
practise in many districts.  
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Generally, correspondence by NCs from the time the ordinance was passed reveals the inability of 
African livestock owners to build their own tanks. In areas where there were settler farms, a stop-
gap measure was adopted: that Africans dip at private tanks belonging to settler farmers at an 
undisclosed fee. However, many Africans were still not sure of its benefits. Their concerns were 
captured succinctly by the Superintendent of Natives (Bulawayo):  
I met the chiefs Nematanga and Nekatalubi together with sixty of their followers. 
Dipping was the principal subject discussed. They told me that they were quite 
prepared loyally to carry out without question any instructions they received from 
the government but that I was not to understand them to say that they expected 
any benefits from dipping.  They had, many years before, dipped their sheep and 
goats under instructions from their Native Commissioner with the result that most 
had died. They expected their cattle to die. However, they were in the hands of the 
government to whom they would be obedient.
392
  
 
This letter reveals the undercurrents of resistance. It also reveals the suspicion that existed 
regarding these veterinary measures, and that Africans only dipped because they were mandated 
to do so. That there were rumours that livestock was supposedly being killed deliberately by 
colonial officials was not unique to Southern Rhodesia.  Using rumour and gossip as historical 
sources, White discusses the context in which biomedicine was practiced, how biomedical 
technologies were believed to work as well as how much power was invested in their application 
in colonial Africa.
393
 She also examines the interaction of African ideas on diseases and imperial 
science and argues that the vampire accusations that emerged in Northern Rhodesia involved local 
and colonial ideas about the relationship between wild animals, tsetse flies, authority and shifting 
cultivation practices.
394
 Although colonial officials in Southern Rhodesia, as will be below, 
dismissed such rumours, oral interviews with elderly Africans suggests that many Africans 
believed them.
395
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All over the country, for instance, Charter and Marandellas Districts, there were rumours that 
Africans were killing their livestock on account of high dipping fees demanded by settler 
landowners. However, in Southern Rhodesia NCs dismissed that rumour in their reports to the 
Superintendent of Natives (Salisbury).
396
 An exception is the report given by NC Insiza: 
 I have not heard of any cases where natives have been killing their cattle in 
consequence of the high dipping charges, but from remarks made at different 
meetings I have held in connection with dipping, I am convinced that the natives 
have come to the conclusion that it is a crime in the eyes of the government, and 
the European land-owners for them to own cattle. That they should come to such 
a conclusion is not surprising when we find the owners of all the occupied lands 
in the territory using the Ordinance as a means of improving their property at the 
expense of their native tenants.
397
 (My emphasis) 
 
Although this NC did not see the particular correlation between the exorbitant dipping fees and 
the tendency by Africans to kill their livestock, what is clear is that, overall, Africans felt that 
dipping regulations made it difficult for them to rear livestock.  
 
Reported cases of Africans who contested the basis upon which compulsory dipping lay were 
dealt with indirectly. Rather than censure the culprits, the administration punished some chiefs 
and headmen for failure to lead their people in following government dipping regulations.  Chief 
Gutu of Victoria District was a notable example. Although dipping was not yet compulsory in 
Gutu, his ‘crime’ was that he did not encourage his subjects ‘in every way’ to dip voluntarily, 
and that he had also ‘opposed’ the Native Commissioner’s efforts in the matter.398 But since that 
was hardly an offence for which he could be tried for under the Native Regulations, the CNC 
was, ‘of the opinion that Gutu’s studied attitude of opposition to the government would be better 
dealt with by reduction of his subsidy… and I recommend that this chief’s subsidy be reduced 
from £5 to 5s per mensem.’399 While this course of action was eventually abandoned, Chief Gutu 
                                                 
396
 For instance, see NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917- 23, letter from NC Charter to CNC, 01/11/1917; 
NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23, letter from NC Marandellas, 12/12/1917. 
397
 NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23, NC Insiza to the Superintendent of Natives Bulawayo, 08/11/1917. 
398
 NAZ A3/18/18/12 Chiefs and headmen: Non-compliance with government orders, letter from the CNC to the 
Secretary, Department of the Administrator, 16/10/1917. 
399
 NAZ A3/18/18/12 Chiefs and headmen: Non-compliance with government orders, letter from the CNC to the 
Secretary, Dept. of Administrator, 16/10/1917.  
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
98 
 
escaped with a warning that his subsidy would be stopped if he did not support the government. 
Across the country, several other chiefs found themselves in this situation if the native 
commissioners felt that they were not encouraging their subjects to follow instructions from 
colonial officials.
400
  
 
By 1918, the number of dip tanks needed on unalienated lands throughout the country amounted 
to 66.
401
 This was considered a heavy responsibility hence the suggestion by W. Olive, the BSAC 
Commercial Representative, that the BSAC could be relieved of the responsibility for the 
construction of dip tanks at a cost of £6 750 if such lands were alienated or if African living on 
such lands were moved to reserves or if arrangements were made with adjoining landowners.
402
 
The BSAC’s rejection of the Native Department’s schedule for the urgent construction of 51 dip 
tanks for an estimated 39 500 cattle in 15 African areas in unalienated lands in 1919, therefore, 
did not result in the stoppage of the project but added a financial burden on the Africans.
 403
 The 
BSAC justified their stance on the Privy Council’s 1918 ruling which stated that unalienated land 
neither belonged to the BSAC, settlers nor Africans but to the Crown.
404
 Nevertheless, this project 
resulted in a significant increase in the number of cattle being dipped; 158 526 on farms and 343 
379 on reserves and unsurveyed land.
405
 In 1919, the total number of cattle being dipped was 503 
465 which was only 110 311 cattle less than the number of cattle estimated to be in the country.
406
  
 
An amendment to the dipping ordinance resulted in the Cattle Cleaning Ordinance (1918) which 
gave full powers to cattle inspectors to inspect any cattle at any time and to take samples from the 
contents of any dipping tank. The inspection and reporting of disease in areas where there were 
few cattle inspectors was also dealt with. In such areas, if an animal died before the cause of death 
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was detected, the owner was required to send the spleen or liver of the dead animal to the dip 
attendant, who in turn prepared blood smears to send to the Veterinary Office for analysis. Such 
measures were mostly used in the Native Reserves as the government did not have enough cattle 
inspectors to effectively inspect cattle.
407
 Unlike the 1914 ordinance, this made dipping 
compulsory in all parts of the colony. Furthermore, any cattle with 10 or more engorged ticks 
were declared ‘tick-infested,’ and failure to dip became a punishable crime. The impact of this 
ordinance on dipping was tremendous. By 1927, dip tanks had expanded significantly throughout 
the country, and relatively large numbers of cattle were dipping as can be shown in Table 3.1 
below.
408
 
 
Table 3.1: Return of Cattle and Dipping Tanks 
Veterinary District No. of tanks No. of cattle. 
Salisbury East 439 251 860 
Salisbury West 455 191 053 
Umtali 233 112 049 
Melsetter 104 37 655 
Fort Victoria 250 407 245 
Gwelo 507 403 121 
Bulawayo 701 980 446 
Total 2 689 2 383 429 
 
However, making dipping compulsory at a time when the government did not control the dipping 
fee turned out to be a recipe for the exploitation of Africans who dipped at private tanks. There 
were big disparities on charges for dipping on alienated land and reserves. Although dipping fees 
varied from district to district, Africans who dipped at government tanks paid a lot less than those 
depending on private tanks. Terms entered into with private tank owners were generally usurious 
hence some Africans had to sell their livestock to offset debts they owed. Resultantly, Africans 
residing on European farms decided to move to reserves where dipping charges were cheaper.
409
 
In light of the exploitation of African livestock owners, one commission of enquiry reported, 
‘there is evidence of instances where natives have been charged an exorbitant fee, in some of 
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which it is feared that the dipping solutions were quite useless. With a view to preventing 
excessive charges, it is proposed that the Administrator may further provide by regulation for the 
fixing of a dipping fee.’410  
 
By 1924, more than 10 000 African-owned cattle were dipped at privately owned tanks at the 
rate of 1d per immersion.
411
 This meant that private dip tank owners got £41.13.0 per immersion 
for 10 000 cattle yet the real cost of dipping fluid was one shilling per head per year for weekly 
dipping.
412
 One result to come out of this was that some Africans stopped dipping some of their 
cattle, that is, the so-called danga redhibha (cattle to be dipped) and danga resango (cattle to be 
hidden).
 413
 For example, in 1920 in Nyanga, out of more than 18 600 cattle about 17 053 dipped 
regularly while 1 547 did not dip.
414
 In 1930 and 1931, an estimated 1 650 and 1 275 respectively 
did not dip. He even suggested that there might have been more cattle which were not registered 
and so were not dipping.
415
  
 
At the time of the passage of the Cattle Cleansing Ordinance (1918), the recommended number 
of cattle per tank was 1 000 but in the reserves this was hardly the case. For instance, in Nyanga 
District only two tanks had been constructed by 1923 to serve all the reserves in the district.
416
 
These two plus four private-owned tanks served 11 807 African owned cattle in the District.
417
 In 
Nyamandlovu District, there were three tanks for approximately 33 339 head of cattle.
418
 In 
Wedza, a government constructed tank at Chehave served a large area comprising Zviyambe, 
Makanda, Ruzawi and Goneso, estimated to have 15 000 cattle.
419
 These problems were to 
worsen after the Morris Carter Commission (1925), constituted to report into the expediency and 
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practicability of setting apart defined areas outside the boundaries of the Native Reserves, 
reported in favour of a policy of separate land purchase areas for Africans and Europeans. These 
recommendations resulted in the passage of the Land Apportionment Act (1930) marked the 
formal beginning of a separate land policy. 
 
One thing that was to pose considerable challenges to African livestock owners was the 
assumption by colonial officials that African-owned cattle living on unalienated land would be 
dipped at adjourning farms for a reasonable fee. Perhaps the most striking example regarding 
dipping and the onerous challenges faced by those upon whom this task fell is that of Tshabuda, 
Tjilimani, Bulawa, Kulumanga and Manuka who pleaded to W. Lees of Alali Farm (Matopo) if 
his dip tank could be made available to their cattle as they had been notified by the police or 
Veterinary Department that they must dip.
420
 Since the nearest government dip tank was ten 
miles away, and near the site of an ECF outbreak in the Figtree area, they had to move their 
cattle to and fro over infected veldt at the risk of picking up and spreading this disease.
421
 Lees 
turned them down for fear that such cattle from a declared infected area posed a big risk to his 
over 400 head of ‘pedigree’ cattle  as well as 124 head of African owned stock kraaled on this 
farm.
422
 He criticised the Administration: 
I respectfully want to point out that it is the business of the Administration to 
build dipping tanks at suitable points so that the natives can comply with the 
regulations of the Cattle Cleaning Ordinance… This point of moving healthy 
cattle from kraals where no East Coast Fever is known, to and fro and across the 
site, and all the surrounding veldt – where East Coast Fever is known to have 
existed and been prevalent is the height of this folly.
423
  
 
Following this powerful letter the government decided to construct two dipping tanks in the 
unsurveyed, unalienated land in the Matopo Hills area.  
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The search for a suitable acaricide, 1918 – 1927 
As has already been discussed, controversy over dipping partly centred on its impact on 
livestock. However, the search for a dip solution which was capable of destroying ticks without 
causing a certain amount of inconvenience to the animal dipped only began after the enactment 
of the Cattle Cleansing Ordinance (1918). This was probably the first official recognition that 
there was something wrong with the country’s dipping solutions. Investigations into the death of 
ten working oxen at the Agricultural Experimental Station in 1919 which revealed that they died 
from arsenic poisoning resulted in serious state-funded research into dipping solutions.
424
  
 
These problems at the Agricultural Experimental station were, in actual fact, a microcosm of the 
macrocosm. Similar deaths were recorded among  cattle African-owned in Charter but the NC 
denied culpability when he reported, ‘A considerable number of deaths have occurred amongst 
calves both by being trampled down in the muddy kraals by big cattle and scalding, the three-day 
dipping presumably being too strong for them. There were also deaths of big cattle from arsenic 
poisoning.’425 The Veterinary Department merely stated ‘the deaths of big cattle were due to 
sheer neglect on the part of the native owners and that the scalding of calves was occasioned by 
the severe climatic conditions then existing and to the fact that these particular cattle had not 
been dipped before, the strength of the dip was regularly tested and found correct.’426 In this 
case, the Veterinary Department was only trying to mask a big problem it had failed to resolve 
since the introduction of dipping in the territory. The problem can be seen in the proliferation of 
cattle dips available for sale in 1920. In fact, there were six different kinds of cattle dip on the 
Southern Rhodesian market: Champion Star Dip, Cooper’s Tixol Cattle Dip, St O’Gorman Cattle 
Dip, Capex Cattle Dip, and McDougall Cattle Dip – all approved in terms of the Cattle Cleansing 
Ordinance. Efforts to standardise the strength of these dips did not bear desired results. For 
instance, in 1922, an analysis of the Melsetter Commonage Dip revealed that the fluid was 
considerably over-strength, and that it had also been fatal to certain calves.
427
 The Chief Chemist 
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doubted whether the cattle inspector’s test of the fluid was helpful, pointing out that, ‘owing to 
the high degree of oxidation, the cattle inspector’s test of the fluid is no criterion of its actual 
strength. From the figures of our analysis, the fluid is shown to be considerably over strength for 
weekly dipping, and it has proved fatal to calves.’428 By 1925, this problem had largely remained 
unsolved and, therefore, prompted the Chief Chemist to seek counsel from the Director of 
Veterinary Education and Research (Pretoria):  
Experience in Rhodesia indicates that cattle dipped in solutions of the prescribed 
strength for short intervals, either 5 day or 3 day interval, are severely scalded, 
and that two of the proprietary dips suitable for “short interval” dipping are 
Cooper’s Improved and St O’Gorman’s. Doubtless you have studied this question 
very closely, and for any information you can give us concerning it we shall be 
very grateful.
429
  
 
The search for a dip which combined maximum tick-killing efficiency with minimum risk to the 
animals was futile because, although the total arsenic content in all proprietary dips by 1930 was 
equivalent to 64 grams per hundred cubic centimetres of strong solution, they had somewhat 
different compositions.
430
  
 
Attempts by the Veterinary Department to prosecute white dip tank owners who dipped their 
livestock and African-owned cattle in weak solutions turned out to be in vain since the Cattle 
Cleansing Ordinance (1918) did not have such a clause. Impromptu tests carried by cattle 
inspectors at private dip tanks were proved inadmissible in a court of law as the Rex versus 
Coulson case (tried at Mazoe Magistrate’s Court) demonstrated. Although the cattle inspector’s 
records indicated that for several months, the defendant had, in spite of warning, persisted in 
dipping not only his own cattle in very weak solutions but also many African-owned cattle for 
which he received payment, he was acquitted.
431
 Evidence submitted by the Chemist was 
dismissed as the magistrate maintained that the only kind of dip sample which could constitute 
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valid evidence under the Ordinance was one taken during, or immediately after dipping of 
stock.
432
 This ruling caused the following procedures to be adopted when it was found necessary 
to prosecute for dipping below strength:  
Having found out on what day the suspected farmer dips, the C/I (Cattle 
inspector) should inform him (dip tank owner) that he intends to be present at a 
dipping to take samples, invite him to be present, and ask him to reply as to the 
suitability of the day specified. On the dipping day, he should proceed to the farm 
accompanied by a witness (preferably a policeman), and taking 3 carefully 
cleaned bottles. During dipping he should draw a large sample in a thoroughly 
clean bucket or paraffin tin: from this he should fill each of the three bottles…. To 
each bottle he should affix a label with the following particulars: owner, farm, dip 
used, date taken and signed by: Taker of sampler and witness.
433
  
 
In addition, making the certificate of analysis sufficient evidence admissible in a court of law 
was made possible by the Cattle Cleansing Act (1927). In addition to this, the Act modified the 
definition of tick-infested animals to include all livestock with 5 or more engorged ticks. It 
recommended a seven day cleansing scheme for most of the areas except for areas such as 
Nyamandlovu, Gwaai and Tjolotjo in Matabeleland where they had to dip every 5 days due to 
higher tick infestation.
434
  
 
In the reserves and areas where there were public tanks, the need to supervise the strength of the 
dip brought with it unexpected results. One, which deserves considerable discussion, was the 
belief that Africans could not supervise the strength and, therefore, needed the supervision of a 
European whose salary was paid from contributions by livestock owners. The 1920s, a 
particularly difficult ecological period characterised by the 1922 drought, gave opportunity for 
contradictions within the white community to manifest. Given that Africans bore a plethora of 
socio-economic responsibilities, some liberal whites sought to defend them from colonial 
inequalities. A rumour circulated in Marandellas District to the effect that the Chief Native 
Commissioner, H.J. Taylor, had sanctioned the Native Department  to levy 1/6 a head on the 
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estimated 15 000 African owned cattle with the object of appointing a European cattle inspector 
and advisor for African stockowners in the district.
435
 A very vocal and liberal white missionary, 
A. Cripps, protested the rumoured changes:  
I would register a very solemn protest against the imposition of any such levy at 
this particular time. It is generally understood, I should imagine, that there are 
very grave objections just now to the loading up (with any extra local burdens) of 
native life in our Mashonaland reserves. Natives have had a very stern struggle 
with hunger. I should think it probable that hundreds of natives in Marandellas 
district have not paid last year’s Government tax as yet. What with the collection 
of dog tax, and with dipping fees superadded, our Natives’ struggle for existence 
after coming through a terrible period of scarcity is hard enough already. I hope to 
hear that any idea of the kind I have indicated is to be abandoned.
436
  
 
Regarding the argument brought forward by the NCs to the effect that African stockowners in 
Marandellas were demanding the services of a European cattle inspector, and were willing to pay 
for the services, Cripps, argued, ‘their ideas for the improvement of the native are quite sound, 
and for his betterment, but the time is not yet. It always seems to me such a simple matter for a 
native commissioner in Rhodesia to make natives say anything they want them to….’437  
 
A letter of similar tone was also received from Reverend John White of Waddilove Training 
Institution (Marandellas). Unlike Cripps who wrote directly to the CNC, White chose to air his 
protest by appealing to a bigger audience as he send his complaint to the Editor of the Rhodesia 
Herald. His main concern was the ‘unprocedural’ manner the issue of white cattle inspectors was 
being dealt with hence he asked rhetorically: 
Is there not a very important political principle involved in this proposal? Where 
there is taxation, there should be some form of representation. If, as your 
correspondent suggests, these European supervisors of dipping are to be generally 
adopted and schemes for the improvement of stock introduced, for which, of 
course, the native must pay, should not the matter be brought before the 
Legislative Council, where it can be fully and freely discussed? Should not the 
natives too in some way be consulted in this matter?
438
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Like-minded whites also wrote supporting this stance. A letter by Archibald McDonald which 
reiterated White’s contention ended in a very revealing way, ‘For the missionaries are labouring 
not … for the good of one race but for the good of all races and Rhodesia.’439 With this show of 
support, Cripps wrote another personal letter to the CNC arguing that, ‘If assistance be required 
by the Native Department, let the Vet Department provide such extra assistance. I submit that it 
is grossly unfair that the burden of the cost of extra assistance required in a job that is pre-
eminently a Vet Department job, should be thrown on to the Natives directly, when Europeans 
are given the services of the Vet Department in the ordinary course of things.’440 Members of the 
Native Affairs Department dismissed MacDonald as being influenced by White and Cripps. He 
was not thought of as a ‘suitable’ candidate to criticise the dipping policy in African areas 
because he ‘kept a native woman some time ago and has a half caste child living with him on his 
farm at present.’441 These slanderous statements notwithstanding, the fact that veterinary services 
favoured whites while disenfranchising African livestock owners and that NAD officials were 
playing a key role in perpetuating disparities in accessing them could not be hidden.   
 
The NC Marandellas among other things responded to the issue of white supervision of African 
dipping, and the allegation that the Vet Department was offering the same services to settler 
farmers free of charge. In a letter to the Superintendent of Natives (Salisbury), he denied that the 
Veterinary Department was supervising the dipping of cattle belonging to Europeans. Before 
telling Cripps to confine his activities to African spiritual welfare, and to cease to ‘meddle’ in 
administrative measures which were not his immediate concern, the NC argued, ‘There is 
certainly inspection not supervision as Mr Cripps implies. Furthermore, the European knows 
what he is doing, and realises the dangers of poisoning cattle but we cannot expect the same 
degree of responsibility from the individual native.’442 This did not reduce the heat generated by 
the missionaries’ contestations hence the CNC found himself having to clarify issues to the 
Secretary (Department of the Administrator). Regarding the imposition of the levy, he argued 
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that certain headmen and chiefs in Marandellas District had approached the NC with a request 
that three more dipping tanks be erected, and that well-bred bulls be bought from their funds to 
improve their herds.
443
 He emphasised that there was no levy whatsoever, as this was a voluntary 
collection by the Africans from which a European cattle inspector they particularly requested, 
was appointed and paid.
444
 He accused missionaries of confusing Africans and undermining the 
idea that NCs were there to help them. To him, there was nothing wrong in ‘encouraging and 
educating the native mind to the advantages to be gained by the systematic care and 
improvement of their main source of wealth – their herds – and it is obvious that any 
manifestation of a desire to improve, as in this instance, merits the greatest encouragement from 
the government.’445 The problem though was, as Cripps pointed out, that there was ‘no 
machinery in shape at present for gauging the mass opinion in the back blocks of any really large 
Native Reserve, whether in Marandellas or any other district known to me.’446 
Dipping: African livestock owners’ views 
While it has been shown how the colonial state set up its veterinary regime, and how white 
livestock owners reacted to veterinary policy, it is imperative to locate dipping within the 
colonial milieu, and explain how African livestock owners reacted to the changes the colonial 
state effected. It is important to state that state’s imagination of the African reserves and African-
owned livestock as ‘diseased’ served both a scientific and social purpose. Firstly, its scientific 
purpose was interwoven with the need for the eradication of tick-borne livestock diseases which 
were a constant hindrance to the development of capitalist modes of livestock management. 
Secondly, its social purpose concerned the settler intention to ‘transfer’ technology and technical 
knowledge, often presented as development and improvement, to ‘barbaric’ Africans.447 As has 
already been shown, the dip card, the power behind the enforcement of dipping, was also a 
powerful enumerative tool for administrative purposes.  
                                                 
443
 NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23, letter from CNC to the Secretary, Dept. of the Administrator, 
12/06/1923. 
444
 NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23, letter from CNC to the Secretary, Dept. of the Administrator, 
12/06/1923.  
445
 NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23, letter from the CNC to the Secretary, Dept. of the Administrator, 
12/06/1923. 
446
 NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23, letter from A. Cripps to CNC, 25/06/23. 
447
 S. Brooks, ‘Images of ‘Wild Africa’: nature tourism and the (re)creation of Hluhluwe game reserve, 1930-1945’, 
Journal of Historical Geography 31 (2005), 220-240. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
108 
 
 
One fundamental point of conflict between veterinary officials and Africans emanated from 
conflicting beliefs on the role of ticks in the propagation of livestock diseases. Studies in a 
related colonial context, the Cape, have revealed that ticks were accepted by Cape settler farmers 
as the cause for certain diseases because they were visible and their vicious bites being tangible 
evidence to the harm they caused to livestock.
448
 In contrast, in Southern Rhodesia, as has 
already been shown, dipping only came to Africans as an unexplained government directive. In 
typical fashion of NAD officials, self-styled specialists in African affairs, dipping was literally 
‘dropped’ on Africans ‘out of the blue.’449 In their interaction with veterinary issues and African 
livestock regimes, vets considered the countryside a ‘blank page on which they could write their 
authority.’450 Reports from native commissioners reveal that dipping (and its intended purpose of 
eradicating ticks) was not appreciated since prior to colonisation, African livestock owners 
argued, ‘native’ cattle had always had ticks but had not been susceptible to epizootics.451  
 
Though African livestock owners were not able to mobilise ‘scientific’ explanations in 
connecting tick-borne epizootics to colonial intrusion, their thinking was not entirely wrong. As 
is discussed in Chapter 4, serious problems with tick-borne diseases were linked to the 
introduction of tick-infested exotic livestock breeds into the territory.
452
 The fledgling capitalist 
economy depended heavily on ox transport hence cattle infested with ticks, and infected with 
tick-borne disease agents were moved into areas where such tick species did not exist previously. 
Given that ECF was mainly prevalent in towns and commercial centres where transport riders 
had traversed, and also that the government did not have adequate financial resources to build 
many dip tanks across the territory, certain African areas experienced dipping much earlier than 
others. However, rumour circulated to the effect that ECF was caused by dipping, inoculation or 
spraying. In tackling this rumour, the Veterinary Department deliberately left infected African 
                                                 
448
 Gilfoyle, ‘The heartwater mystery’ 153. 
449
 Bessant, ‘Coercive Development,’ 42. 
450
 I. Hofmeyr, “We spend our years as a tale that is told” Oral historical narrative in a South African Chiefdom, 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1993), 73. 
451
 See NAZ N3/18/2-3 Livestock: General 1917-23. 
452
 J.E. George, J.M. Pound and R.B. Davey, “Chemical control of ticks on cattle and the resistance of these 
parasites to acaricides” Parasitology, 129, S1 (2004), S353. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
109 
 
herds to die, and then intervened when it was clear that the disease was coming from 
elsewhere.
453
 The suspicion that veterinary policies were part of a bigger colonial scheme was 
not limited to Southern Rhodesian African livestock owners. Hofmeyr has argued that fencing 
regulations in rural South Africa were also construed as ‘part of a more general white invasion 
whose object was to dispossess Africans of their livestock.’454  
 
Dipping offered an opportunity for the colonial governments to reshape the interaction between 
people and their livestock. Africans came to realise its potential revolutionary impact on 
livestock regimes in the reserves. In particular, dipping was at odds with African livestock 
regimes as it involved ceding livestock control to an outsider (a white veterinary official) as well 
as counting whose purpose was not really understood. One’s cattle herd came under close 
government scrutiny, and attempts to influence the breed of livestock they could rear were also 
made through livestock improvement lessons often delivered at the local dip tank.
455
 
Furthermore, the fact that compulsion was used to make African livestock owners provide 
building materials, and take part in the construction of dip tanks forced some to consider that 
kind of work as chibaro (forced labour) – commonly used by the BSAC in the construction of 
roads, railway lines, and  on European farms.
456
 Forced labour – chibaro – has justifiably been 
considered as ‘the baldest manifestation of the coercion inherent in colonialism.’457 Therefore, 
dipping ‘concretised’ other restrictive colonial measures Africans had to deal with. Indeed, 
Beinart has argued convincingly that new technical ideas were seldom socially neutral and 
conservation interventions in African agriculture were often examples of the imposition of 
technical ideas.
458
 The top-down nature of the introduction of dip tanks boomeranged on the 
administration because much later when dipping became widely discredited it became difficult to 
meet Africans to ‘impress’ on them its advantages for fear that it would suggest ‘that the 
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desirability of dipping was in question.’459 It also interfered with daily lives as people had to 
travel long distances in order to dip. 
 
Dipping legislation dictated that all livestock were supposed to be brought forward for dipping at 
a fee. One Shona elder, Majoni Hombarume stated, ‘Cattle must dip because that is the law of 
the white man. What else can we do when they declared that cattle must dip? We were not 
supposed to resist orders. Our task was just to oblige.’460 Indeed, one popular Shona expression 
Dhibha harina mhuru (even the calves must dip) demonstrates both the rigorous nature of the 
colonial dipping system, and how foreign the idea was to existing notions of livestock disease 
control among black Africans. African livestock owners read the state’s seriousness about 
dipping from the fact that even calves, despite their delicate nature, were not spared from the 
rigorous process of dipping.  Furthermore, the categorisation of their herds as danga redhibha 
(herds to be dipped) and danga resango (ghost herds) reveals their aversion to it.
461
 Hiding of 
livestock from colonial administrators, as shown in chapter 3, started sometime after the Ndebele 
Loot scandal in Matabeleland in 1894. However, by 1914, the practice had become prevalent as 
to cause bureaucratic concern. For instance, the Statistician was alarmed by the 1914 statistics of 
cattle belonging to Africans that he remarked: 
I am of the opinion that the number of number of horned cattle belonging to the Natives at 
the end of 1914 has been greatly underestimated. There is no need to refer to the extreme 
repugnance that natives have for any sort of inquiry into their possessions, nor to the 
obstacles that are invariably placed in the way of any attempt to get at the numbers of their 
livestock, but the desire for concealment naturally lends itself to error of this description… 
the figures relating to European farmers shows an increase of over 100 per centum. There 
is reason to believe that the rate of increase amongst natives’ cattle is normally greater than 
amongst Europeans’ herds.462  
 
The Statistician’s suspicions were real as they touched on an important issue of ghost herds, and 
yet nothing could be done as there were other factors that hid African livestock from such 
scrutiny. However, his concerns could not ignite an inquiry into African livestock regimes as 
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Native Commissioners explained the discrepancy by arguing that between 1911 and 1914 there 
were droughts hence Africans sold their livestock to Europeans, and that there were floods at the 
end of 1914 which destroyed many calves and young beasts.
463
  
 
Besides interfering with immediate human-animal relationships, dipping tanks had an impact on 
African cultural habits as Africans sought to negotiate new forms of interaction in a colonial set 
up. It strengthened certain cultural habits while new others were developed. Prohibitive dipping 
fees necessitated and popularised cultural habits such as kuronzera / ukusisa (cattle loaning) as 
large livestock owners spread their herds among relatives and friends. Cattle loaning had long 
played the purpose of preventing overgrazing, reducing losses due to disease by dividing the 
herd, and enabling the poor to access milk and build their own herds. In the colonial era, some 
Africans continued with the practice which also became a popular way of ‘hiding’ cattle from 
seizure by authorities.
464
 Archival sources are replete with stories of how the keeping of ‘ghost’ 
herds became a bureaucratic nightmare for colonial officials in general and veterinary officials in 
general.  The hidden ownership of cattle challenged white claims to domination and control. 
‘Cattle trade’ that also grew increasingly during this time was simultaneously both a 
‘centrepiece’ of relations between Africans and Europeans and a hidden arena in which herds 
were concealed from investigators, placed outside the reach of regulations, and moved to official 
and unofficial markets away from roads, and out of view, without permits.
465
 As such, these 
covert acts were in themselves a critique of the superficial power the colonial state held over the 
colonies.
466
  
 
Given the numerous pressures which dipping placed upon African livestock regimes, the dip tank 
assumed a new meaning other than that offered by colonial officials. It also came to symbolise a 
convenient platform for demonstrating loyalty to the administration. Archival evidence suggests 
that in many areas some Africans simply obliged without necessarily understanding the logic 
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behind dipping. For instance, in a classic demonstration of what Bundy calls ‘reluctant 
acquiescence’467 or Scott’s ‘self-protecting compliance’468 Chief Manjikili told the CNC that his 
people were dipping, ‘not because they thought the methods adopted in dealing with the disease 
were correct, but because we recognised that what the Government said was Law.’469 This 
objectification of dipping tallies with Scott’s contention that farmers are ‘pragmatically alert to 
knowledge coming from any quarter should it serve their purposes.’470  
 
Africans were prepared to accommodate state veterinary measures (which they referred as the 
Law) so long they did not have negative effects on their herds. In apparent reference to culling, 
Manjikili argued that his people had never had occasion for their confidence in the Government 
to waver, but that they were hurt by the killing of their cattle hence they wondered, ‘whether the 
government really desire us to live: why have the officials deliberately destroyed our cattle? 
How can the Government expect us to assist them when we see our healthy cattle killed by these 
officials?’471 That Manjikili suggested that cattle had been ‘deliberately’ killed, and that this 
made it difficult for his subject to ‘assist’ the government shows that some Africans followed 
veterinary regulations, not because they agreed with their stated purpose, but because they 
wanted to please vets. In his report, the CNC acknowledged that African livestock owners were 
angry but accused them of behaving like children, ‘because it was nonsense for them to think the 
government was no longer interested in their welfare.’472 Paternalistic notions in this statement 
are detectable. In fact, the CNC proceeded to appease Africans for their livestock losses by 
offering them compensation. This was against the general practice that livestock owners (both 
white and black) were not compensated for their losses due to veterinary sanctioned culling.
473
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Such compromises often brought conflict between the Native Affairs and Veterinary 
Departments, and in the process this demonstrated the fractured nature of colonial administration 
in Southern Rhodesia. Contradictions played out more clearly in the African reserves. The main 
concern of Veterinary Department was protecting, and controlling epizootics while to the Native 
Affairs Department, and the government in general ‘public order was of paramount importance 
hence anything that threaten to undermine that had to be avoided as far as possible.’474 Given this 
consideration, NCs, who were also veterinary caregivers, were torn apart on how to proceed, and 
this explains the haphazard nature of the enforcement of dipping regulations in different parts of 
the territory. In some instances, they did not rigorously enforce dipping as they feared that it 
would provoke resistance throughout the reserves. At times, there were even exemptions to the 
ordinance especially mombe dzemadiramhamba or inkomo zamadhlozi (bulls dedicated to the 
ancestral spirits). NCs knew that such animals would not be produced for dipping if there was 
any likelihood for them being interfered with while at the dipping tank in any other way than the 
mere act of dipping.
475
 Interestingly, most Africans, as shown by Chief Manjikili’s statement to 
the CNC, were also careful not to appear to defy government regulations. Thus, there was mutual 
distrust on both sides of the racial divide with either side choosing to tread carefully for fear of 
repercussions.  
 
On one hand, Africans had to walk the tight rope of civil obedience expected by the 
administration, and on the other, complain without offending the authorities. Zachrisson has 
shown how African reacted to the encroachment of the settler economy in Belingwe. His 
findings are important for this study especially his categorisation of ‘rumour’ as a form of 
unorganised African reaction to European rule prior to the 1920s.
476
 He notes that in the rural 
areas of Belingwe the older forms of response consisting of tax evasions, contraventions of pass 
laws, non-payment of dipping fees and passive resistance against government regulations in 
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general continued and were increasing.
477
 In the east, resistance to colonial domination in general 
and veterinary control in particular took a slightly different form because of that area’s proximity 
to Portuguese East Africa. For instance, in 1906 the NC Inyanga reported that the population in 
his district had, like in the 1890s, decreased, ‘owing to the large number of natives who crossed 
over into Portuguese Territory, in consequence of the warning given to them that they should pay 
hut rent if they remained on the land on which they were living before they left the territory.’478  
 
Besides the above, the anxieties produced by colonisation resulted in fatalism or hopes for 
salvation. In Southern Rhodesia, it was more of the latter than the former. Some Africans looked 
back to Nehanda’s 1897 promise that her bones would rise again and fight colonial rule. The 
resurfacing of individuals claiming to possess spiritual power to deliver Africans from their 
sorrows, therefore, found a very fertile ground for recruitment. 1906 was a bad year as there was 
a drought hence the re-emergence of spirit mediums was a potential source of destabilisation. In 
Ndanga, a rumour circulated to the effect that the government intended to restore to the Matabele 
all the cattle that formerly belonged to them and which prior to the advent of Europeans were 
herded by their Shona vassals.
479
 This rumour was fomented by a police patrol in the District 
with the result that large numbers of cattle were slaughtered.
480
 In an attempt to protect them 
from ‘seizure’ some livestock owners in Nyajena drove their cattle to the mountains.481 In 
Umtali, the rumour took a different form as the NC reported that an order had gone forth from an 
unknown source that,  
all native kraals are to be kept scrupulously clean, and all the kraals in my district 
have been thoroughly cleaned up. The punishment for failing to carry out these 
instructions would be the appearance from the South of a woman with one breast, 
and one large front tooth, who would cast her spell upon the kraal, and all would 
die of disease ….482  
 
In Mazoe District, there was the rise of a Nehanda spirit medium who demanded to meet the 
CNC and promising to punish the people if they did not meet her demands. This woman, 
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Nyamita, commanded a lot of respect from several chiefs as the one after another took turns to 
visit her. Chiefs who visited her were Chiweshe, Chinamhora, Hwata, Gutu, Shavenduku, 
Zvomuya, Makumbi and Dososa.
483
 Nyamita claimed to have the solution to all African 
grievances and to have been sent to take care of Africans. Although the source does not specify 
what she exactly wanted to solve, that all this was happening at a time when there was a serious 
drought, and ECF was wreaking havoc in the country puts everything into proper perspective.  
At the same time, Kamoti, a messenger of a spirit medium domiciled in Portuguese East Africa, 
moved from kraal to kraal in Pfungwe and Maramba (central Mashonaland) in 1907 telling 
people to kill all their pigs and cattle because, ‘the Mondoro did not wish to see any of these 
animals when he came.’484 However, this oracle did not result in the widespread slaughter as 
NCs did not report any conspicuous livestock slaughter. Such a call had regional precedence. 
Episodes of mass slaughter for rebirth through mass communication with ancestors had a longer 
history in South Africa, especially the Xhosa cattle-killing of 1857.
485
 In 1905-6 in Zululand, 
Africans had begun killing white goats, pigs and chickens as well as to destroy tools of European 
manufacture.
486
 Though Nyamita and Kamoti failed to ignite widespread slaughter through their 
messages of regeneration, their calls reflect a regional response to rural crises.
487
 Their 
movement, unlike that in the Eastern Transkei which was led by educated Africans, was loosely 
organised and, therefore, could not stop the development of a capitalist economy in general and 
the imposition of veterinary measures in particular.
488
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Since changes associated with the dipping regulations often came during unfavourable ecological 
conditions, Africans tended to view their predicament using spiritual lens. For instance, 
following a drought and the forced movements from European land there were visits in 1912 to 
Mlimo by messengers from Chivi. The oracle told them that, ‘he had withheld rain because they 
were always selling their grain to the European store keepers, and he wished to punish them. He 
also told them that he would not now give them rain to save their crops, but would give them 
drinking water and locusts to eat.’489 In Plumtree District, there were dances in 1914 which 
raised further alarm over the resurgence of the Mlimo cult. These dances were being held in 
various parts of the Plumtree District for ‘rainmaking purposes.’ These had been on the 
Department’s radar for some time. The Superintendent of Natives wrote to the CNC, Bulawayo, 
‘I would express my opinion, based on my experience of this religion in the Matobo District, that 
Mlimo worship has rarely had any political significance since its misuse in the Matabele 
Rebellion, and my conviction that the proper attitude of the government towards it is to keep it 
under observation and so to prevent it from becoming dangerous, but that no attempt should be 
made to suppress it.’490 Prior to this, the attitude of the Government to these superstitious 
observances had been one of tolerance while at the same time keeping Africans informed the 
government was aware of their existence.
491
 In consequence, there was no tendency on the part 
of the Africans towards secrecy in regard to these practices. The government only intervened 
when proceedings became subversive.
492
 Despite the rise (and fall) of millenarian movements, 
and muted protest from some livestock owners, by government went on make dipping 
compulsory in certain parts of the country in 1914. 
 
While between 1912 and 1914 spirit mediums tended to focus on the general hardships that 
followed colonialism, during the 1922 drought they particularly linked it to dipping. This 
connection was captured in a letter written by the NC Belingwe to the Superintendent of Natives, 
‘some of these imposters connect the drought with dipping, pandering to those cattle-owners who 
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are in a state approaching despair on account of the fees they have to pay at privately owned 
tanks etc… Wanzira ‘the umbuya’ is probably now in the Chibi district prophesying years of 
drought and inveighing against dipping…’493 These activities in the South-Central Zimbabwe 
had spread to the North East where there was a very curious case involving human sacrifice in 
order to placate the rain god in 1923.
494
  The ritual killing which occurred amongst the KoreKore 
people living south of the Mavuradonha Mountains in Mt Darwin District was called by a 
traditional healer from Portuguese East Africa named Kamoti. Regarding Kamoti, the NC Mt 
Darwin wrote:  
He exercises his malign influence over the natives not only of this district but also 
those of Mtoko, Mrewa and Mazoe. When it is remembered that the influence of 
Kamoti was sufficient to force nearly a hundred natives to run the risk of 
participating, in broad daylight, in a crime for which the penalty was known by all 
to be death it is not difficult to realise that the same influence would be powerful 
to ensure absolute silence on the part of all the participants… I have no doubt that 
had the rain fallen within three days after the sacrifice of Manduza this crime 
would also have remained undiscovered. The continuation of the drought however 
assured the victim’s brother of his innocence of the offence imputed on him and 
he disclosed the crime as he had threatened to do if the rain did not follow 
immediately on sacrifice.
495
  
 
In Chief Mataruse’s and Maduna’s areas in Belingwe, there were rumours in 1923 that the 
English and Dutch were preparing to fight which resulted in people killing their cattle and hid 
their grain. An investigation into the rumour revealed that Africans behaved in the manner they 
did following their failure to meet financial obligations to the state.
496
 However, throughout this 
period despite identifying how the veterinary apparatus furthered the interests of the colonial 
state, African livestock owners’ grievances were not channelled in a systemic manner and, thus, 
Africans could engage the system in ways that could change their material conditions in the 
reserves significantly. 
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Conclusion 
Having discussed African livestock therapeutic ideas, and how they were supplanted in Chapter 2, 
this chapter particularly concentrated on the processes, reactions, and results of the dipping as 
both a form of livestock disease and social control. As a form of disease control, dipping had by 
1930 become a conspicuous weekly activity which resulted in the decrease of tick-borne diseases, 
and this partly explains the exponential growth of livestock herds across the territory during this 
time. However, dipping also performed another function as it came as an integral part of the 
growth of the capitalist economy offering an opportunity for herds across the country to be 
enumerated for taxation purposes. Their distribution across the country offers a revealing portrait 
of the social relations in the territory. Although there was state legislation, the process through 
which dip tanks spread across the country was both non-linear and haphazard for the practical 
reason that some areas were not tick-infested, and land policies were applied idiosyncratically in 
different areas. On their part, Africans did not resort to overt forms of resistance as happened in 
the Transkei and Zululand in 1905-6 because they were aware of their inferior military power, and 
were also loosely organised. The passage of legislation in 1914 and 1918, which made failure to 
dip a punishable offence, resulted in grumbling among Africans in the reserves. At another level, 
the absence and inadequacy, or both, of dip tanks in certain reserves and farms precluded vets 
from enforcing dipping regulations, and this also placed them in a conflict situation with some 
white farmers, who believed that African-owned livestock were essentially pathogenic. The 
increased movement of Africans from European farms into reserves from 1914 resulted in land 
shortages in the latter. In turn, this meant that Africans also sought grazing pastures in contiguous 
farms, and at times entered into grazing agreements with settler farmers. Compulsory dipping 
exposed African livestock owners to exploitation by white private tank owners. By 1930, dipping 
had become a very important tool of both social and livestock disease control. 
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Chapter Four  
‘Where nature objected to anything imported’: Africans and 
the Cattle Quality Clause in Southern Rhodesia, 1912 – 1930 
 
The logic of successful animal husbandry dictates that livestock owners detect, and, as far as 
possible, arrest disease by recognising when their animals stray across the ill-defined border 
between health and disease. An intimate acquaintance with both the habits and appearance of 
their livestock enable livestock owners to detect transition from normal to abnormal. This, 
however, not only necessitates a regular, thorough and systematic examination of livestock but 
also requires a vernacular understanding of which types or ‘breeds’ thrive in local ecological 
conditions. Thus, African livestock regimes and formalised veterinary science are not limited to 
the treatment and prevention of epizootic and enzootic diseases as they include animal 
improvement and increase (qualitatively in yield, productivity and quantitatively in stock 
numbers). Although this chapter examines the introduction of new cattle breeds in to the 
territory, and the challenges faced after colonisation, it also focuses the lens on how Africans 
grappled with livestock breeding issues in a changing economic and socio-political environment 
characterised by the imposition of a hegemonic veterinary regime. By focusing on cattle 
reproductive issues, this chapter slightly differs with the previous chapters which were mainly 
concerned with therapeutic and preventative aspects of cattle disease control. It is also a 
pioneering study as it explores   livestock ‘improvement’ policies prior to the more intrusive and 
cohesive state conservation policies (also known as ‘Betterment’) of the 1930s.497  
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Although a history of exotic breeds in African reserves is yet to be written, issues related to it 
have been tangentially addressed in studies that trace the development of Southern Rhodesian 
settler agriculture in general and the beef industry in particular.
498
 For instance, Phimister and 
Samasuwo have examined settler attempts to create a beef industry big enough to challenge the 
major beef producers like Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina.
499
 Their studies throw light into the 
complex relationship between white farmers and the Southern Rhodesian government, and also 
illuminate Southern Rhodesia’s predicament on how to produce steers of the desirable weight 
and quality.
500
 Scoones and Wolmer have identified lack of capital, recurrent disease and poor 
market infrastructure as the major factors hampering the growth of this sector.
501
 Closely related 
to these approaches are studies which investigate the relationship between Africans and their 
cattle through the lens of the African Cattle Complex theory.
502
 For instance, Mtetwa and Steele 
have shown that Africans were willing to sell their livestock to Europeans provided that they 
judged the prices offered to be adequate.
503
 However, since these studies were preoccupied with 
the exchange (economic) function of African livestock, environmental and ecological parameters 
of interaction on the African livestock economy remain largely unexplored. More specifically, 
such studies have neglected pre-betterment livestock improvement activities. Furthermore, 
notwithstanding their acknowledgement of the existence of ‘indigenous’ livestock breeds that 
were acclimatised to the local environment, these historians did not investigate the role played by 
the Veterinary Department in livestock improvement prior to the 1930s.  
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However, some socio-environmental historians have focused on a deep investigation of breeds 
and breeding in the colonies.
504
 Swart’s account of the history of horses traces the introduction of 
‘breeding’ regimes in Southern Africa in the attempt to introduce a horse suited to the southern 
African environment.
505
 Jacobs’ study of the donkey massacres in Bophuthatswana offers a 
classic demonstration of the power/knowledge dynamic, and how it influenced attitudes towards 
certain species of domestic animals in the post-‘betterment’ era.506 Others have examined how 
settlers strove to ‘tame’ the local environment. For example, Beinart and Phimister have both 
studied the influence and impact of environmental ideas on soil conservation and animal 
husbandry.
507
 In focusing on official concern about soil conservation, Beinart makes an 
important observation that official thinking was not merely determined by the immediate needs 
of metropolitan or settler capital as it was rooted deeply into the colonial encounter, and also 
derived partly from older ideas about improvement and development. However, unlike Beinart 
who focused mainly on South Africa, Phimister has shown that in Southern Rhodesia, ideas and 
prescriptions associated with conservationist thinking were first put into practice in relation to 
peasant agriculture, not settler farming.
508
 Although Phimister’s work illuminated intriguing facts 
on specific relations between Africans and their livestock from the 1930s, his perspective, as 
Tropp has argued about the Eastern Cape, obscures significant contestations over resources and 
meaning which surrounded the state’s initial takeover of local landscapes and the imposition of 
new environmental categories during the formative development of colonialism in the region.
509
  
 
Where scholarly attention has been paid to environmental dimensions of African livestock 
management practices in the pre-1930 period, such attention is generally limited to discussing 
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land and livestock holding within African reserves. Although environmental concerns became 
the foci of agricultural policy between the 1930s and 1950s, the fact that these had begun to be 
identified by veterinarians and ‘conservationists’ from as early as the turn of the twentieth 
century is yet to be explored in depth.  In addressing this lacuna, this chapter raises the following 
questions: Were indigenous breeds intrinsically inferior to exotic?  Whether, the fact that they 
did not fit into the capitalist idea of a beef economy necessarily made them a ‘bad’ cattle type? 
Were the ideas of veterinary scientists about smaller herds economically sound and 
environmentally rational? Were African livestock owners more knowledgeable on cattle breeds 
that suited the reserves than state bureaucrats – and did this shift over time? 
‘Native’ and ‘European’ Cattle of Southern Rhodesia  
At the time of colonisation, Southern Africa, unlike Australia and South America, already 
possessed certain breeds of cattle.
510
 However, as already noted in Chapter 2, in Southern 
Rhodesia there were regional differences in the types of cattle possessed by the major ethnic 
groups (the Shona and the Ndebele).  The hardy Mashona type was predominant in Mashonaland 
areas while in Matabeleland, the Tuli type (see Fig. 4.1
511
 below), predominated.
512
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 Figure 4. 1: Tuli Cattle 
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The introduction of new cattle types after colonisation, as will be shown, did not immediately 
result in significant changes in the genetic makeup of the national herd.  In fact, prior to the 
reorganisation of the Southern Rhodesian agriculture industry in 1908, the line separating ‘scrub’ 
(mongrel) from ‘pedigree’ beasts was blurred since distinction was largely based on ownership 
rather than biological traits. Cranefield’s broad classification of Southern Rhodesian cattle types 
into two groups ‘native’ and ‘European’ cattle shows the ideological rather than biological 
differences thought to exist among livestock. Like the case of horses in South Africa, the value 
of cattle depended more on whose possession they were rather than their biological traits.
513
 The 
term ‘native’ cattle loosely denoted cattle owned by the Africans, and these were largely made 
up of strains of cattle that had been in the country for many years. ‘European’ cattle were not 
only owned by European settlers, but were sometimes made up of imported strains (see Fig 
4.2
514
 below).  
 
 
515
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Figure 4.2: Afrikander Cattle 
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‘Native’ cattle were generally looked down upon, as is demonstrated by reports written by native 
commissioners after exploratory visits to different parts of the territory. ‘Primitive’ and 
‘wasteful’ methods were generally thought to characterise pastoral life in the African areas, with 
cattle being deemed poor, allegedly because of serious in-breeding, ‘careless’ grazing and the 
use of ‘unsuitable’ bulls.516 Nothing is as telling about this prejudice as the following statements 
given by two high ranking colonial officials: one an agricultural scientist and, another, a 
veterinary bacteriologist. The colony’s first Director of Native Agriculture, E.C. Alvord, 
dismissed African agricultural practices, arguing, ‘their methods are wasteful, slovenly and 
unnecessarily ineffective, and, if continued, will be ruinous to the interests of Rhodesia.’517 The 
Veterinary Bacteriologist, L.E.W. Bevan was more scathing and direct in his criticism: ‘the 
indigenous cattle in the country, although hardy and prolific, are slow to mature, and are 
undersized – many of them too small to be placed on the world’s markets except as canned 
products.’518  
 
The gross generalisation of the differences between ‘European’ and ‘native’ cattle, and the 
disparagement of the latter obfuscates complex differences that existed. The differences between 
various types of ‘native’ cattle were actually greater than the perceived differences between 
‘European’ and ‘Native’ cattle. The intermixing of various ‘native’ cattle blood types amongst 
themselves and, in some cases, with ‘European’ cattle during grazing meant that there were 
regional differences in ‘native’ cattle. In Matabeleland, there were various shades of cattle types 
– a result of Ndebele cattle raiding from different kingdoms during their journey from Zululand, 
and after their settlement in the colony. ‘European’ cattle were also mixed breeds. In fact, the 
foundation stock on white-owned ranches and indeed the great bulk of settler-owned herds 
before the Second World War, was mainly derived from, and composed of, indigenous cattle 
breeds such as the Nkone, Mangwato, Matabele, Mashona and Tuli.
519
 Incessant cross-breeding, 
as will be shown, meant that there were constant changes in the genetic make-up especially of 
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white-owned cattle and this meant that the construction of what constituted ‘good’ cattle also 
changed over time.  
 
Hybridisation notwithstanding, the norm was to extend racialised identities onto cattle. In cases 
where Africans were found in possession of perceived good breeds, the popular explanation 
among whites was that they were originally ‘European’ cattle. A notable example was the 
uncharacteristic white admiration of cattle owned by the Shangaan in the south which whites 
argued had, allegedly, intermingled with ‘fresh’ and ‘good’ blood from the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate.
520
 They further argued that ‘Shangaan’ cattle owed their ‘good’ stature to cross-
breeding with Afrikander cattle Africans ‘acquired’ from Northern Transvaal during the South 
African War.
521
 However, ‘Shangaan’ cattle, when taken to a different ecological zone fell off 
rapidly in condition and often contracted gall sickness.
522
  
 
This categorisation of cattle was largely informed by the demands of the world beef market. The 
world beef market, among other things, demanded quick maturing cattle of uniform quality and 
size unachievable with either ‘native’ or ‘European’ breeds as there were many variations in 
mature size and maturing abilities.
523
 For instance, in Argentina, beef cattle matured within 20-
24 months, where local breeds needed 4-5 years.
524
 Thus, before cattle production with a view to 
supplying the international meat markets could be contemplated, it was necessary to ‘blood’ 
(cross-breed) with ‘better’ breeds.525 This thinking mirrored popular ideas and developments in 
Britain where there was change from the notion that all livestock were valuable to the idea that 
some ‘breeds’ were more valuable than others.526  
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The need to ‘improve’ local breeds had been noted as early as 1893, yet throughout the 1890s no 
change in their biological composition occurred.
527
 Though the Rinderpest outbreak (1896-7) led 
to a severe depletion of all cattle breeds in Southern Rhodesia, the rate at which the hardy 
Mashona type in particular proliferated afterwards was remarkable. The proliferation of ‘native’ 
cattle perplexed administrators such that by 1902 the NC for Matobo, for instance, reported, 
‘Horned cattle … are increasing more rapidly than could have been expected in 1896 when the 
cattle had all but exterminated… Natives who possessed one or two herd of cattle which had 
escaped the Rinderpest now have growing herds.’528 Five years later, he noted uneasily that 
‘Cattle are increasing rapidly, and it is seldom that many are sold. I know of cases where men in 
1897 owned one or two head of cattle who now have herds of fifty or more!’529  
 
From 1904, native commissioners also complained that there was no quality ‘improvement’ at all 
among African cattle herds, and that Africans were averse to the introduction of ‘superior’ 
European bulls.
 530
 Many were frustrated that the beasts to which Africans clung were ‘unsalable’ 
due to serious in-breeding while their numerical increase had no commercial value and, 
therefore, constituted a ‘menace’ than an advantage.531 The Chief Native Commissioner argued 
that the frequency with which cattle changed hands for lobola purposes meant that Africans had 
no motivation to ‘improve’ such herds as they were bound to pass them soon.532 However, if one 
considers that lobola was essentially a circular transaction: daughters brought in cattle from other 
groups, and sons took them out again, the charge that there was serious in-breeding falls into 
question.
533
 
 
‘Blooding’ of scrub beasts 
The previous section has shown that there were different types of cattle in Southern Rhodesia 
whose commercial value on the world market was low hence the need to ‘improve’ them. And 
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yet, as this section will show, ‘improvement’ was a nebulous term as its meaning was very fluid 
depending on the observer. Generally, an animal was considered ‘improved’ if it had some exotic 
blood while for the more commercially minded it referred to animals saleable on the 
international beef or dairy market. The Southern Rhodesian state, which was also a private 
commercial company (the British South Africa Company), had to run the colony as a business 
entity hence it played a very important role in the introduction of exotic breeds into the colony. 
However, the motivation of the state is difficult to explain in simple commercial terms as it was 
also influenced by different contradictory expectations. For instance, hidden behind scientific 
ideas about livestock improvement was the need to introduce aspects of a capitalist society to 
Africans but without giving them leverage to compete with white farmers.
534
 Fear that Africans 
could out-compete settler farmers were more pronounced in central Matabeleland due to the 
existence of cattle with big stature that turned out to be competitive on the settler cattle market. 
Furthermore, large stockholding among Africans interfered with intended cattle ranching 
activities because their livestock utilised extensive grazing areas. In addition, large stock 
holdings guaranteed Africans economic security even in the event of their agricultural land being 
curtailed.
535
 This notwithstanding, the officials in the Native Affairs Department (NAD), who 
considered themselves to be protectors of African interests, generally believed that technical 
development policies would benefit African farmers and their production systems.
536
 Nothing is 
as revealing about this as the words of one native commissioner who wrote:   
Native cattle unless fostered by the introduction of fresh  and good blood must of 
necessity deteriorate, owing to its constant in-breeding from poor original blood, and what 
they will have to sell is a small light undesirable animal for which they will receive only 
the lowest of prices.
537
 
 
However, technical development policies were as much about ‘recruiting the people into 
“modernity”, as a way of gaining ritual authority over them,’ as they were about increasing 
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agricultural production.
538
 Thus, the livestock improvement idea was a form of ‘mental’ 
imperialism as it was used in the colonisation of the mind.
539
 In fact, ‘improvement’ in certain 
cases also included the importation of people of ‘good’ British blood to ‘improve’ the local 
supply.
540
 
 
Economic factors, external to southern Rhodesia, also shaped and informed the livestock 
improvement agenda. In particular, the growing demand for meat in Europe necessitated the 
opening of new sources of meat supply.
541
 As a relative latecomer, Southern Rhodesia sought to 
learn how the livestock industries in New Zealand, Argentina, Australia and Uruguay were 
founded, and how they became the world’s major beef suppliers. Towards this end, the British 
South Africa Company (BSAC) played a leading role in the development of the beef industry 
through practical demonstration. For instance, in 1910, it purchased Rhodesdale Ranch and 
developed it into one of its important cattle ranches. By 1912, Rhodesdale Ranch had been 
extended to over 1 million acres; by 1914 it carried over 19,000 head of cattle, which had almost 
doubled to 40,000 by 1923.
542
 The Ranch was strategically situated at the centre of the colony 
between the main line of railway from Salisbury, the capital, to Bulawayo in the west, and the 
branch line from Gwelo to Fort Victoria in the south.
543
 Its proximity to local markets for dairy 
and beef produce offers a telling example of how the colonial state placed the interests of white 
capital over those of black livestock owners.       
 
In addition to serving predominantly ideological and economic purposes, ‘improvement’ also 
resonated with the concerns of a fledging group of environmentalists. Conservation ideas 
influenced ‘breeding’ policy as they often featured as ancillary arguments for the promotion of 
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exotic and cross-breeds. This influence mirrored the growing environmental concerns within the 
British Empire.
544
 Thus, from around 1912, environmental issues began to feature regularly in 
administrative reports of the Native and Veterinary Departments as bureaucrats developed 
interest in how livestock breeds held by Africans could be ‘improved’ for environmental 
purposes. State bureaucrats began to argue that keeping smaller herds of higher economic value 
would check incipient environmental degradation in the reserves. As a policy, the promotion of 
smaller herds had scientific justification as it was based on studies of how large a herd could be 
supported on a given parcel of land.
545
 Furthermore, just as in neighbouring South Africa, state 
officials drew on their experience of, and information about, other parts of the world – India, 
Australia and especially the USA.
546
  
  
Cattle breeding challenges 
As the previous section has shown, Southern Rhodesia’s participation on the world market was 
hinged on its ability to cross-breed cattle and develop a viable commercial cattle breed. This 
section argues that the major impediment to the introduction of exotic breeds was that they 
succumbed to tropical diseases. A contemporary understanding of these difficulties is provided 
by Stanley Hyatt, an ox transport trader in the colony between 1899 and 1904. Hyatt, who 
witnessed how exotic and cross-breeds succumbed to tropical disease during his journeys across 
the territory’s diverse ecological environments, remarked, ‘in Rhodesia nature had not provided 
at all for the coming of the white man, where, judging by the number of diseases she had in 
reserve, she objected, and still objects, most strongly to anything imported, whether man, or 
beast, or vegetable.’547 While Hyatt’s observations reflect an ordinary white settler’s perspective 
on the challenges presented by the local physical environment to the settler community at large 
and livestock owners in particular, reports from veterinary scientists corroborate them. Indeed, 
delegates from British colonies in Africa who gathered at the Pretoria Zoological Conference 
(26-28 January 1920) issued a report which acknowledged that ‘No continent presents such a 
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variety of zoological problems as Africa, and the southern area, by reason of its past history, 
presents a field almost unrivalled…’548 
 
Tropical diseases - to which exotic and cross-breeds were particularly susceptible – were a bane 
to the capitalist livestock economy. By 1901, settler livestock owners had come to know, albeit 
through harsh experience and at great cost, that Southern Rhodesia was a Redwater area. 
Successive Redwater outbreaks in various parts of the territory especially in Marandellas and at 
Gwebi forced veterinary experts to advice livestock owners to:  
Only introduce stock from the low lying districts of Cape Colony, Natal and or from other 
such districts. People from there would also be comparatively immune from gall sickness 
and boschzikte (Heartwater). I think young cattle best to introduce… if farmers are lent 
money to bring in stock – it is of importance that they should do it wisely.549  
 
This correspondence reveals that the livestock improvement scheme depended on the 
importation of stud bulls from South Africa for breeding purposes. Many farmers, however, 
could not import on financial grounds.
550
 The major problem with the Southern Rhodesian 
livestock industry was that, just as in Britain during that time, diseases of production were 
considered the farmer’s responsibility – something which resulted in poor white farmers to resort 
to popular therapeutic practices.
551
 The introduction of a cattle scheme under which the 
government provided greater facilities to farmers for obtaining breeding stock to the tune of £60 
000 was introduced but did not change the situation significantly.
552
 Neither did the purchase at 
low cost of looted Boer cattle after the South African War (1899-1902). An agreement entered 
into with Lewanika, an African king in Bechuanaland, for the purchase of breeding stock from 
his kingdom did not help since Lewanika was averse to cows leaving Barotseland, and, therefore, 
prohibited his people from parting with them.
553
 Furthermore, as Phimister has argued, state 
subsidies on imports of high-grade stock and its relaxed policy on the introduction of new cattle 
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strains did not bear immediate results since most livestock owners lacked the experience and 
capital to up-grade such animals successfully.
554
 The success they envisaged was, nonetheless, 
possible subject to supplementary feeding but this entailed higher production costs for at least 
three or four years before any returns would be seen – something which many white farmers 
could not afford.
555
  
 
Even the activities of farmers who afforded to import exotic breeds for breeding purposes such 
as an Insiza (Matabeleland) farmer, P.D. McGuffie, who bought breeding stock (100 cows and 
300 ewes) North Western Rhodesia, did not improve the situation.
556
 Cross-breeding fell short as 
the initial success obtained with crosses between imported bulls and indigenous cattle could not 
be sustained resulting in subsequent crosses being poorer.
557
 State assistance notwithstanding, as 
late as 1919, the territory was 5 000 herd less than the required national pool of breeding 
stock.
558
 Thus, the foundation stock on white-owned ranches and indeed the great bulk of settler-
owned herds continued to be derived from, and composed of, ‘indigenous’ cattle breeds.559 
 
While the lack of finance among settler farmers explains the failure of ‘improvement’, that alone 
does not tell the whole story. In fact, the efforts of the better-equipped state animal scientists and 
veterinarians to rectify some ‘defects’ of local livestock through the production of bulls of 
‘improved’ varieties also bore undesirable results. For instance, in cross-breeds, resistance to 
diseases was reduced, but since such animals were ‘attractive’ to ticks they were very vulnerable 
to tick-borne diseases.
560
 Some of the other, difficult challenges included the death of imported 
breeding stock, shortage of bulls for improvement of local stock, unsatisfactory calves from 
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imported stock, loss of growth and or delayed maturity. By 1914, the national loss from these 
causes was perceived to exceed half a million pounds per year.
561
 
 
Before the introduction of dipping in 1904, at least 90 per cent of all cattle imported for the 
improvement of local stock succumbed to diseases.
562
 Where it was thoroughly implemented, 
systematic dipping offered limited protection from a number of tropical diseases to cross-breeds. 
Yet when ticks were totally eradicated from a farm, livestock born and reared on it remained 
susceptible and contracted diseases when shifted from a ‘clean’ area to an ‘infected’ veld.563 
Thus, livestock owners who completely eradicated ticks by dipping were also placed at some 
disadvantage if their livestock were sold or transferred into areas where dipping was not carried 
out effectively, as diseases tended to break out in a very virulent form and their cattle had no 
acquired immunity to the diseases.
564
  
 
Efforts to ‘tame’ the local environment and make it conducive for exotic breeds were also made 
through the introduction on an inoculant. Such attempts involving the immunization of the 
imported bulls by inoculating them with infected blood of low virulence were made from 1909. 
However, these operations sometimes had disastrous results. For instance, a large inoculation 
camp that was opened at Letombo in Salisbury District in 1911 was forced to close down three 
years later after an attempt to inoculate 70 animals resulted in their death.
565
 
 
Some of the diseases amongst exotic breeds defied conventional veterinary medical knowledge. 
Contagious abortion in dairy cows and quarter evil are good examples. The 1916 Quarter evil 
outbreaks in Bulalima-Mangwe and Matabeleland revealed that its nature and symptoms, and the 
methods of dealing with it possessed peculiar characteristics.
566
 These outbreaks were a 
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veterinary mystery because the Southern Rhodesian strain was epizootic and spread rapidly, 
while, elsewhere, it was enzootic.
567
 Its peculiarity rendered hitherto conventional treatments 
useless forcing Southern Rhodesia to develop a unique vaccine for the local strain. No local 
therapeutic remedies existed as Africans regarded the 1916 outbreaks as the first case. In fact, 
Africans wrongly diagnosed quarter evil as snake bite until the frequency of cases showed that to 
be impossible.
568
  
 
Similarly, the lack of veterinary knowledge concerning the local peculiarities of contagious 
abortion precluded the Veterinary Department from instituting satisfactory methods during the 
first recorded outbreak in 1917. Its prognosis necessitated a closer examination of the disease 
both in the field and the laboratory.
569
 Outbreaks of contagious abortion among exotic cattle and 
cross-breeds occurred in their most virulent form in 1921. In response, the CVS took the 
unconventional step of consulting elderly Africans in the larger cattle districts, asking whether 
the disease existed before Rinderpest swept the country.
570
 This is particularly significant as a 
rare occasion in which a veterinary specialist officially sought African veterinary knowledge. His 
investigations revealed that the disease never made any headway among African- owned 
livestock because they slaughtered any cow that aborted.
571
 The findings, however, were not 
adopted as the Veterinary Department was in favour of a vaccine and focussed its efforts in the 
search for one. While this search was on-going, the CVS merely recommended the removal of all 
‘aborters’ from the herds, removal of all bulls for 4 to 6 months from the infected cows, regular 
dipping and inoculation of a ‘devitalised vaccine’ prepared by surgeons at the veterinary 
laboratories.
572
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The pursuit of a contagious abortion vaccine was short-lived as a series of inconclusive 
experiments forced the CVS temporarily to concede defeat. The CVS wrote ‘our endeavours to 
restrict the spread of contagious abortion of cattle by quarantine and other measures having met 
with no better results than in other countries, it was decided during the year to remove it from the 
schedule of “destructive” diseases under the “Animal Diseases Consolidation Ordinance, 
1904.”’573 The peculiarity of the disease’s aetiology also forced Southern Rhodesia to reconsider 
its reliance on Onderstepoort Research Laboratory in Pretoria (South Africa).
574
 Vaccines 
obtained from Onderstepoort proved inefficacious, forcing Southern Rhodesian veterinary 
scientists to adopt the thinking that local problems must be investigated on the spot.
575
 However, 
the search for a vaccine developed locally was in vain. 
 
Besides the impact of veterinary diseases, the absence of a clear regulatory framework on cross-
breeds impacted negatively on the goal of building a commercial cattle breed. A contemporary 
comment by one Professor Wallace on the purchase of breeding cattle for Southern Rhodesia is 
revealing as to the confusion existing in the sector,  
there is no country in any part of the world that I know of, taking animals of such low 
quality, and it would be disastrous to the reputation of Rhodesia and an injury which 
might take many years to shake off, if it is acquired the reputation of being willing to 
accept the off-scourings of the pedigree cattle market, the outcasts of the Shorthorn and 
other breeds of cattle that no other foreign buyer would look at because they ought to 
have been castrated. The Company would do the country a good service if it declined to 
assist farmers or others to ship anything but good cattle.
576
 
 
This state of affairs was attributed to the ‘praiseworthy desire by each farmer to experiment and 
ascertain for himself the breed best suited to his farm.’577 However, this often resulted in a 
nondescript result at considerable cost of time and in bulls. Furthermore, the extent to which any 
‘European’ blood could be infused without the necessity for occasional reversion to hardy type, 
                                                 
573
 Annual report of the Chief Veterinary Surgeon (1924), 5-6. 
574
 See L.E.W. Bevan, ‘Contagious abortion in cattle in Rhodesia,’ Rhodesia Agricultural Journal, 16 (1919), 117-
118. 
575
 Report of the Committee of Enquiry in respect of African Coast Fever, Quarter Evil and Epizootic Diseases of 
Cattle, 32. 
576
 NAZ A3/2/5/3 Cattle General: 1912-3, undated statement by Prof. Wallace on the purchase of cattle for Rhodesia. 
577
 Southern Rhodesia: Handbook for the use of prospective settlers on the land, (London: W.S. Cowell Ltd, 1924), 
32. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
135 
 
such as the ‘native’ breed or Afrikander, remained controversial.578 The use of any bulls led to 
the intermingling of types in a heterogeneous assortment of breeds and crosses in one herd. Thus, 
the number of pure-bred bulls consisting of Afrikanders, Shorthorns, Lincoln Reds, Devons and 
Herefords expanded slowly from 906 in 1915 to 2765 in 1923.
579
 The chief dairy breeds were as 
follows: Frieslands were 1 313; Aberdeen Angus numbered 700; South Devons 424, Sussex Red 
Poll 77, Ayrshires 20 and other breeds 12.
580
  
 
The implementation of a carefully planned programme for the gradual improvement of the herd 
was delayed by the conflicting interests of participants in the capitalist cattle economy. On the 
one hand, some large white stock owners aimed at beef for export hoping that there would 
always be an ample supply of hardy ‘native’ and Afrikander stock obtainable for draught 
purposes.
581
 Others wanted to create a class of grade beef and dairy cattle for local consumption 
– a highly profitable line. On the other, there were mere breeders of numbers who usually aimed 
at creating very hardy cattle types, regardless of productiveness of flesh or milk. These competed 
with Africans in the over-supplied market for compounds and canners.
582
 Some white farmers 
struggling to improve their livestock, just as was the case in South Africa, perceived African-
owned cattle as both a commercial threat and a health threat to white-owned European breeds of 
cattle.
583
 Some farmers, like Leavitt’s Southern farmers in the USA, sold their best stock to the 
butcher, and used their poorest for breeding as the better breeds degenerated when given the food 
that was fed to indigenous cattle, which is why they found it wiser to keep the latter.
584
 
 
The ad hoc and haphazard nature of breeding activities within the territory created conditions for 
conflict between the state and white farmers who had either advised or helped to buy ‘improved’ 
breeds. The state had, through the Agriculture Department, assisted some farmers in acquiring 
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stud bulls at reasonable rates. H. Barnes-Pope’s experiences may well have been a reflection of 
pervasive disgruntlement among ‘unfortunate’ white livestock owners who were dissatisfied with 
the quality of the bulls. He complained: 
The BSAC must relieve me of the bull and pay me the balance I have paid in. I can 
honestly tell them the bull is not worth the balance they demand much more the money I 
paid in – and congratulate their buyer for being sold such a miserable animal...  
Personally, I am advised that I have a very good case against paying for the bull as I have 
had him now two years and he has not produced a single calf.
585
 
 
Despite his disappointing experiences with pedigree animals, Barnes-Pope epitomises a group of 
white farmers who believed in the fundamental idea of livestock ‘improvement.’ And yet, the 
existence of settlers who contested the promotion of ‘improved’ breeds put the heterogeneity of 
the Southern Rhodesian settler society into perspective. Disparaging remarks made about 
‘native’ cattle that permeated reports of various state experts contrast sharply with the rise of a 
thriving cattle trade in such livestock among European traders, and even among native 
commissioners who were tasked with discouraging the rearing of such livestock among Africans. 
In fact, between 1897 and 1908 some native commissioners became big ‘native’ cattle owners, 
large enough to threaten European livestock traders hence the state had to ban them from owning 
cattle.
586
 A telling example of the expropriation of the so-called inferior herds by white settlers is 
the Orlandini affair, discussed extensively by Davis and Döpcke in their examination of capitalist 
accumulation in Gutu district. Within a 22-year period, Orlandini who had arrived in Gutu in 
1914 as a missionary with just a horse, a plough and 60 head of cattle had among his other 
possessions at least 900 ‘native’ cattle grazing in the district.587 Thus, just like in South Africa, 
many whites were an integral part of the African cattle economy, and easily overcame prejudice 
against ‘native’ cattle when it suited them.588 
 
An unexpected outcome of the bureaucratic discouragement of local breeds was that trade 
involving African-owned cattle in the border areas was usurped by foreigners, especially 
                                                 
585
 NAZ T2/29/28/1-5 Cattle dipping, letter from H. Barnes-Pope to the Secretary of Agriculture, 26/08/1915. 
586
 NAZ A3/2/5/1 Cattle General: 1910. See also NAZ A3/2/5/5 Cattle Trading by Native Commissioners (1907). 
587
 See B. Davis and W. Döpcke, ‘Survival and Accumulation in Gutu: Class Formation and the Rise of the State in 
Colonial Zimbabwe, 1900-1939,’ Journal of Southern African Studies, 14, 1 (1987), 64-98. 
588
 A.S. MacKinnon, ‘The Persistence of the Cattle Economy in Zululand, South Africa, 1900-50,’ Canadian 
Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne des Études Africaines, 33, 1 (1999), 113. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
137 
 
Afrikaners from Messina (Transvaal) who came to buy cattle and small stock from Africans. 
James Hartley, a cattle trader affected by this practice, complained  
it seems to me hardly fair as a licenced trader like myself to have to put up with 
competition from people outside the country who are not paying any penny in licence or 
in support of this country and it has come to my knowledge that permits are flaunted to 
these people by officials of the BSAP [British South Africa Police] rather indiscriminately 
and are being misused… these people should not be allowed to buy in this country from 
the native and certainly not without being licensed, and manoeuvre, I think all this buying 
of cattle and small stock from natives for white masters should be put an end to. 
Otherwise Sir, I am afraid the people in the Union, will ultimately acquire the native trade 
in this country.
589
 
 
In 1909, pressure from such affected traders resulted in restrictions being put on the importation 
of livestock into Southern Rhodesia. Under Govt. Notice No. 60 (1909), pedigree stock from 
Great Britain, Ireland, United States, Netherlands, Cape Province, Orange Free State and 
Transvaal were imported subject to licences confirming their status but under no circumstances 
were cattle of any description to be imported from N. Rhodesia, Bechuanaland Protectorate and 
Portuguese East Africa, except slaughter cattle from the latter. Pigs, sheep and goats could be 
imported from Bechuanaland and South Africa subject to a veterinary certificate of health.
590
 
Competition from abroad was, however, not the only cause for concern among white farmers, 
since the viability of the African livestock economy limited opportunities for white capitalist 
accumulation. A letter sent to the editor of the Rhodesian Herald captures settler fears in a 
revealing way. An anonymous writer who adopted the ironic pseudonym ‘Optimist’ complained:  
We also hear of proposals for bettering the native stock, of teaching him how to farm 
cheaply and yet we see the Chartered Company advertising Rhodesia as a land for 
settlers! What will happen in a few years’ time when Northern Rhodesia wants all its 
labour?
591
 
 
‘Bigger, better and fewer cattle’: The African Cattle Quality Clause, c.1912-30 
The ensuing discussion shows that the state aimed at a certain commercial cattle breed and that 
white farmers also attempted to develop one. While the need to participate in the world cattle 
market lay at the heart of state and white settler efforts to ‘improve’ cattle,  a set of conditions 
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existing in the African reserves partly as a result of overcrowding and partly as a result of the 
proliferation of undesirable ‘native’ cattle, forced colonial officials to intervene. This matter 
attracted the attention of self-styled conservationists within the Native Affairs Department into 
examining livestock and veld management practices closely. Looming large in their motivations 
was the thinking that Africans would benefit from ‘bigger, better and fewer’ cattle. The ‘bigger, 
better and fewer’ cattle argument was generally referred to as the African Cattle Quality Clause.  
In the absence of any legislation that banned the rearing of ‘undesirable’ strains of cattle, Native 
Commissioners used their discretion in encouraging a more ‘enlightened’ attitude to stock wealth 
whereby big herds would be replaced by smaller herd of bigger beasts.
592
 From 1912, the 
Superintendent of Natives – a government official appointed to deal with the social welfare of 
Africans – came to play a very important role in this endeavour through the provision of state-
owned stud bulls for use by Africans. The benefits thought to accrue to the country as a result of 
this initiative were that such stock would be consumed locally, or exported either as carcasses or 
on hoof. However, linked to this delicate matter were state attempts to prevent Africans from 
developing a commercial cattle economy that could compete against white settlers. This explains 
the hesitancy with which African agriculture in general, and the cattle quality clause in 
particular, was approached. Thus, until 1916 there was no clear policy in respect of African 
agriculture, nor had it been decided how Africans were to be helped in agriculture and animal 
husbandry.
593
 This meant that cattle improvement did not become part of official policy but was 
an issue left to Native Commissioners to exercise their discretion. 
 
Despite the lack of a clear-cut livestock policy, activities by Native Commissioners towards 
livestock ‘improvement’ began to take shape from around 1912. Unlike in Lesotho, where the 
state encouraged Africans to rear small stock between 1910 and 1920, in Southern Rhodesia the 
focus was mainly on cattle.
594
 The 1912 drought offered an opportunity to state bureaucrats to 
push their ‘bigger, better and fewer cattle’ argument. However, rather than fixing the maximum 
number of livestock per owner as was the case during the destocking campaigns in the 1940s, 
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administrators believed Africans would, by force of circumstances (restrictions in the available 
grazing lands), gradually cease being (or even aspiring to become) big cattle owners, and begin 
to consider smaller herds of pedigree animals. One Native Commissioner succinctly captured 
this way of thinking when he remarked: 
We will not coerce them in any way to decrease the ownership of cattle. The pressure will 
be inevitable. The ownership of cattle must become similar to that of white farmers who 
can only own as many cattle as they have grazing for. Today a very large proportion of 
native cattle graze over land which does not belong to their owners.
595
 
 
Though the structural re-engineering of the reserve landscapes for conservation purposes which 
native commissioners advocated was necessary given the circumstances there, the broader impact 
of such an intrusion into African livelihoods were not adequately considered. Indeed, certain 
African farming practices then in use were not sustainable as they posed threats to the 
environment but conservationist concerns were ironically blind to the existence of the same on 
white farms, and did not take into consideration that this was a national problem affecting both 
African and European areas.
596
 
 
Environmental problems (overcrowding and overstocking) that begun to attract the attention of 
native commissioners from around 1912 were largely a result of the colonial land policies. The 
passage of the Masters’ and Servants Act and the Private Locations Ordinance (1907), which 
made it illegal for Africans to reside on settler farms except as labour tenants or sharecroppers, 
were a major assault on African access to land in the country.
597
 In Mashonaland, livestock 
owners were forced to leave settler farms for they did not have the money to pay rent.
598
 Some 
Africans residing in the eastern parts of the colony migrated with their livestock to Portuguese 
East Africa.
599
 In Matabeleland, where the land was drier, where there were large African 
livestock owners and European farms larger than in Mashonaland, land shortages and 
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competition over it were particularly fierce.
600
 By 1915, overcrowding had become worsened 
badly in the region. There were also shortages in grazing land. For example, in the 51,200 acre 
Matopo Reserve, there were three chiefs who owned 10 000 head between them and yet the 
reserve could not carry more than 3 000 head at the most even in a good year.
601
 On a regional 
basis, livestock herds in Matabeleland rose from 16 000 in 1902 to 155 410 in 1914 while in 
Mashonaland they increased from 39 155 to 250 763 during the same period.
602
 These figures 
suggest that there was a seven fold increase in the number of African cattle at a time when their 
access to grazing land was being curtailed severely. If one considers that statistics for African-
owned livestock were largely inaccurate throughout the colonial period given the well-known 
tendency of Africans to understate their livestock holdings, one can argue that the rate of 
increase was much higher than was assumed at the time.
603
 Even the Director of Agriculture, Dr 
Eric Nobbs, knew about this practice, ‘…in regard to native’s livestock, you will no doubt have 
in mind the admitted tendency to an underestimation, more noticeably in respect of the number 
of horned cattle in their possession.’604 
 
Limited access to grazing lands resulted in an increase in cattle losses due to malnutrition. For 
example, one Barirwong of Raditladi’s Reserve, along the border with Bechuanaland, succinctly 
revealed these grazing challenges when he said, ‘We have lost a great many cattle through 
poverty. That is two years ago. We lost many and then we got a permit and shifted them. We are 
sorry we came here because of the scarcity of grass. There is grass further south and that is where 
we have our cattle.’605 Gambo, an important Matabele chief in Nata Reserve, also complained that 
there was not enough water for livestock.
606
 In 1913 alone, Gambo lost 34 head of cattle in the 
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reserve from malnutrition.
607
 An application made in March 1915 by Chief Mpini to move and 
graze his livestock (700 head of cattle and 250 small stock) on unalienated land in the Bulalima-
Mangwe District was turned down. The Acting Director of Land Settlement explained:   
We cannot allow Mpini to move his cattle to the neighbourhood indicated. We have 
several applications from Europeans for land there and the district has recently been 
inspected and provisionally set out into farms. Are we under any obligation to provide 
land for Mpini’s cattle? He apparently obtain grazing on Lion’s Park and Pleasant View 
but he objects to pay rent and presumably expects to occupy British South Africa 
Company’s land rent free or at a nominal rent…608 
 
Such was the dilemma facing many African livestock owners at the time. Mpini was permitted to 
move to unalienated land on the west bank of Semokwe, where he was supposed to pay monthly 
rent of £3 for the grazing lease. He was warned, however, that he could be removed at a 
moment’s notice.609 In South Africa, Sol Plaatje painted a vivid picture of the horrors African-
owned livestock suffered in the aftermath of the Native Land Act (1913).
610
 
 
Land shortages forced Africans into seeking grazing pastures in contiguous farms, and to enter 
into grazing agreements with settler farmers. However, NCs from across the country noted with 
concern the tendency of unscrupulous settler farmers who had not beneficially occupied their 
farms a living by extorting exorbitant damages from African cattle owners whose livestock 
trespassed onto their farms. The CNC wrote, ‘The natives greatly resent being exploited in this 
manner, especially as the farms are unfenced and their boundaries undefined by any visible 
lines.’611 This exploitation prompted the CNC, who feared that at some point the Africans were 
going to retaliate, to suggest that:  
If a landowner finding native-owned cattle trespassing on his land were compelled, under 
penalty, to report such trespass to the Native Commissioner within a reasonable period, 
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and were also obliged to submit his claim for damages to the arbitration of the assistant 
Magistrate, I think the interests of the natives would be sufficiently protected.
612
 
 
Kadgausai’s case against a white farmer Mr Dyke reveals the difficulties Africans faced when 
trying to reclaim livestock improperly confiscated by settler farmers. Kadgausai, who lived at a 
kraal adjacent to Dyke’s farm, testified in the Magistrate’s Court that he made several journeys to 
the farm to try and get his livestock back but on each occasion was told to ‘voetsek’ (go away) 
and that his cattle would not be returned.
613
 He also witnessed the branding of his animals, and the 
castration of one of his bulls, by his neighbour, a white farmer.
614
 
 
In order to avoid the pitfalls of the Africanist argument, which portrays Africans as innocuous 
victims of colonialism, and as environmentally conscious land users, it is important to note that 
changes in African agriculture after colonisation also had profound effects on the environment.  
Beinart writes that during the early twentieth century, like settlers, many Africans in Southern 
Africa were experimenting with new agricultural methods, new crops and animals.
615
 In 
Southern Rhodesia, some African farmers quickly identified the value of the plough, hence the 
dramatic increase in its use. For instance, Scoones notes that only eighteen ploughs were counted 
in Chivi district in 1902, there were 1 300 a decade later, and over 5 000 by 1939.
616
 However, 
ploughing was done rather haphazardly, and this resulted in sheet erosion.
617
 Thus, arguments for 
environmental control were partly justified.  
 
From 1913, when measures for pasture improvement (paddocking and fencing grazing areas) 
were passed, veld management concepts began to influence practice.
618
 That year, a Water 
Ordinance was passed to apportion use of public water, and an Herbage Preservation Ordinance 
to prevent the indiscriminate burning of grass. The Rhodesia Agricultural Journal (1913) also 
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issued its first bulletin on soil erosion, extolling the virtues of contour ploughing and grass strips. 
This was soon followed by legislation to prevent tree removal within 50 feet of streams. Between 
1921 and 1934, the Department of Agriculture ran a series of articles on erosion, while officers 
of the Irrigation Department were assigned to assist European settlers in the art of 
conservation.
619
 
 
The way in which these activities intersected with breeding issues in African areas was clearly 
captured in the1913 Report of the Chief Native Commissioner. The CNC stated that partly owing 
to the passage of the Herbage Preservation Ordinance in July 1913, and partly owing to the 
‘increasing good sense’ of the Africans, grass fires had become practically non-existent. 
However, in several districts, Africans approached Native Commissioners asking for a relaxation 
of the law in the reserves. They argued that long grass attracted large carnivores which attacked 
their herds. Africans also claimed that as a result of the preservation of the pasturage, ticks and 
mosquitoes had become endemic.
620
 
 
Colonial officials generally believed that efforts to improve local cattle would be more 
successful among African herds owned by tenants on settler farms. The assumption was that the 
presence of ‘superior’ bulls owned by settler farmers would result in the improvement of African 
herds. This was considered to be a form of charity from the settler farmers to Africans:  
Among the more progressive natives there is an intelligent disposition to improve the 
breed of their cattle. A factor tending towards the improvement of native-bred stock is the 
European stock farmer, who very rightly insists, as one of the conditions on which his 
native tenants may be permitted to run their cattle on his land, on all native bulls of an 
inferior quality being castrated, the farmer granting them the use of his own superior 
bull.
621
 
 
This was cheap propaganda since an earlier discussion revealed that the ‘superiority’ of settler 
cattle was just a fallacy. As has already been shown, settler farmers cross-bred animals without 
regard to biological traits leading to the development of animals which were largely biologically 
poor. Above all, this brand of ‘charity’ was not acceptable to most white farmers as they believed 
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that ‘native’ cattle, if grazed on their farms, would be in competition for grazing with their 
commercial herds.  
 
Besides the suspicion that African herds would spread diseases to pedigree breeds, white 
farmers, like their South African counterparts, feared that interaction would result in the 
degradation of their stock breeds.
622
 Telegony appears not to have been a factor, but there were 
concerns that uncastrated bulls among African cattle if left to mix with exotic cows could 
deteriorate the value of the latter’s progeny. Nonetheless, some native commissioners in outlying 
districts, such as Belingwe, believed pessimistically that the improvement of African stock in 
their districts was failing because the district had too few white farmers to set a ‘good’ 
example.
623
 This thinking obfuscated the possibility that the negative African response towards 
the ‘improvement’ of their stock was clearly decided by hundreds of years of cattle rearing in the 
area. During severe droughts, especially in 1912, the European breeds of cattle had suffered most 
while African stock withstood the drought better.
624
  
Africans and exotic breeds 
The previous section has demonstrated what livestock improvement sought to achieve in the 
reserves. Nonetheless, it is important, as will be shown in this section, to note that the 
‘bastardisation’ of ‘native’ cattle did not result in the state assuming a more coercive stance as 
was the case with the introduction of dipping tanks or centralisation policies from the 1930s.
625
 
Yet in their attempts to ‘improve’ cattle breeds across the territory, colonial experts failed to 
understand why Africans held on to their supposedly inferior beasts.  It will show that although 
African livestock owners had a differently constructed view of reality from that presented by the 
state, their views had their own validity too.
626
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Before one can discuss the impact of colonial livestock policy on animal husbandry in the 
reserves, it is important to acknowledge that African livestock regimes were not immune to 
external influence, and that the capitalist economy expanded and impacted on Africans in 
different reserves differently. For instance, the spread of the plough and African participation in 
the trade of agricultural products with mining communities is evidence of this ability to 
experiment with new ideas as well their adaptation.  Rural differentiation that became evident a 
few years after colonisation also suggests that Africans reacted and adapted to changes in the 
capitalist society differently. Nyambara’s study of the experiences of African tenants who 
resided on different parts of the Rhodesdale Estate reveals how social differentiation arose partly 
as a result of differential access to critical productive resources as well as climatic and soil 
differences in various parts of the estate.
627
 
 
While reporting on the effects of the 1912 drought, the NC for Insiza noted that the hardy 
‘native’ cattle had not felt its effects to such an extent as had exotics. More importantly, he 
observed that, ‘the natives who have exercised an intelligent interest in improving their stock 
suffered the most.’628 This unfortunate turn of events for Africans who had adopted ‘superior’ 
breeds raises questions about the transfer of ‘technology’ to Africans as well as attempts by 
colonial veterinarians and animal scientists in tropical Africa to deal with breeds of stock whose 
hereditary characteristics, feed, and whose environment were so different from the corresponding 
factors within their previous experience.
629
 On the other hand, the NC’s report comment reveals 
that there were Africans who were interested in settler breeds, and acquired them. Whilst it is 
unclear for how long they had had exotic breeds and with what effect, this demonstrates that 
African livestock owners were not homogenous. Nevertheless, the unpleasant experiences of 
some African livestock owners who tried rearing exotic breeds reinforced widespread local 
thinking that these were unsuitable. Furthermore, imported stock required extra feeding, hence 
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when asked why they did not want these new breeds some Africans argued that, ‘their progeny 
would probably be far less able to find their own living.’630 
 
The heterogeneity of African experiences, however, does not obscure the fact an overwhelming 
majority, as can be seen in Veterinary and Native Commissioners’ reports, appear to have 
resisted exotic breeds. Besides the criticism they faced from the settler community, colonial 
administrators faced resistance from African livestock owners among whom they tried to 
inculcate the thinking that the size and amount of meat obtained per beast were the most 
important characteristics of cattle. This was a difficult task given that autochthonous Africans 
had their own value systems. As custodians of an extraordinary knowledge of the local 
environment, Africans knew its capacity, and the best way to utilize it for cattle production. This 
knowledge partly explains their scepticism about the viability of raising pedigree cattle. Similar 
problems were faced in Lesotho, a related colonial context, where the administration pursued a 
policy to eliminating ‘off-breeds’ of small stock and attempted to discourage the Basotho 
pony.
631
 Although the administration, like that in Southern Rhodesia, realised the need for cattle 
improvement programmes, it did not attempt to take action arguing that the matter required a 
‘careful consideration in view of the severe winters and the scarcity of cattle feed.’632 
 
The hardy Mashona type which from the 1890s became the major target of disparaging remarks, 
was in fact the most popular breed among Africans in Mashonaland. Africans had their own 
version of rationality for preferring ‘native’ cattle but these were not solely economic. These 
ranged from ecological – certain breeds were known to die in certain environments and cultural 
aesthetics of cows, that is, African wanted cattle which looked and behaved in a certain way. 
Cultural conservatism was also paramount in the resistance of exotic breeds. Local breeds were a 
cultural property in relation to their role as a ‘historical’ witness – a very important a point of 
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reference in local traditions, and, therefore, a ‘custodian of local tradition.’633 Thus, it was 
observed, ‘Africans do not use the bulls or they use them as sparingly as they can. The reason 
advanced in one district was that where a native beast will have a calf a year, a better beast will 
often miss a year.’634 Some native commissioners noted that ‘many Africans prefer their own 
type of stock and the only reason they give is that they do not stray so much when grazing is 
scarce as do better bred animals.’635 The Shona also saw hard Mashona cattle as more useful as 
they could be kept in better condition through being able to feed full in a short time, could be 
hidden easily in rock kraals, and in huts if necessary.
636
 In the Marandellas District, it was 
customary to keep one or two cows inside living-huts at night to escape from being burnt during 
cattle raids, while small compact oxen were more convenient for riding and packing than large 
ones.
637
 In certain areas, African perceptions of masculinity were extended to cattle. For 
instance, in Matopo (Matabeleland), cross-breeds were for a long time considered weak animals 
following a bull-fight in which a ‘native’ bull emerged victorious. The NC Matobo reported, 
‘Two or three [stud bulls] have been wasted in combat with bulls of the mongrel breed, with the 
owner receiving a reflected glory from the issue and he has a sneaking admiration for the 
victorious animal.’638 That ‘native’ bulls got engaged in fights with cross-breeds was not by 
accident as it is common for herd boys to start bull fights with the intention of finding the ‘king’ 
of the grazing lands. The bull that conquers all is thus perceived to be strongest. Thus, the 
bullfights in themselves were a cultural measure of what a good bull was. This was an extension 
of the thinking that an animal that can subsist in harsh environmental conditions was the best 
animal to have. Cross-breeds failed this test when they were defeated by ‘native’ bulls. However, 
this contradicted the official position that the bigger the stature the better the animal that was 
being brought forward by the colonial officials. 
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Cattle improvement was suggested in a certain political context thus political interpretations 
were also drawn. Africans noticed that cattle marketing systems favoured white-owned cattle 
hence ‘improvement’ of livestock was not expected to bring much material benefit. For instance, 
the NC Hartley reported, ‘the progeny of grade bulls introduced several years ago are distinctive 
but the natives say they get no better prices for them and the provisions of improved  grade bulls 
from Dipping Funds was voted against two years ago by the Native Board.’639 The NC 
Marandellas reported, ‘there are eleven grade bulls in the district. Natives do not want these bulls 
and refuse to look after them.  No further bulls are being purchased.’640 However, the 
unpopularity of stud bulls was not always based on practical considerations. At times rumour 
played a very important role in influencing African perceptions of the stud bull programme. The 
following statement captures a popular belief among Africans during this period. Inquiries made 
in the 1930s into understanding the unpopularity of this programme revealed very interesting 
information. For instance, the NC for Mt Darwin reported that, ‘in one remote part where a grade 
bull was placed a few years ago, it was difficult to overcome the popular belief that the 
Government would take the offspring of the bull in question.’641 Such rumours were to be 
expected if one considers, and as has also been shown in earlier chapters, that the relationship 
between the colonial state and African livestock was largely parasitic with much of the state 
revenue generated either from taxing Africans or the sale of African livestock. The provision of 
livestock to Africans, whose memories of the cattle looting after the First Chimurenga, and 
forced sales to raise money for taxes, was hardly to be seen as act of benevolence but as a 
seemingly generous gesture with the hidden intention of claiming their entire herds.
642
 Indeed, as 
White has argued, rumour ‘is not events misinterpreted and deformed, but rather events analysed 
and commented upon.’643  Thus, rumours that the offspring of stud bulls would be taken away 
was commentary on the ambiguity of state policy – a by-product of its top-down implementation. 
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The ensuing discussion shows that Africans had their own brand of rationality. Criticisms 
levelled against their livestock were also racialised as native commissioners believed that they 
were replacing ‘primitive’ with ‘modern’ breeds. Likewise, certain criticisms were unjustified. 
Colonial officials exaggerated in-breeding problems among ‘native’ cattle. Africans had a 
number of cultural checks. For instance, the lobolo or bride wealth payments ensured, through 
the practice of exogamous marriage, that the interchange of stock among villages prevented in-
breeding.
644
 Furthermore, in a society where bulls were not popular due to their tendency to 
break out of kraals (small night pens) and damage crops, they were protected for breeding 
purposes by means of the mombe yemidzimu (Shona) or inkomo yamadhlozi (Ndebele) in which 
a bull was dedicated to an ancestral spirit.
645
  
 
Practical considerations meant that in many districts stud bulls provided by native commissioners 
could not find either buyers or Africans who wanted their services. For instance, in 1914 Native 
Commissioners in Sebukwe-Magungabuzi, and Insiza Districts reported to the Superintendent of 
Natives (Gwelo) that they had heard of no native stock owners who required that stock. 
However, the NC Belingwe wrote to the Superintendent, ‘I have the honour to report that I have 
interviewed the most advanced natives on the subject of purchasing bulls, but it is most difficult 
to effect a sale without the animal being in view…. There is too much risk involved in my 
making a similar suggestion as regards goats and sheep rams.’646 This correspondence reveals 
that there were Africans who were willing to cross-breed their livestock and that these were 
considered to be ‘advanced.’ In 1916, the issue of improving Africa cattle once again arose but 
this time from Africans in the Charter District who allegedly wanted to exchange with NC 
Posselt hardy Mashona stock for ‘better’ class bulls which he possessed.647 However, concern 
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was raised since government regulations prohibited such an exchange by a Native Department 
official.
648
 
 
Claims that Africans were interested in these breeds were, however, challenged by missionaries 
and liberal-minded settlers. Their main concern was that Africans were made to make 
contributions for the purchase of pedigree bulls. Lobbying by the anti-bulls group forced the 
Chief Native Commissioner to clarify matters to the Secretary, Department of the Administrator. 
Regarding the imposition of the levy he argued that certain headmen and chiefs in Marandellas 
District had approached the NC with a request that dipping tanks be erected, and that well-bred 
bulls be bought from their funds to improve their herds.
649
 He argued that this was a voluntary 
collection by the Africans from which a European cattle inspector they ‘requested’ was 
appointed and paid. Missionaries were advised from confusing the natives since NC officials 
were there to help Africans. He wrote, ‘I would emphasise the desirability of encouraging and 
educating the native mind to the advantages to be gained by the systematic care and 
improvement of their main source of wealth – their herds – and it is obvious that any 
manifestation of a desire to improve, as in this instance, merits the greatest encouragement from 
the government.’650 However, Reverend Cripps was not deterred for he questioned both the 
thinking that chiefs and headmen really represented ‘native’ interests, and protestations of 
innocence:  
Should the government desire to help progressive natives, by all means let it provide bulls 
of a good class, and charge a moderate fee for their use, recovering from those particular 
Native Headman or stockowners who require their services. I submit that there is no 
machinery in shape at present for gauging the mass opinion in the back blocks of any 
really large Native Reserve, whether in Marandellas or any other district known to me.
651
 
 
Success among Africans who ignored colonial experts meant that the claim that exotic breeds 
were better than local could not be made without question. There were several examples 
indicating that individual Africans could reach better results with their hardier cattle than with 
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European types. Some Africans were willing to embrace western breeding ideas but on their own 
terms. They did not do this by adopting or cross-breeding to develop a suitable type to their 
environment as did the Basotho in developing a local horse but did so through utilising European 
modes of livestock husbandry to fatten local types.
652
 The NC Belingwe described how in 1916 
an African cattle-owner in Mpateni had raised about a hundred head of cattle from two cows 
during twenty years of in-breeding, ‘undoubtedly the finest lot of cattle I had seen in this country 
including European stock of that class.’653  
 
Some Africans hid their herds from the meddling of colonial experts. In cases where Africans 
seemingly adopted these so-called ‘improved’ breeds new developments linked to their efforts to 
meet the demands of a rapidly changed African economy to a capitalist society threatened to 
reverse the ‘gains’. In particular, some Africans castrated all their bulls in an attempt to make 
them amenable to the plough, with the added incentive that when they were no longer useful, 
they would fetch higher prices than bulls.
654
 The emasculation of larger animals had unfortunate 
long-term consequences as the quality of African stock degenerated and their saleability 
diminished. European cattle traders operating in African areas were particularly affected by this 
as cattle offered to traders were sometimes elderly and had little further economic value. A 
comment made by one Native Commissioner in 1918 is particularly revealing. He noted that:  
Those who own big oxen are loath to part with them, while “weeds” do not command a 
ready sale. Breeding stock are very rarely sold. In time, this practice provoked many 
official grumbles about African ignorance of market forces, but in point of fact breeding 
and draught animals were too valuable to be sold to outsiders except in a very buoyant 
market or in cases of extreme adversity.
655
  
 
Approximately 2 383 429 cattle were in the territory in the late 1920s but the majority were 
largely ‘unimproved’ despite livestock improvement schemes.656 Only a few African-owned 
cattle, especially those running along settler herds, had had a little ‘European’ blood. It was in 
the 1930s that the government’s resolve to provide European cattle dealers with a ready source 
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of wealth and to reduce African cattle herds led to the creation of a state-run livestock 
improvement station at Msengezi Experimental Farm.
657
 Further breeding stations for the 
improvement of hardy African cattle breed known as the Sanga were established at Makholi, 
Tjolotjo, Tuli, Lupane, Maranke, Mangwende, Shangani and Ndanga. However, even these 
schemes had by 1955 not fully achieved their intended result as most African cattle still belonged 
to the compound and inferior grades.
658
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the development of the Southern Rhodesian cattle industry through 
the lens of livestock improvement activities. It has shown that contrary to popular belief the 
colonial state took an interest in African livestock management much earlier than is assumed, 
and that this interest began much earlier than the more pronounced betterment policies of the 
1930s. Thus, what happened during the 1930s was the cementation of policies that had a much 
longer history in the colony. It also shows that the settler attempts at ‘taming’ the local 
environment through the introduction of better breeds was accompanied by disease outbreaks 
which were particularly virulent mong imported cattle or cross-breeds, and that efforts to control 
these through either breeding or development of an inoculant made very slow progress with the 
major failures being that of quarter evil and contagious abortion. Conflicting views regarding the 
position of Africans in the colony also meant that colonial policy was often contradictory as the 
state sought to balance the fears of the white settler community while making African reserves 
amenable to capitalist livestock production. The role of state animal scientists and veterinarians 
in the colonial bureaucracy – as tools for subjugating epizootics and enzootics to pay way for 
colonial domination – saw them playing a leading role in influencing opinion and creating 
conditions under which scientific asset management could be imposed in both African and 
European areas. The need to rear pedigree animals fitted very well into the intentions of the 
colonial state to participate in the world beef market. Africans, among whom the ‘better, bigger 
and fewer’ argument was encouraged, also had a set of reasons for not adopting ‘better’ breeds 
hence by 1930 no significant change had occurred in African livestock regimes.  
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Chapter Five  
‘It is no use advising us! Command us and we will obey’ 
Livestock management, centralisation, and soil conservation, 
c.1930-51.  
 
The previous chapters have explored the interaction between scientific and local diagnostic, 
therapeutic, and prophylactic ideas as well as the diverse ways in which biomedical approaches 
seeped into state polity. Chapter 2 established how hegemonic veterinary apparatus came into 
being while Chapters 3 and 4 revealed how African livestock regimes interacted with dipping, 
and livestock improvement activities respectively. This chapter argues that from the 1930s, this 
fluid interaction crystallised, becoming rigid, and the state’s previously nebulous programme 
became both intrusive and coercive. It will show how state-induced conservation policies 
manifested a sustained state intention to eradicate a variety of African religious, cultural and 
social engagements that centred on farming.
659
 More specifically, this chapter examines, firstly, 
conservation policies and the various ways through which veterinary challenges and measures 
intersected with centralisation efforts, and, secondly, how these attempted to reshape African 
livestock regimes. Thirdly, it looks at African reaction to this intrusion. 
 
Environmental Conservation Historiography 
Apart from examining how the reorganisation of land into farming and grazing areas as well as 
how the reduction of livestock numbers to meet the perceived carrying capacity of the land 
affected livestock management in the reserves, very little has been written regarding how 
veterinary and soil conservation policies related to each other from the 1930s. The available 
literature has outlined how calls for intervention in African reserves were motivated by the 
thinking that African agriculture and livestock management practices were responsible causative 
agents for soil erosion, but fails to interrogate how this intervention informed, shaped, or 
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changed African livestock regimes. Although conservation in practice consisted of a motley of 
technical measures, scholarship has largely restricted itself to land and water conservation 
methods at the expense of the various ways through which this affected livestock management 
practices.  
 
The impact of soil conservation practices on African livestock management in southern Africa 
has been mentioned tangentially in environmental conservation historiography. The trajectory of 
Zimbabwean scholarship has also followed a sub-regional trend. For instance, in Botswana and 
Malawi respectively, Morapedi and Mulwafu’s latest studies emphasize colonial state policies in 
crop production at the expense of subtle interventions in livestock improvement and disease 
management.
660
 In South Africa, historians have examined the twin policies of centralisation and 
culling of livestock emphasising that betterment was conceived and carried out within the 
ideological confines of separate development but mentions little on the impact of such practices 
on the African livestock economy other than the reduction in numbers.
661
 South African 
‘betterment’ historiography has shifted from Beinart’s initial focus on conservation activities on 
white farms to discussing their environmental, agricultural and social impact in African 
reserves.
662
 For instance, unlike Beinart
663
 whose focus was the Cape and conservation on white 
farms, Delius and Schirmer traces and compares the evolution of state conservation policies in 
relation to both white farmlands and African reserves in the Transvaal.
664
 Notwithstanding their 
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varied arguments, South African historians generally argue that centralisation policies in 
Southern Rhodesia from the late 1920s marked the first instance in which there was a concerted 
push for villagisation in southern Africa, and that these policies later influenced betterment in 
South Africa.
665
 Like these, this chapter will focus on conservation programmes in Southern 
Rhodesia, a related colonial context. 
 
Moreover, more specifically to Zimbabwe, Kramer simply argues that ‘centralisation operated on 
many levels’ without disaggregating these, thus, the way it related with or was packaged as a 
veterinary method is yet to be analysed.
666
 This chapter also contributes to a historiographical 
debate pertaining to the position of centralisation in the conservation matrix. McGregor suggests, 
contrary to the generally accepted view in the recent literature, that centralization was not 
conservation oriented. Instead, she argues, that conservation was a by-product of agricultural 
improvement and rational land use, and that the motives behind centralization were a mixture of 
agricultural intensification, modernization, control and aesthetics.
667
 Her conclusion was that 
conservationist arguments became more important in the late 1930s, both as a justification for 
centralization itself and as an excuse for its forcible implementation.
668
 However, as already 
shown in Chapter 3, conservation was at the centre of intervention in the reserves long before the 
1930s. McGregor’s reliance on Alvord, the architect of the centralisation policy, is 
understandable but it is methodologically incorrect to assume, as she does, that conservationism 
in Southern Rhodesia was a by-product of the centralisation policy.  Primary evidence suggests 
that at its inception, Southern Rhodesia already had a fledgling group of conservationists who 
expropriated and mobilised ideas central to centralisation to develop a conservation argument. In 
particular, the Native Affairs Department played a leading role in this programme right from its 
inception, and, as already been shown in Chapter 3, there already existed within that department 
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a fledgling group of self-styled conservationists whose reports from as early as 1912 reveal their 
strong sense of environmental degradation in the reserves. In fact, in another work McGregor 
concedes that there was a barrage of conservation legislation in Southern Rhodesia in late 1920s 
such as the Water Act (1928), the Native Reserves Forest Produce Act (1929) and the Game and 
Fish Preservation Act (1920).
669
 Thus, it is not surprising that reports from the NAD, 
Agricultural, irrigation and forestry officials reveal that this was understood and implemented as 
a conservation method right from the start.   
 
Studies on cattle destocking have also not examined its specific relationship with livestock 
disease management. For instance, though Shutt makes an important contribution to our 
understanding of African farming practices not only in the reserves but also in the Native 
Purchase Areas
670
 and acknowledges that destocking was a matter of animal control, her focus 
was not on environmental and veterinary arguments that justified this policy but rather on the 
economic function of African cattle, and the conflicting positions of different white classes over 
the culling of African cattle.
671
 Scoones and Wolmer have made the valuable observation that the 
livestock control measures by the Veterinary Department targeted at both wildlife and cattle on 
account of Foot and Mouth had severe implications for landscapes and livelihoods as they were 
mainly structured to suit the imperatives of beef production, rather than wider livestock and 
disease management objectives. Yet they fall short of identifying the various ways these 
impacted on environmental degradation.
672
 Their examination of the various ways mixed farming 
discourse has informed agricultural research and policy in Zimbabwe over the last century is also 
useful in understanding the country’s agricultural history.673 However, the various ways 
concentration impacted on, and reshaped ideas about and actual human-animal relations in 
concentration areas has not yet been analysed.  
                                                 
669
 J. McGregor, ‘Conservation, Control and Ecological Change: The Politics and Ecology of Colonial Conservation 
in Shurugwi, Zimbabwe,’ Environment and History, 1, 3 (1995), 258. 
670
 A. Shutt, ‘Pioneer Farmers and Family Dynasties in Marirangwe Purchase Area, Colonial Zimbabwe, 
1931-1947,’ African Studies Review, 43, 3 (2000), 59-80. 
671
 A. Shutt, ‘The Settlers’ Cattle Complex: The Etiquette of Culling Cattle in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1938,’ Journal of 
African History, 43, 2 (2002), 263-286.   
672
 I. Scoones and W. Wolmer, ‘Land, Landscapes and Disease: The Case of Foot and Mouth in Southern 
Zimbabwe,’ South African Historical Journal, 58 (2007), 42-64. 
673
 W. Wolmer and I. Scoones, ‘The science of ‘civilised’ agriculture: The mixed farming discourse in Zimbabwe,’ 
African Affairs, 99 (2000), 575-600. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
157 
 
 
This chapter will also challenge Scoones’ view that government interventions in African areas 
during the 1920s and 30s were concentrated on breed improvement, and that this gave way to the 
destocking policy of the following two decades where government tried to intervene directly and 
reduce stock to ‘acceptable levels’.674 It will show instead, as has already been demonstrated in 
the previous chapter, that livestock improvement programmes started long before the 1920s, and 
that these policies continued even during the period of destocking. Thus, it will be argued that 
destocking did not replace but complemented livestock improvement in the reserves.  
Unpacking centralisation policies  
Before an analysis of the major influence of conservation methods on livestock management can 
be made, it is necessary to sketch the key ideas behind conservation programmes. At the heart of 
conservation policies was the assumption that sustainable forms of agriculture and livestock 
rearing could only occur with effective planning.
675
 Although the American Dust Bowl 
experience of the 1930s came to play an important role in  shaping the sense of environmental 
degradation among colonial experts and hence provided further justification for centralisation, its 
introduction as a policy predated the American Dust Bowl.
676
 In Southern Rhodesia, 
conservation policies were manifest in the centralisation policy – measures meant to reorganise 
land owned by Africans into farming and grazing areas. These were first introduced in 1929 by 
the Agriculturist for the Instruction of Natives (later Director of Native Agriculture), A.E Alvord, 
and entailed drastic and coercive transformations of interactions of land, animals and people in 
the African reserves.
677
 Alvord’s work in improving African agricultural practices had been 
noticed during his stint as an agricultural missionary at Mount Silinda Mission hence the state 
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gave him the mandate to expand these to reserves across the territory.
678
 Centralisation was also 
characterised by the allocation of standardised plots to each landholder. It was partly, as Ranger 
has argued, a direct assault targeted at ‘rural entrepreneurs’ – a distinct group of African farmers 
who had responded to capitalist demand for food items to expand their crop farms in an 
extensive manner.
679
  In South Africa related policies were initially legislated in 1939 but were 
refined in 1949 as Betterment.
680
  
 
Centralisation arguably became the major colonial activity in African reserves in the 1930s. It 
was as much about the perception by colonial officials that ‘primitive’ African farming methods 
were causing environmental degradation in the reserves, as it was an attempt to revise the 
position of the African reserves in the fledgling economy. Prior to the 1920s, the reserves had 
been seen as temporary enclaves which would ultimately vanish as the peasantry was drawn into 
the exchange economy. However, after the attainment of responsible government status in 1923, 
they came to be seen as areas where Africans could develop in their own manner.
681
 A clause in 
the Land Apportionment Act (1930) stipulating that all Africans living on White land were to 
move into reserves within a period of six years, meant that reserves were supposed to be 
developed so as to increase carrying capacity, and not merely maintained as had been the 
previous policy.
682
  
 
A predominant view among colonial officials and justification for their intrusion was that 
Africans did not know what their own ‘real’ interests were and without government direction 
they would destroy their environment through ‘ignorant’ farming practices.683 Curiously, there 
was a remarkable transition in the state’s stance towards successful African peasants from seeing 
them as ‘heroes of progress,’ progressive converts to the ‘gospel of the plough’ to ‘destroyers of 
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the environment.’684 Thus, besides playing a crucial role in conservation, centralisation was also 
meant to put the activities of these ‘reserve entrepreneurs’ to a halt. The perceived threat was 
that, over time, these entrepreneurs would till more land and thereby create a landless class of 
Africans whose discontent might imperil the political order. Underpinning this fear was the 
presumption that reserve entrepreneurs were already using more land than the government 
deemed necessary for one family.
685
 
 
However, as Showers points out in a related Basutoland context and more generally in the 
southern African context, ‘despite the general acceptance of these “truths” there is room to 
question whether they do, in fact, represent the situation accurately.’686 Indeed, these policies 
rested on colonial power relations as colonial experts had the power and machinery to 
communicate and implement their version of conservation truth without either consulting 
Africans or carrying out research into the actual environmental conditions.
687
 The fallacy that all 
would suffer from environmental degradation had a flip side which assumed that all would 
benefit from conservation fuelled intervention.
688
 These policies also played another politico-
strategic role especially control and surveillance of the colonial state since the creation of village 
settlements under a headman allowed for more effective control in the rural areas.
689
 Thus, C.S. 
Lewis’s words that ‘What we call Man’s power over Nature turns out to be a power exercised by 
some men over other men with Nature as its instrument,’ resonate with the Southern Rhodesian 
experience.
690
 
 
Besides the state’s environmental mantra that accompanied centralisation, it is important to note 
that it also was an attempt to deal with perceived land shortages in African reserves as a result of 
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racialised land policies. Faced with a growing demand for more land in the reserves, colonial 
administrators began to argue that a permanent solution to the problem lay in intensifying 
African agriculture. Thus, Africans in the reserves were also encouraged to plant improved 
varieties of grain and cash crops in a four-course rotation, with the whole system being sustained 
by large inputs of cattle manure.
691
 From the 1930s, these measures were initially implemented 
through ‘forceful persuasion’ rather than ‘direct compulsion.’692 As has been shown in the 
previous chapter, persuasion rather than coercion was at the centre of state-sponsored livestock 
improvement activities in African reserves, and in the 1930s the state at first tried to utilise this 
approach. However, resistance (mostly passive) by Africans in the reserves, and the 
disillusionment of certain colonial officials who felt that Africans needed to be forced influenced 
the state to adopt a coercive stance.  
 
While the changing environment as a result of new livestock diseases, and land shortages 
generally made it impossible to pursue extensive livestock management practices, it is important 
to note that centralisation affected different categories of African livestock owners differently.
693
 
Africans responded to the changes in the economy in varied ways. Inside the reserves, there was 
increasing differentiation with some Africans doing much better to produce a surplus while 
others were struggling to come to terms with the capitalist society.
694
 Some owned more 
livestock than others, while some were ‘struggling’.695 Successful ‘self-peasantisation’696 among 
some Africans in the reserves resulted in the rise of ‘enterprising ploughmen,’ cattle barons, rural 
entrepreneurs or ‘men of cattle.’ These succeeded in manoeuvring the colonial system to 
purchase land for themselves in the Native Purchase Areas, while others made use of their riches 
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to negotiate more land from their resource poor neighbours or spread around their livestock in 
continuing with the pre-colonial practice of cattle loaning (kuronzera).
697
  
 
Local conditions differed geographically and the implementation of policy often bowed down to 
the personality of the colonial official concerned with some being stern conservationists while 
some were more pragmatic and sought to improvise policy according to local conditions. For 
instance, colonial communications and state power developed comparatively slowly in Madziwa 
much later than in districts such as Makoni, Goromonzi and Victoria which were far closer to 
towns and areas where European farms were concentrated.
698
 However, since this thesis is 
specifically concerned with experiences of African livestock owners in the reserves, it is 
pertinent to state that by the 1930s only an ‘enterprising few’699 had gained while the majority of 
the African population in the reserves could not escape the deliberate impoverishment pursued 
by the colonial state.
700
 This was partly because of the Land Apportionment Act which limited 
land accessible to Africans in the reserves and partly due to the Depression and veterinary 
measures which precluded trade in grain and livestock.  
 
The impulsive implementation of centralisation proved problematic in Native Purchase Areas 
since African purchase farmers, unlike those in the reserves who had only communal rights, 
owned the land they farmed. Unlike those in the reserves, African in the purchase areas were not 
under  the Native Affairs Department but under the Native Lands Board (NLB) which proved to 
be less radical in pursing the soil conservation policies. Unlike the NCs (who were under the 
NAD) who operated the reserves as their personal fiefdoms, NLB officials were hamstrung by 
personal relations and influence which NPA farmers had within the echelons of the colonial 
state. Policy was difficult to enforce because most NPA farmers worked for the state as clerks, 
police-men, and teachers hence local native commissioners and police chiefs sometimes 
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personally petitioned the NLB on behalf of their employees made intervention in NPAs 
difficult.
701
 Furthermore, when confronted by the state over their ‘primitive’ farming practices 
these farmers presented a brash defense of their family values which they connected to their 
farming methods. Instead of disciplining the farmers for their ‘waste’ of land, the state conceded 
certain development patterns to the farmers, foremost being the permanence of family farms, 
thereby enabling extensive farming.
702
 Thus, overall NPA farmers frustrated the state’s intention 
to establish enclaves of ‘modern’ or ‘civilized’ farming. These administrative differences 
account for dissimilarities in policy implementation and when this was acknowledged officially 
the state made amends by passing the NLHA which did not separate the implementation of such 
policies in the two different areas.  
 
Despite the relentless implementation of centralisation in the 1930s, it did not immediately halt 
environmental degradation. By 1938, 13 of the 96 Reserves were 25-50 per cent ‘badly’ eroded 
(sheet and gulley erosion), while 5 were 50-75 per cent ‘badly’ eroded. Between 1930 and 1937 
erosion in African areas had increased by 60 per cent while 8 per cent of the entire native 
reserves was badly eroded, and this translated to 1 665 360 acres.
703
 Although the logic of 
separating grazing from farming land was partly the noble idea of preventing cattle from 
destroying crops, the spatial reorganisation of the countryside meant that certain geographical 
spaces that had hitherto been available for grazing stock ceased to be, and, thus, added to 
overstocking in certain reserves. This called for further state intervention in the African livestock 
economy especially cattle culling in order to reduce numbers to the perceived land carrying 
capacity. This, as will be shown, had important ramifications on African livelihoods in the 
reserves. Cases of Africans who resented state-induced cattle sales in Gutu and Victoria in 1937-
8 reveal antagonism to the state-desired livestock management style.
704
 The passage of the 
Natural Resources Act (1941) finally gave power to the state to force Africans into adopting soil 
conservation methods. This further entrenched state intervention in the reserves.  
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Breaking the ‘bank’ 
State intervention notwithstanding, livestock holdings remained high which, among other 
reasons, precipitated the passage of the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951). Though widely 
understood as evidence of African ‘irrationality’ by colonial officials, the continued existence of 
large herds even after state–led destocking partly demonstrates how Africans adapted to this 
intrusion. Although agriculture remained an integral part of African subsistence, the cattle 
economy was better able than subsistence agriculture to withstand the onslaught of the wider 
capitalist economy – as Africans produced less food from their fields after state land 
expropriations severely restricted the amount of arable land available to them. Furthermore, 
cattle were easy to bring together and to move to market than agricultural produce.
705
 Oral 
interviews suggest that the thinking that cattle were a Black man’s ‘bank’ thrived.706 For 
instance, one interviewee, Titus Mutindori of Chimanimani explained:  
The idea was that too many cattle will destroy grazing land. So people spread their 
livestock amongst their male children because it was the only bank we had when 
preparing for the future. We didn’t accept explanations that land was short because in our 
view there were many open spaces for pasturing than is the case now.
707
 
 
Other than the availability of open land for pasturing animals, there were other state-induced 
pressures which made the animal husbandry more attractive to Africans.
708
 In particular, the 
passage of the Maize Control Act (1931), introduced partly to protect white producers from 
falling international price and their fear of black producers undercutting them, gave European 
traders a monopoly to purchase maize in the reserves. This, coupled with the impact of the 
depression, meant that maize prices fetched by peasant farmers fell from 6/- to 7/6 per bag in 
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1928-30 to around 2/- per bag in 1932.
709
 In many African Reserves Africans ended up selling 
grain to each other or barter for stock at prices they could regulate.
710
 
 
Environmental challenges which soil conservation policies sought to check were not only 
confined to the reserves as the situation was worse on land owned by absentee Europeans but 
occupied by African ‘squatters’.711 Native Department officials argued that this was because, 
unlike in the reserves where there was some control through headmen, chiefs and NCs, where 
‘kaffir farming’ prevailed there was little if any, restraint.712 Furthermore, such areas had 
inadequate dipping facilities leading to the driving of cattle to distant dipping tanks, with the 
attendant trampling out of the soil and vegetation and consequent erosion.’713 The situation in 
European-farmed areas, especially maize and tobacco farmers was not any better. In an effort to 
maintain or increase their output, some farmers ploughed up natural hollows, hillsides and 
narrow valleys between hills which resulted in dongas.
714
 Although erosion due to overstocking 
and overgrazing had not assumed serious proportions on land occupied by whites as was the case 
in the reserves, some damage was done by the driving of cattle to and concentrating them at 
watering places and dipping tanks. McGregor has argued convincingly that, other than being a 
useful cog in Southern Rhodesia’s segregationist politics, the representation of the causes of 
environmental problems in official discourse reflected regional trends and was part of a wider 
colonial scientific culture. She argues that ‘backward’ ‘native’ populations’ wasteful destruction 
of natural resources was a dominant theme of Empire-wide discourse in the 1930s. 
Consequently, this became part of officials’ training, was repeated in conference presentations, 
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technical reports and scientific journals.
715
 Thus, the fact that these views were ‘scientific’ and 
were propounded by scientists gave them weight and an appearance of objectivity.
716
 
Furthermore, this also betray the overwhelmingly  agrarian vision which the colonial experts had 
for Africans, that is, they did not accept that  the colonised could live any other than a rural, 
agriculture life  and therefore the need for agricultural intensification.
717
 
 
However, soil conservation policies were not carried out in a few reserves, which were perceived 
as not needing immediate intervention. For instance, environmental concerns did not extend to 
the tsetse-fly prone north-western African reserves in Sebungwe (Sanyati, Sebungwe, Sibaba and 
Pashu) which in 1930 had just ten cattle, and the percentage of worn out land was ‘nil’ making 
agricultural demonstration efforts of any kind ‘unnecessary’.718 In some areas where 
centralisation had been carried out, NCs claimed success, and that their activities were deeply 
appreciated by Africans. For instance in 1937, the Agricultural Demonstrator for Mondoro 
stated, ‘reserve people are thanking us very much for the centralisation done in this reserve for 
they have now seen the good results of centralisation. Its good result is plenty of grass. Cattle are 
also fat and strong.’719 However, as will be shown in the following sections, conservation 
policies generally impacted heavily on African livestock management systems.  
Livestock disease management in the 1930s 
The previous section has shown how state intrusion in the reserves was motivated by the 
thinking that African farming systems were flawed. This section seeks to show that the history of 
anthropogenic erosion has been fragmentary, requiring an examination of the activities of 
colonial experts (specifically veterinary officials), which this chapter offers. Understanding the 
various ways through which environmental degradation may have been fuelled by colonial 
activities must begin with an assessment of livestock disease management policies of the state 
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experts. Thus, this section examines the various ways through which veterinary policies shaped 
and informed rural land use in a way that sometimes contradicted the overarching conservation 
discourse.  
 
The formalisation and intensification of the struggle to control environmental degradation in the 
reserves coincided with the outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in 1931. This disease joined the 
list of serious veterinary challenges in the territory which included East Coast Fever, Screw 
worm, Quarter evil, Heartwater and Contagious abortion in cattle. While veterinary control 
measures for tick-borne and tick related diseases centred on the dipping tank (yet another source 
of environmental degradation – discussed separately in the next section), cattle concentration 
methods specifically necessitated by FMD, as this section shows, were a bane to the 
environment. For fear of losing the export markets for its beef industry the state considered Foot 
and Mouth control to be a matter of high priority hence the implementation of extreme measures 
to curb it. As this section will show, these radical measures ignored conservation methods with 
the result that while checking the further spread of diseases they actually worsened 
environmental conditions in the reserves.  
 
Veterinary measures necessitated by Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) outbreaks in the post-1930 
period reveal the extent of ecological degradation in the reserves. The 1931 outbreak originated 
at Nuanetsi Ranch along the Fort Victoria-Beitbridge road in the southeast from where it spread 
to Victoria, Enkeldoorn and Gwelo. In Bulawayo Veterinary District, the disease broke out at 
Liebig’s Ranch from where it spread to surrounding areas: Beitbridge, Tuli, Dendele, Bubye 
River, Siyoka, Belingwe Reserve, Insiza District, Bubi District, and Gwelo District.
720
 Its 
prognosis was somewhat different from elsewhere as it was only traced to direct contact with 
infected cattle. In no instance did suspicion point to other means, such as equines, mechanical 
transport, humans, game, wild animals, drinking water or foodstuffs.
721
 Its mildness meant that 
Africans hardly considered it a dangerous disease hence they were reluctant to report outbreaks. 
Since the disease occurred during the dry season when cattle were neither herded nor kraaled 
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efficient veterinary supervision was very difficult. At first, veterinarians suspended dipping, and 
prevented close contact but this later turned out to be an incorrect policy. Sometimes, the disease 
occurred at several dip tanks where it was thought to have passed through and died out. Such 
cases of recrudescence were a result of restarting dipping operations.
722
 This was because 
dipping offered opportunity for cattle from different areas to converge and made it possible for 
the disease to spread through direct contact. There was, however, a general trend that where 
dipping was restarted FMD disappeared.
723
 The Veterinary Department’s inability to deal with 
the short term dangers of resuscitating dipping versus its long term benefits consequently 
resulted in policy inconsistency. Veterinary districts were given the leeway to exercise discretion 
hence in certain areas weekly dipping was reinstituted and kraaling was made compulsory while 
in some (such as Bulalima-Mangwe, Gwanda, Matobo, Bubi and Belingwe reserves) dipping 
was not resuscitated.
724
 In the later, there was increased tick infestation resulting in mortalities 
due to tick-borne diseases especially Heartwater.
725
 
 
The Veterinary Department also started a system of infecting cattle in areas adjoining active 
infection through contact and the intra-nasal injection of infective blood. The direct contact 
method – the introduction of diseased animals – was carried out on a large scale in the Victoria 
area with satisfactory results.
726
 Its success emanated from the creation of cattle-free belts 
between areas under inoculation and the perceived clean belts.
727
 Since this outbreak coincided 
with the Great Depression, it meant that it occurred at a time when the system of inspection of 
cattle was being reorganised. Reorganisation was characterised by the reduction in the number of 
cattle inspectors throughout the country with several veterinary districts being merged to form 
larger ones under cattle inspectors, and in some cases veterinary duties being taken over by a 
special police force whose supervision devolved entirely from the district police officers.
728
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Special native police officials responsible for guarding quarantine fences (zvipeshura) became a 
permanent feature in FMD areas to ensure compliance to veterinary measures. By 1933, FMD 
had disappeared, albeit temporarily. However, while Southern Rhodesia was still enjoying its 
success, outbreaks occurred in Bechuanaland Protectorate and Barotseland in the same year.
729
  
In 1934, a new outbreak suspected to have originated in Portuguese East Africa led to inter-state 
consultations with the Union government culminating in an agreement that cattle were to be kept 
away from the Limpopo River where possible.
730
 New outbreaks in Mtilikwe Native Reserve and 
Victoria Native Reserve in 1937 resulted in changes to the inoculation method to include 
slaughter of all calves born during the period of infection after inoculation; institution of 
disinfection stations at all points of exit from the infected areas.
731
  
 
These veterinary methods not only contradicted livestock management methods central to the 
centralisation policy but also exacerbated the shortage of pasture. While promoting 
centralisation, Alvord, the Director of Native Agriculture, had drawn attention to the fact that 
scattered arable lands in the midst of pasturage meant that cattle could not be let into these areas 
during the growing season for fear of damage to crops. After centralisation cattle could no longer 
traverse arable land in order to reach water supplies or dip tanks as these were now located in the 
grazing area but the results of the new system were equally disastrous. The separation of lands 
into grazing and farmland meant that cattle grazed in areas set aside specifically for this purpose, 
and these areas became overgrazed and barren long before harvest time.
732
 This emanated from 
Alvord’s conviction, at least until 1936, that the major problem affecting the reserves was not 
overstocking but overpopulation. The concentration method, as it came to be applied, also had a 
serious oversight but of a different nature – which derived from its emphasis on disease 
eradication over conservation. Thus, as will be shown, the price of concentrating large numbers 
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of cattle in small geographical spaces to check FMD resulted in serious environmental 
degradation in the reserves.  
 
Besides the problems inherent in the centralisation policy, state officials had difficulties in 
reconciling veterinary and land use improvement policies. Thus, though veterinary policy 
required Africans to provide cattle-free belts, no regard was taken of the effect which such 
enforced concentrations of stock had on pasture, water and soil. Yet this was an important 
question worthy inclusion in any assessment of soil erosion and its causes in the reserves. An 
acknowledgement of this fact would have necessitated the state to make some provision from 
public funds to counteract the consequent ill-effects of concentration on African land as well as 
to provide compensation for stock that starved as a result of the concentration policy.
733
 Fig 
5.1
734
 below is an example of what a cattle concentration camp looked like. 
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In this illustration, large numbers of cattle were moved from 8 different locations (area shown in 
blue stripes) to a very small quarantine camp (in red dots) at the centre of the Reserve. The size 
 Figure 5. 1: A cattle concentration camp in Ndanga Reserve 
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of the quarantine camp betrays the oversight by veterinary officials to grazing matters. As will be 
shown, cattle starved in cattle concentration camps, and the impact of cattle trampling on the soil 
was also disastrous. 
 
There are a number of compelling cases illustrative of the insensitivity of the state to the fact that 
African lands were generally poor, and also the rural struggles and hardships triggered by both 
spatial reorganisation and veterinary policy. The concentration of infected herds placed a burden 
upon African livestock owners and the environment. In Chilimanzi in 1934, there were 76 390 
head on 753 475 acres, from which 43 000 acres of land were under cultivation and a very large 
area covered by ranges of rocky hills which carried no grazing at all. In addition to cattle, the 
area also had 10 300 sheep, 36 850 goats and 1 600 donkeys.
735
 Thus, livestock starved for lack 
of pasture. Furthermore, following an outbreak at Nuanetsi in 1934, Africans in Ndanga had to 
drive their cattle between 100 and 116 miles to the quarantine areas where their cattle (5000 
head) were closely herded in small overgrazed areas.
736
 Approximately, 483 head of cattle from 
Matsai Reserve and 73 from Sangwe Reserves died while in June 1935 over 100 had to be left 
behind in the Ndanga District as they were too weak to travel when they were further moved to 
Bikita Reserve.
737
 By May 1936, the number of cattle facing death by starvation had risen to 15 
000.
738
 These beasts were moved to a bad grazing area and this resulted in appalling mortality 
rates. This even precipitated a change in African preferences for domestic animals. Amidst this 
great suffering of cattle in concentration camps, a peculiar and unprecedented demand for 
donkeys was reported since they did not succumb easily to malnutrition and were not hampered 
by veterinary restrictions.
739
  
 
The creation of a cattle-free belt along the Northern boundaries of the Zimutu Reserve and the 
Mshagashe Area (Fort Victoria District) resulted in cattle being brought into the centre of the 
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reserve for three consecutive years between 1935 and 1938. In this reserve, Africans had a 
difficult task in guarding cattle to prevent damage to standing crops. Their livestock were in a 
starving condition as there was no grass for them to graze.
740
 Sympathising with the livestock 
owners, the NC for the area demanded that the Chief Veterinary Surgeon cancel the cattle-free 
belt and allow Africans to drive their cattle home. He remarked, ‘The Government should not for 
a moment countenance this cruelty to animals.’741 That a colonial official could raise the issue of 
cruelty to animals in his argument for the cessation of concentration is not an oddity. This was a 
remarkable case of the state falling prey to its own propaganda. One popular view peddled in the 
public press and official circles especially during cattle culling in Gutu and Victoria Districts was 
that Africans’ poor treatment of cattle had forced the state to act.742 In fact, a few years later the 
Natural Resources Board, as will be shown, pushed for compulsory destocking in the reserves 
partly on the basis of anti-cruelty to animals.  
 
The impact of veterinary restrictions on the rural economy and the ability of Africans to meet 
their financial obligations to the state, especially in South Eastern Zimbabwe where Foot and 
Mouth outbreaks were concentrated, have been delineated.
743
 The unprecedented suffering saw 
Africans in Fort Victoria sending a deputation the CNC complaining that, among other things, 
they were deprived of their oxen and could not plough their lands.
744
 In this they had the support 
of the native commissioner who observed that:  
Not only is the marketing of native crops affected but in two of the most congested 
reserves in this district, namely the Victoria and Mtilikwe Reserves, no one will buy the 
Native’s cattle because the reserves are in quarantine, and it is not known when cattle 
from there will be allowed access to the Liebigs factory… My suggestion is that an 
advance of £500, to be augmented by a further £500 if necessary, be made to me for the 
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purpose of buying cattle from the older natives in the reserves. Only sufficient stock 
would be bought from each middle aged man to enable him to pay his current tax.
745
 
 
Thus, other than the damage to the environment, quarantines also had the effect of limiting the 
ability of Africans to meet their tax obligations to the state. In particular, the experiences of 
Africans in the concentration areas are captured trenchantly in Chief Maroza Mukanganwi’s 
complaint:  
We are aware of the fact that the Government is giving the considerable good help to us 
natives, we know that the government is giving a big sum of money per month, therefore 
we do not want to make the Government sorry, as though we do not see what is being 
done for us, but because of these practical difficulties we beg to submit the following: 1. 
Cattle are not affected by the disease, but why should they remain there then? 2. We are 
sorry to hear that people are dying, not knowing why. 3. Cattle are like pests to those 
people where they are. 4. We are not all have enough food [sic] for boys who are herding, 
some are not sending food to the cattle kraals, this create a lot of trouble in kraals. 5. The 
grass is getting finished, they go far for grass, calves die on the way. 6. We always buying 
and selling among ourselves for taxes, this cannot be done this year. 7. As we always go 
to the cattle kraals, are we not bringing disease to the cattle? 8. May we know when will 
the cattle come? We will be pleased to be given the right directions in all.
746
  
 
Mukanganwi’s plea exposes several key issues. Firstly, it reveals the difficult position African 
chiefs faced in the system – they were torn between the interest of the state that paid them 
monthly salaries, and protecting the ordinary people whom they were culturally supposed to 
protect. Secondly, it also reveals the inability of Africans to understand the concentration system 
at a time when cattle had no visible signs of illness for to them a diseased animal must 
necessarily look sickly. Thirdly, question 5 shows that Africans had also grasped key aspects of 
pasture management as they questioned the idea of concentrating cattle.  Fourthly, question 7 
exposes the inability of Africans to follow settler policy as it was always shifting – at times to the 
point of absurdity. It also demonstrates that veterinary rules were malleable as they were utilised 
to protect the interest of white livestock owners – a dominant preoccupation of the settler state in 
the 1930s. Question 2 referred to the death of two youths from malaria. One took place at 
Mufuwa’s cattle post where cattle from Chief Maroza’s area were being herded and the other 
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near the Mujichi tank where Chief Jiri’s country had been placed.747 In their thinking these 
deaths could not have happened had the government not moved their cattle. This grievance also 
touches on African thinking that certain environments are not suitable for settlement.
748
 
 
In instances where the state flagrantly violated its own policy, some Africans were quick to point 
out the contradiction. For instance, S. Maambe, argued: 
Why is it that Mr Cameron’s cattle are going into the fence? Will they not get sick when 
they get in there? They are going down to Nyajena Reserve where they are transporting 
mining machinery; are they not bringing the sickness out with them when they come out 
again. If mine would bring out the disease, they would as well…. They (Cameron’s cattle) 
pass the kraal (Nyajena Reserve) where I reside, because I was at the gate. I was told that 
my cattle might have taken the disease out. My cattle were right at the gate.
749
  
 
Perhaps the biggest oddity to some African cattle owners was that their diseased cattle were sold 
for consumption. Gombiro summed up the feeling among Africans, ‘We are afraid to say a lot, 
because it appears to us that the Europeans are more than the natives. I do not want to say much 
because if I start talking a lot the authorities will say that I am mad.’750 The word ‘mad’ is used 
in a metaphoric sense that is those who accepted colonial policy were seen as ‘progressive’ and 
those opposed to it ‘senseless’. Thus, this statement reveals the political interpretation of colonial 
policy, and more specifically it is evidence to the popular belief among Africans that the white 
community was a ‘concentration of irrationality.’751 One African chief indicated his resignation 
in the face of colonial experts’ power as he sighed simply, ‘it is no use advising us! Command us 
and we will obey.’752 This statement conjures a picture of a powerless people whose major form 
of response to intrusion was peaceful acquiescence. This fits into the broader argument that 
during this time Africans were not concerned about removing the system that oppressed them but 
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wanted to reform it. Though speaking specifically about destocking, Raphael Svikiro explained 
why Africans seemingly resigned to their fate: 
All I can say is that during this time blacks had no say (option). Whatever the white men 
introduced, no one would question. The white man was in power. They could do whatever 
they wanted because it was their time. The blacks had to accept this albeit grudgingly. 
Many people lost their cattle. Nhimura/Muchiso (destocking) was a strategy to dispossess 
the black man of his animals. It was not for environmental reasons (erosion). Whites used 
to send majoni (policemen) and these were feared hence there was no one in our area who 
disobeyed orders from white men.
753
 
 
Some Africans resisted destocking overtly. For instance, in 1933 Maplanka of Essexvale was 
taken to court and found guilty for being contemptuous to Christie Bertie Twyman, a 
government cattle inspector after he refused to give the number of his livestock.
754
 In 
Umzinyathi, Seka Jaya of the Matshena Dip had 100 of his cattle shot and in reaction demanded 
that he too be shot – because he had been deprived of his source of living.755 Collaborators were 
sometimes attacked, for example, one Lonyovu was assaulted by Sekenyala because the former 
had collaborated with the whites in taking the latter’s cattle and was even boasting about it.756  
 
Given their disillusionment over the way the bureaucratic system operated with regards to soil 
conservation and livestock concentration methods, some Africans hid the infection. For instance, 
a popular practice which made it difficult for veterinary officials to tell whether the disease was 
present involved Africans substituting calves when there had been mortality among their 
herds.
757
 To obviate this, dip supervisors visited villages to check numbers, and furthermore 
spleen smears were taken from all cattle dying in their areas.
758
 That Africans were apprehensive 
is not surprising for there was suspicion towards both soil conservation and livestock 
concentration methods. Thus, one African reported, ‘my fear is that if I were to go to a 
Demonstrator and be taught, my land would be cut up and I would be given a very small area to 
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plough . . . we feel that if we follow these people there is a danger that some of our land will be 
taken away from us.’759 Suspicions that teachers and agricultural demonstrators were government 
agents ‘sent to sniff out the best land and make new expropriations possible’ also abounded.760 
That civil servants were feared in this manner was understandable because their increased 
activities in the reserves came in the wake of the early land alienations, forced labour and tax 
collection.
761
 
 
Complaints such as those raised by Chief Mukanganwi were thought to be issues of national 
security hence native commissioners sometimes refused to carry out veterinary instructions. For 
instance, in Chipinge, the native commissioner refused to the proposal from the Veterinary 
Department that African-owned cattle along the Eastern side of the Sabi River from Wangezi to 
Mahenye be moved away from their owners’ kraals into the higher ground adjoining the 
European occupied plateau. Such movements were considered not ‘fair’ to Africans because 
water in the local rivers was not sufficient even for all the cattle whose movement was asked for. 
He argued: 
Even if the proposed movements were practicable, the cattle would be continually bolting 
back to the River where they have been raised, and general dislocation and confusion 
would result, all to no useful purpose… for the reasons already adumbrated it is most 
desirable to avoid causing further irritation.
762
   
 
He suggested that the Sabi River be used as a means of protection. This was approved hence 
cattle were moved 2 miles from the river and not from Wangezi to Mahenye. When they were 
eventually moved Africans complained that they were being moved to tsetse-fly prone areas. 
Seeing that there was nothing they could do to stop state-sanctioned cattle movement to some 
forty miles away, Chief Mahenye and his people, as an act of defiance, quietly killed most of 
their cattle for consumption such that by 1946 there was only 17 head of cattle left.
763
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By 1938, modifications to veterinary restrictions had been effected with the consequence that 
movement of cattle from the Chikwanda and Zimutu Reserves into Victoria Veterinary District 
were allowed without undergoing a preliminary period of three weeks quarantine in the vicinity 
of the Reserve of origin.
764
 These were meant to enable Africans to sell their livestock. But these 
sales, happening as they were in Foot and Mouth areas, meant that these beasts were sold for a 
pittance – something particularly welcome to colonial officials who were keen to prevent white 
beef producers from African competition.
765
 All the cattle culled in Victoria and Gutu thus went 
to the Liebigs meatpacking factory in West Nicholson, which specialized in ‘scrub’ cattle.766 
 
A policy of fencing prohibited areas was inaugurated in 1937 to allow freer movements of 
animals, and vegetable products outside the fence. Accordingly the following areas were fenced: 
Victoria, Mtilikwe and Nyadjena Native Reserves and the Mshawasha Native Purchase Area in 
the Victoria Native District; the South-eastern portion of Gwanda and Chibi native districts east 
of Nuanetsi Ranch; the Ndanga Native District and the Bikita Native District south of the 
Turgwe River, including Nyahunda Native Purchase Area. In addition to these areas, the farms 
Morgenster, Mzero, Oatlands, Le Rhone, Clifton, Kyle and Retreat were included.
767
 The fence 
covering over 250 miles was also erected on the boundary of the prohibited area, in addition to 
existing fencing on Nuanetsi and Devuli Ranches. An internal fence (about 133 miles long) was 
also erected with the object of preventing contact of immune cattle in the Ndanga, Mtilikwe and 
Victoria Reserves with susceptible cattle to the West.
768
 These fences also performed another 
role which is clear in administrative reports as they were, as Wolmer and Scoones have already 
shown, rooted in a desire to safeguard the commercial beef ranching landscape through 
separating it from a communal herds and game.
769
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In addition to the above challenges, as a veterinary policy concentration faced sustained attacks 
from entomologists and native commissioners (all white) given its ramifications on tsetse-control 
efforts. The Secretary for Natives argued, ‘The depopulation of considerable tracts of country 
brings in its train wilderness conditions. There is also the danger of tsetse fly invasion through 
the presence of game in the depopulated area (more particularly buffalo) and that area was once a 
‘fly’ area.’770 In this case, Africans were supposed to be a buffer against the spread of the fly in 
the south-eastern corner of the colony. The Chief Entomologist explained:  
Depopulation is on the face of it, a retrograde step…. The great patch of dense forest 
between the angle made by the Lundi and Sabi Rivers may make it difficult to keep a 
wide enough game free zone along the border in that region. If the fly were to get 
through, game reduction operations would probably need to be undertaken on a very large 
scale to drive it out again. The less populated the country, the more difficult and 
expensive the task would be. The presence of cattle is also an excellent safeguard against 
undetected advance of the fly. In actual experience, most of our warnings concerning the 
advance of fly have been received through the appearance of Trypanosomiasis amongst 
cattle. In the long view, therefore, I should regard the depopulation of the southern end of 
the Ndanga District as a handicap in reference to tsetse fly control.
771
 
 
However, the eradication of FMD – a disease posing direct danger to the country’s prospects for 
beef exports – was deemed a priority higher than the long term entomological concerns over 
tsetse-fly control. Consequently, the most important state bureaucrat, the Minister of Agriculture, 
remarked, ‘The longer the concentration is delayed, the greater the risks, and in my opinion it 
should be proceeded without further loss of time.’772 This resulted in the fencing of the Gutu 
Quarantine Camp in 1938 amidst complaints from the Native Commissioner.
773
 The fencing of 
Victoria Reserve restricted access to grazing land as it was reduced to half of its 1937 size while 
the purchase of farms by elite Africans in the new Mshagashe Purchase area meant some 
communal land farmers no longer had access to land they had formerly used for grazing.
774
 Other 
quarantine camps that were fenced included Chikombedzi, Magudus, Mazuna, Chiduma, 
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Tshaikembedza. However, in areas such as Chiduma and Tshaikembedza (Ndanga District) the 
abundance of game rendered the maintenance of the fencing exceedingly costly hence they were 
disbanded in 1940.
775
 Thus, the erection of veterinary fences by the veterinary department as a 
preventative measure against FMD, added rather than reduced pressure on the environment. 
 
Besides revealing the tensions within the bureaucracy, cattle movements for concentration 
purposes unearthed possibilities for reclaiming lost pasture, and the adoption of better pasture 
management systems. There were certain areas in Matabeleland and Mashonaland where there 
were remarkable results after cattle had been moved elsewhere for as part of creating cattle-free 
belts. For instance, in Chilimanzi District, it was found that in an overgrazed area, the young and 
older grass never had a chance to seed properly, with the result that every year the 
impoverishment of grazing land occurred. However, the shifting of all cattle out of an area of 
between 50 and 60 miles in length and varying from 5 to 8 miles in width vividly illustrated how 
the veld regenerated. The area from which they were removed was bare when they left but went 
back to the old original state before the return of the cattle six months later.
776
   
Soil erosion and dip tanks 
Concentration was not the only veterinary policy in contravention of conservation policies. 
Major issues overlooked by the state in its centralisation policies (other than the impact of the 
concentration method on environmental degradation) concerned the location and numbers of 
dipping tanks as well as the way African cattle were driven to the dip.
777
 Of particular concern 
amongst conservationists was the manner ‘native’ cattle were ‘causing’ rivers to dry through 
grazing at the river sources (headwaters), and gulley erosion at dip tanks.
778
 These contrasted 
sharply with those of the Veterinary Department which considered the eradication of FMD and 
other tick-borne epizootics a more important matter demanding the observance of veterinary 
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regulations, their impact on the environment notwithstanding. By 1938, this subject had become 
so controversial to merit the attention of the Natural Resources Commission. M.W. Ingram, 
revealed:  
There is a definite increase in soil erosion during my 29 years’ experience and increase is 
cumulative. A reason for this is having nearly all dipping tanks built on rivers and 
consequently many tracks to dips which are now dongas. This also leads to water not 
reaching the msenyas and to the silting up of the rivers and streams. When water is 
plentiful in rainy seasons there is no necessity for the cattle to go to the rivers and the 
result is cattle tracks and tramping in of the river banks.
779
  
 
Irrigation officials protested that efforts to reclaim sources of rivers and vleis (moisture retaining 
soils and wetlands) which dried as a result of overstocking and trampling at Mutsago Dip Tank 
in the Maranke South Reserve had been in vain. One irrigation engineer testified: 
That place used to have a small spring bubbling out of the ground and it was the only 
source of water in the district. A dip tank was built near this water supply and the cattle 
congregated at the dip and all the land round it was turned into a sale-yard. They so 
demolished the area that the spring ceased to flow. Protection works were started. The 
area was fenced round and the eroded ground was filled with loads of sands. The area was 
also protected from fires, and all these measures caused the stream to flow again.
780
   
 
Naturally, this elicited questions whether the benefits of dipping were bigger than those of veld 
management. It was indeed a matter of compromise: as has been shown already, sometimes the 
cattle got so poor that the bad effect of taking them the dip was greater than the beneficial effect 
of getting rid of the tick! The effect of these contrasting discourses between colonial officials 
from different departments on Africans must have been negative as well as confusing since they 
had dipped as per regulations, and yet their animals were still considered an environmental 
hazard. 
  
Yet it is important to note that conservationists raised a question that was not addressed 
appropriately at the time largely because Africans livestock management and farming practices 
were considered the only threat to the environment – a dominant theme of Empire-wide 
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discourse in the 1930s which became part of officials’ training.781 Though showing the 
development of gulley erosion around dip tanks at a much later period, Figs. 5.2
782
  and 5.3
783
  
vividly illustrate the impact of dip tanks on the immediate environment, and environmental 
challenges posed by the agglutination of large numbers of cattle at dip tanks in Mtoko and 
Mondoro-Ngezi Reserves. 
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Figure 5.2: Incidence of gullying around a dip tank in Mtoko 
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These figures reveal that there was indeed a connection between the agglutination / convergence 
of large numbers of cattle at dip tanks and the development of gulley erosion. Indeed, evidence 
to the Natural Resources Commission reveals that throughout the territory administrative 
officials working in African reserves were concerned with the fact that there was increased 
erosion activity close to dip tanks. However, finding an amicable way to settling conflicting 
Figure 5. 3: Gulley erosion in Mondoro-Ngezi 
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veterinary and conservation needs proved futile. Some colonial officials suggested that cattle be 
allowed to approach the dipping tanks by many deviations but this,   
[i]s not possible, for either the cattle must take one or two paths or, alternatively, trees 
have to be cut down to allow them to approach by many paths. One way method has been 
suggested of stopping erosion round dip tanks where it is most noticeable … is to pave a 
considerable distance round about each tank, because in every instance the tank is near a 
river and the approach to it is very steep. It is impossible to approach a dip tank by many 
ways, because you have the river which will stop the cattle coming from one direction, so 
that all the paths must converge at some distance from a tank owing to the steepness of 
the hill running down to the dip tank.
784
 
 
An enduring solution to this problem lay in reducing the number of cattle using a single dip tank 
through the construction of many more. Limiting the distance cattle travelled to the dip tank was 
generally considered helpful but there were financial and other pressing ecological limitations to 
achieving this. Although the Veterinary Department acknowledged their importance, increasing 
the number of dipping tanks was not being followed to any great extent for lack of funding.
785
 In 
Matabeleland, the provision of dipping tanks and thus the reduction of cattle’s travelling distance 
thereto did not solve the problem of water shortages. In that region, cattle drank water once in 
three days and were, in some cases, driven all day to drink water sources and then back to the 
grazing area.
786
 Thus, besides dip tanks cattle trekking to watering places was also a serious 
environmental threat. 
 
Though efforts were being made to reduce the number of cattle utilising a single dip tank, 
logistical implications of filling such dip tanks with water meant that the Veterinary Department 
continued with its not so environmentally friendly practice of constructing dip tanks close to 
vulnerable water bodies such as rivers. With regard to availability of water at dip tanks, the 
acting CVS explained, ‘that is the difficulty, and we have to build our dipping tanks close to a 
river. I would rather not do it but it would mean getting water by boring or some other means if 
you go any distance from a river.’787 He downplayed this matter and chose to blame Africans for 
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keeping ‘too many’ cattle against the advice of veterinary officials. Upon realising that the state 
neither afforded increasing the number of dip tanks nor constructing them far away from rivers, 
did state conservationists shift their attention to their long standing argument about the manner 
cattle were driven to dip tanks to question the prudence of dipping even when cattle were tick 
free. By implication this meant that the Veterinary Department was supposed to leave the onus of 
dipping to livestock owners, a position they were not prepared to agree to given past experiences 
when dipping was not yet compulsory. The compromise was that they kept authority over 
dipping while they reduced, in certain circumstances, the frequency of dipping whenever there 
were no outbreaks. 
 
By 1939, these issues had become subject of a commission of enquiry set up to inquire into the 
preservation of natural resources in the colony – the Natural Resources Commission. Despite 
acknowledging that veterinary matters were hazardous to the environment, the Committee could 
not solve these contrasting views as it reported,  
it is difficult under the circumstances to suggest a complete remedy, but an increase in 
both watering places and dipping tanks would obviously be beneficial, as would dipping 
at less frequent intervals…. It has been suggested that, in the case of Native cattle, to save 
undue concentration, the numbers to be dipped in one day should be restricted and 
operations at the same dip tank spread over a longer period, but this would increase the 
work of the Dip Supervisors correspondingly and it is doubtful if the advantages claimed 
would not be altogether set off by the increased number of days in which dipping took 
place.
788
  
 
Restating the ‘bigger, better but smaller herds’ argument 
The acknowledgement that state-imposed and settler-desired veterinary methods were destroying 
the environment did not result in measures being taken to combat the damage they were causing. 
Instead, the state opened new avenues for restructuring African livestock management systems in 
the countryside. Although effort was, as will be shown, eventually put on livestock improvement 
and destocking, a number of possible solutions had been proffered. Some colonial officials like 
Alvord thought that the real problem in African reserves was overpopulation not overstocking 
hence the argument that unless active steps were taken to make more land available to blacks, or, 
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to get the surplus people, in some manner off the land, the position could only get worse.
789
 
Alvord suggested the following schemes: transferring excess population to under-populated 
areas, restricting rural population to those people who had a special aptitude for farming, 
establishing African towns in reserves to be occupied by non-farmers, establishing orderly 
African villages in the vicinity of European towns and industrial centres and requiring the 
families of men employed there to live with them in those towns. Furthermore, he recommended 
the establishment of training farms in the Reserves, introducing collective farming in Reserves, 
developing irrigation schemes, and establishing supervised tenant farming in European areas.
790
 
Though not immediately implemented, these ideas were to influence the Native Lands 
Husbandry Act (1951) which intensified state intrusion in the reserves. Destocking and livestock 
improvement were implemented simultaneously as they were two sides of the same coin. 
 
Livestock improvement activities encapsulated in the African Cattle Clause
791
, which had been 
side-lined by Alvord’s centralisation policy in the 1930s, were from the 1940s repackaged to 
accommodate the dominant environmental ideas of the time. Language accompanying livestock 
improvement activities in the reserves from the 1940s suggests that colonial officials began to 
perceive it as a viable conservation method. This policy shift came in the wake of the Natural 
Resources Act (1941) which intensified the process of reorganising African livelihoods in the 
reserves through empowering native commissioners to ‘depasture stock, give orders on methods 
of cultivation, prohibit the cultivation of land and control water.’792  
 
Unlike in the pre-1930 period, when introducing cross-breeds was thought to be the best way to 
assist Africans into adopting ‘economic’ herds, a new school of thought rose in the post-1930 
period. In the 1930s, colonial officials had begun to argue that ‘it would be of no avail to 
introduce the best imported pedigree bulls into the Native Reserves, if their progeny are to 
starve.’793 Those in support of this idea further argued that since Africans were, ‘oblivious to the 
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evils attendant on overstocking and are opposed to reducing the numbers of their flock. The 
solution of the matter maybe found in an endeavour to improve Native stock by selection, rather 
than in a continuance of cross-breeding.’794 Thus, from the 1940s they began to assess the 
livestock improvement operations of the Department of Native Agriculture since its creation in 
1929. They decried the fact that during centralisation, work towards the improvement of local 
livestock had not gone beyond castration – a policy aimed at eliminating animals of perceived 
poor quality.
795
 In fact, since demonstration work began in 1927, demonstrators yearly castrated 
large numbers of  scrub bulls, which over a period of years ending December 1940, totalled 
approximately 140 000 head.
796
 In a context that believed that Africans were having uneconomic 
herds, destocking or the sale or ‘scrub’ beasts tended to prevail over other pertinent issues 
pertaining to pasture and stock improvement.
797
 This neglect meant that by 1939 no proven 
breed, strong enough to withstand conditions in the reserves and market conditions, had been 
introduced. The Afrikander was still being introduced on an experimental basis, and no definite 
answers as to their suitability could be given.
798
 The following statement by R.L. Cooper (Lands 
Inspector, Native Affairs Department) is a fair assessment of this official neglect of African 
livestock regimes:   
Today the people have advanced so far in their knowledge of the soil cultivation and 
crops, that they practice crop-rotation and seed selection, yet from an animal husbandry 
point of view, they are very little better than they were one hundred years ago, I might 
even go so far as to say they are worse off. It is certainly true that never were Native cattle 
such a poor, mixed, scrubby lot as is to be found today, and the position is becoming 
steadily worse.
799
 
 
Some progressive colonial officials accepted the fact that African reserves were located in 
inferior environments where it was difficult to rear livestock. Thus, they argued that the poor 
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type and quality of ‘native’ cattle was largely due to the very low level of nutrition on which they 
were maintained since some reserves were ‘hopelessly’ overstocked that animals lived on 
practically ‘a starvation ration.’800 Therefore, they concluded that cross-breeds would not survive 
under such conditions making any attempt at ‘improvement’ a waste of the state’s time, money 
and effort.  
Creating the ‘Native beast’ 
In order to address these concerns, in 1941 the state took a serious step towards ‘creating’ a 
standard type of ‘Native’ beast by selection and breeding. Such an animal was to ‘breed true to 
type and prove itself eminently suitable to the conditions and management under which Native 
cattle are required to live.’801 They now officially accepted that the local breed had the 
constitution, and the natural resistance to disease and adverse conditions, hence Cooper’s 
remark:  
No breed developed by the Europeans, – not even excepting the Africander – will stand 
up to the present Native methods of stock management, under which these cattle thrive. It 
is in this connection that the Natives are solely in need of instruction and assistance, for it 
is sad to see how scarce the true native beast is becoming. The scrub that is so prevalent 
today is the result of a lack of knowledge of animal husbandry, for it is my firm opinion 
that the deterioration has been brought about more by the use of unsuitable European 
bulls, than by any other cause. The Native, with his lack of knowledge, thinking to 
improve milking or other properties of his cattle, introduces some pampered blood other 
that of Native origin, little realising that by doing so he is at once lowering the 
constitution of his animals.
802
   
 
Alvord also weighed in, 
it can honestly be said that Native Stock as a whole has steadily deteriorated year by year 
in spite of the valuable work done by the Veterinary Department through Dip Supervisors 
and cattle inspectors, and sporadic attempts to improve the standard of the Native beast by 
the introduction of European breeds and cross-bred bulls by certain Native 
Commissioners.
803
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These ideas, coming from different technical experts within the colonial bureaucracy, were often 
contradictory but the various ways through which they contradicted were conveniently ignored 
while emphasis was put on the way they resonated with the destocking discourse. Like Alvord, 
Cooper emphasized that colonial livestock policy had not adequately addressed the introduction 
of exotic breeds among Africans but further opined that state efforts had been frustrated by 
Africans. These ideological differences notwithstanding colonial officials were agreed that some 
form of intervention was needed in the reserves.  
 
The thinking that a new breed was needed reveal a veiled capitulation of the state bureaucrats 
who had entertained the belief (already discussed in Chapter 4) that nature in the end would 
rectify the balance between stock and feed, that is, some animals would die due to thirst and 
hunger and teach the Africans the virtue of raising smaller herds of bigger cattle.
804
 In the 1940s, 
this thinking had lost currency partly because of its insensitivity to animal cruelty, and, partly 
because of the effects of large herds on the vegetation and soil. It was argued that since 
‘indigenous stock are toughness personified and almost every vestige of vegetation and soil will 
have disappeared and much of the soil will have been lost before the adjustment is effected… 
indigenous cattle are capable of outlasting their food supply.’805 
 
This new livestock policy emphasised the rearing of the pure ‘Sanga’ cattle which existed in the 
country before the Europeans arrived. In the spirit of the new policy Sanga cattle became 
protected species from 1944. From that year, native commissioners were encouraged to make 
full use of animal husbandry officers in spreading of propaganda and to indicate to Africans 
which cows they could not sell. The sale of ‘pure’ (Sanga) cattle as breeding stock was 
discouraged, and sales were only to be of cows which had distinct indications of European breed 
blood while ‘the best Native cattle should be kept as breeders to improve Native owned cattle.’806  
Research was also encouraged into the suitability of the Afrikander in ‘grading up’ ‘native’ 
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cattle. Breeding projects meant to keep the original ‘Sanga’ race of cattle with its hereditary and 
resistance to disease, to improve it in size and quality by selective breeding were started.  From 
1945 work on ‘Sanga’ breeding projects was expanded by the location of sites for five large herd 
breeding stations as follows: at Makoholi, an all-black type; at Tjolotjo, a red and white spotted 
type; at Tuli, a light golden dun type; at Mzingwane, a red and white ‘Nkone’ type; and at 
Buhera, a herd of all varieties of colours.
807
 Herds from these breeding stations were then to be 
distributed to Africans throughout the country and as the breeding stock in each herd was 
‘improved’, the surplus heifers and cows were also disposed either to Africans or sold to 
European stock buyers.
808
  
 
Another important change in livestock policy during this time was the standardisation of 
breeding practices across the territory. Until that time each district had been treated as a separate 
area whose activities and methods of dealing with African cattle breeding had no effect on or 
relation to areas outside its immediate boundaries. The result had been that there developed 
numerous livestock policies throughout the country, some of which were diametrically opposed. 
In some districts, a Native Commissioner merely adopted a scheme which appeared to him 
suitable, and his ideas and programme could be upset entirely by the official who followed. 
Colonial officials thought standardisation would benefit all cattle interests in the country: 
Africans were expected to benefit from the changes through the elimination of ‘scrub’ cattle, and 
the resultant better grade of beast while white cattle traders and commercial farmers were to 
benefit through the general improvement of ‘Native’ cattle they purchased from Africans and 
more hardy cows on which to use their pure-bred bulls for the production of beef.
809
 The country 
would benefit as a direct result of the benefits to both Africans and Europeans, and in the 
conservation of natural resources resulting from a ‘sound’ livestock policy.810 However, one 
unforeseen development of the destocking campaign on livestock improvement activities was 
that Africans were disposing of good type ‘Native’ bulls which native commissioners thought, in 
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the interests of African livestock improvement, could be retained for breeding purposes.
811
 
Though prevalent in many areas, this tendency became more pronounced during the 1946-7 
drought when Africans were forced by circumstance to sell livestock to sustain themselves.  
 
In order to prevent or reduce the destocking of ‘good’ bulls, and to save and redistribute those 
that were offered for sale, the following schemes were approved that season: the establishment of 
bull camps for the holding of young bulls until they had matured or matured bulls until sold; 
when culling for destocking purposes families were permitted to keep one selected bull which 
was exempted from destocking; native commissioners were authorised to purchase bulls of 
‘good’ type which would otherwise be sold for slaughter; bulls so purchased were branded as 
selected bulls and made available for sale to Africans at 50 per cent of the purchase price; 
pending the sale of these bulls, NCs were to make arrangements for keeping them; these selected 
bulls were to be sold to Africans in a dip tank area other than that in which the bull previously 
served.
812
 This was an important intervention as it reduced the sale of ‘good’ animals that may 
have fallen to the butcher’s knife. For instance, in 1946 alone breeding efforts were improved 
when a total of 1 011 bulls and 3 812 breeding cows were selected during the destocking 
programme.
813
 By 1951, three central breeding stations had been established permanently: Tuli 
(Lowveld Station), Makaholi (Middleveld Station) and Mrewa (Highveld Station). Bull camps 
were also established in Matabeleland and Southern Mashonaland.
814
  
 
There were also pasture improvement projects done in reserves. Grazing surveys were carried 
out in a number of reserves in Matabeleland, Southern Mashonaland, Midlands and Manicaland 
circles. Rotational grazing was started in various parts of the country: Southern Mashonaland (at 
Victoria, Zimutu and Western Gutu reserves), while Midlands grazing areas had been created in 
Charter district. In Matabeleland, Inyati Reserve was paddock fenced and came under a system 
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of rotational grazing as was Mzingwane and Ntabazinduna Reserve.
815
 For instance, in 
Chilimanzi Reserve an area of 480 acres which was practically devoid of grass and thickly 
covered with msasa scrub (Brachystegia spiciformis) was fenced in 1948 while in Zimutu 
Reserve (Southern Mashonaland) all the grazing areas were demarcated into paddocks resulted in 
a major improvement of grass cover throughout the reserve.
816
  All these interventions were in 
line with the 1944 recommendation of the Native Production and Trade Commission of Enquiry 
which stated:  
In our opinion, the maximum benefits, both for the State and for the Natives, from Native 
agriculture and animal husbandry can only be obtained by compulsory planned 
production whereby a statutory body should be empowered to direct what crops, acreage 
and areas should be planted, and what livestock should be kept, to enforce good 
husbandry conditions.
817
  
 
Following this sustained attack on African livestock management practices, changes, although 
irregular, began to be seen across the country. After years of propaganda, in the late 1940s some 
native commissioners reported that Africans were beginning to take a keen interest in their cattle,  
ceasing to regard as so many units of stock, respective of quality. Where central breeding 
stations and bull camps are established, there is a keen demand for improved bulls…. A 
significant change from the days when an ox, if not merely a four-legged beast was 
judged by the size of its frame rather than what was on the frame.
818
  
 
However, this change of attitude appeared not to have extended to pasture methods since some 
native commissioners reported, ‘few Africans, however, yet appreciate the value of selective 
grazing, and too often herds cover the same ground month in month out when there is untouched 
pasture within easy reach.’819 Officials also generally spoke of the successes of the culling and 
destocking campaigns and that Africans were beginning to appreciate the resulting improvement 
in the quality of their stock, adding that in some cases Africans themselves accepted 
responsibility for these measures. They gave the example of the Mzingwane Reserve Native 
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Council which carried out the destocking of its small area, and from Mrewa District where two 
of the chiefs carried out the culling. With the NC commenting, ‘When the chief undertakes this 
unpleasant task it is cheerfully accepted by the people and no trouble is experienced.’820 Chiefs 
were also undertaking this unpleasant task of destocking in the Bulalima-Mangwe district. 
Destocking, 1945-51 
The previous section has shown that by the end of the 1930s, challenges posed by veterinary 
measures had forced the state to consider more intrusive methods for the environmental control 
in the reserves from the 1940s. This section examines how destocking came to play an important 
role in conservation policies from the beginning of the 1940s. As a concept, destocking was not 
an entirely new phenomenon in the territory. In fact, the state had tried it in certain African 
reserves in the 1930s – the most popular being the 1938 culling of cattle in Gutu.821 The initial 
excuse for culling in Victoria District had been the need to eradicate disease but this later shifted 
to alleviating over-stocking in the quarantine area resulting from disease restrictions and the 
movement of cattle from European land to Reserves while in Gutu overstocking and 
deterioration of stock, rather than quarantine restrictions, provided the rationale for 
destocking.
822
 At the time, the folly of implementing such a move without any legislative 
instrument had resulted in widespread discontent especially among white liberals – the most 
vocal of them being Mrs R. Comberbach (wife of the NC for Chibi and former NC for Gutu, 
Harold Comberbach), Reverend Arthur Cripps (a radical Anglican missionary), Arthur Creech-
Jones (Member of Parliament) and Reverend A.C. Jackson (Dutch Reformed Church minister) 
whose views had forced the state in 1939 to institute an inquiry into destocking activities in Gutu 
and Victoria Districts (see Fig 5.4
823
 below).
824
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With the memory of opposition to cattle culling in 1938 still fresh, when the idea was 
resuscitated in 1941 the state now had a legal instrument allowing it to destock compulsorily 
across the whole territory. However, at that time the state was still ‘somewhat divided and 
insecure about enforcing the “ecological imperative”’ hence this was a ‘political experiment in 
coercion.’825 Destocking was still perceived by the NC and veterinary officials as a means by 
through which the spread of livestock diseases spread could be reduced.
826
 They argued that if an 
area had a higher percentage of animals than its carrying capacity then if a disease broke out, it 
would spread quickly and affect more cattle than it would have where there are fewer herds.
827
 
Thus, from a veterinary point of view, destocking had two advantages: enabling effective control 
of disease, and assuring sufficient grazing for the cattle. Southern Rhodesia was open to the 
destocking idea having seen a similar proclamation in the Union of South Africa (No. 31 of 14 
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February 1939.), which stated that all inferior beasts, irrespective of ownership, be culled until 
the number allowed for the area concerned had been reached.
828
  
 
The passage of the Natural Resources Act (1941) marked the beginning of a systematic state-run 
reduction of livestock in Native Reserves on account of the perceived damage they were causing 
to the environment through overgrazing. Scientifically, grazing stock has some effect on soil 
properties since the weight of the animal can compress or compact soil while hooves can dig 
down below the soil surface, destroying the soil structure.
829
 However, without dismissing the 
scientific basis for anti-overgrazing measures, it is important to emphasize the state’s narrow 
understanding of the environment problems bedevilling the reserves. The overwhelmingly 
popular view among colonial officials that Africans were responsible holus bolus for 
environmental degradation precluded a fair examination of the problem.  
 
Soil scientists have since challenged the basis on which soil erosion rates were calculated. In 
particular, Stocking has suggested that soil erosion may not have been man-made but just a result 
of the changing environmental conditions.
830
 Indeed, Showers’ findings in Lesotho – a similar 
colonial context – tallies with Stocking’s argument that perceptions were more important that 
real scientific data. She does this by attempting to differentiate between normal from 
abnormal/accelerated erosion.
831
 In fact, there is a general hypothesis that says that accelerated 
erosion was almost non-existent to southern Africa prior to the presence of Europeans in the 
region hence the identification of the factors that led to the ‘origin and development of 
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accelerated soil erosion should be found in an analysis of changes in land use activities’ after 
colonisation.
832
 Under the sedentary form of living necessitated by land shortages in the reserves 
as well as colonial policies, it followed that the grazing management system used during shifting 
cultivation no longer applied. The imposition of sedentism meant that the soil was subjected to 
continuous compaction and soil disturbance by trampling made it more susceptible to erosion.
833
 
The concentration of cattle exacerbated this stress as it increased pressure on pasture. 
 
From 1945, destocking sought to reduce this pressure through obtaining reliable estimates of the 
carrying capacity of each native reserve, that is, the number of mature animal units each reserve 
would carry without loss in a bad year. Cattle and small stock numbers were to be strictly limited 
to this number. It was believed that when done this would result: 
In at least a 25% improvement in the type and quality of the animals apart from the fact 
that losses from poverty will be reduced to negligible figures. Incidentally, such reduction 
and limitation of the number of animals in the reserves will eliminate the main cause of 
soil erosion and reduced water supplies and prove the cheapest method of preventing 
these.
834
 
 
While the environmental argument behind destocking is clear, it is important to explain why the 
state’s ardent commitment to this policy. Besides reducing environmental degradation, 
destocking also appealed to Southern Rhodesia’s war-time needs. Thus, Samasuwo argues that 
while ‘the main reason given for the introduction of destocking regulations in Reserves was the 
need to arrest ecological degradation, the reactivation of the regulations themselves in the early 
1940s was no simple accident of history.’835 Between 1939 and 1945, the destocking policy was 
weaponised to pass the cost of war-time beef shortages onto African farmers. Since the 
commercial beef industry (dominated entirely by whites) could not cope with war-time demand 
for beef, the state targeted the so-called ‘excessive herds of cattle held in the African Reserves’ 
through giving the Cold Storage Commission (CSC) and Liebigs Extract Meat Company 
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(LEMCO) preferential buying rights at all cattle sales held in the reserves.
836
 However, this state 
intervention in the African cattle market further polarized the African society by heightening 
suspicions that whites did not want to see a ‘successful’ black person.837  
 
Under the destocking policy, the CNC stipulated a certain number of stock to be held by each 
resident and animals in excess of this number were to be culled on a selective basis, that is, 
‘worthless’ stock would come first. Officials specially qualified in animal husbandry, referred to 
as ‘culling officers’ undertook the work. A culling officer had power to instruct the owner to 
dispose of or permanently remove from the area all culled animals within three months of the 
date of culling and it was only when the owner failed to comply with the order that that the 
animals could be compulsorily sold with the owner receiving the proceeds thereof. Between 
1945 and 1961, the state simultaneously carried out a destocking policy to regulate livestock 
numbers within the reserves’ carrying capacity.  Africans came to associate destocking with dip 
tanks since it was at the dip tanks that decisions on whether cattle were to be sold or slaughtered 
were made.
838
  
 
The problem with capping the maximum of livestock at a herd of six then thought to supply 
enough manure for farming was that African livestock owners did not agree to it. For instance, 
Furusa, the principle headman under Chief Ndema in Selukwe Reserve argued that at least 
twenty beasts would supply sufficient manure, ‘Those who have enough cattle have enough 
manure to use in their lands, but they don’t all have sufficient cattle to make manure.’839 
Mlambo, the agricultural demonstrator in the same reserve, concurred with Furusa, arguing some 
African farmers were only manuring a quarter of an acre because that is all manure they could 
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get from 15 head of cattle.
840
 However, some Africans deployed mechanisms of informal 
redistribution of livestock (kuronzera) to avoid reaching destocking quotas.
841
 For instance, in 
1950 the CNC:  
The native soon appreciated that the weight of destocking was being borne by owners of 
large herds and this led to a whole sale redistribution of native cattle holdings amongst the 
natives with the result that today the number of native owning cattle in these areas is 
many thousands more than in 1945 and the vast majority of them own small stock.
842
 
 
This redistribution meant that the herds could not be destocked since doing so sufficed to leaving 
Africans with cattle below the perceived possible subsistence level. In the face of such passive 
resistance, the state passed a new regulation, the Native Reserves Destocking Regulations 
(1950), which empowered the destocking officer to decide who should be a stock owner, and to 
consider the extent to which the stock owner was dependent on his animals as a mean of 
livelihood for himself or his dependents. The result was that young able bodied men were denied 
the right to own cattle because they could go into waged employment. Africans resisted these 
regulations resulting in the increase of ghost herds. Some people reacted to these restrictions by 
having multiple dip cards as well as allocating some of their livestock to sons, cousins, friends 
and neighbours. Some even stopped going to the dipping tanks after their cattle had been marked 
for culling to avoid being caught in contravention of the law.
843
 Andrew Rice explained: 
My father had so many cattle and to protect his wealth he resorted to loaning them to his 
relatives and friends. This became a problem because after his death as people he loaned 
cattle did not return them. They simply said these are our cattle as they possessed dip 
cards for them. We had three cattle kraals because the cattle were many and also because 
he would want to tell the authorities that there are not his but belong to his relatives. He 
was also a farmer so he put them in different areas.
844
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Thus, as a measure meant to control African livestock regimes, destocking also forced to 
deploy cultural livestock loaning practices. In the process, it also created conflicts among 
Africans as they sometimes squabbled over kuronzera livestock. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the centralisation policies, pursued most actively by Alvord in the 
1930s, were at variance with the state’s own veterinary policies. Veterinary policies were more 
interested in preserving the country’s position in the export beef economy at whatever cost while 
conservationist thinking considered soil conservation sacrosanct. Moreover, the state failed to 
deal with these contradictions as a result of the popular belief amongst the white community (and 
indeed many state officials) that problems faced in the colony were entirely caused by African 
‘primitive’ farming practices. The concentration method intrinsic to efforts to eradicate FMD, 
actually encouraged overgrazing, and contributed to environmental degradation. Furthermore, 
the location of dip tanks and the manner in which livestock were driven to the tanks were partly 
responsible for gulley erosion across the country. The inability to settle the conflicting positions 
of the conservationists and veterinarians resulted in the state looking elsewhere in its search for 
solutions hence the resuscitation of the livestock improvement idea in the 1940s as well as 
compulsory destocking from 1945. All these intrusive measures had a significant impact on the 
African rural landscape in general and livestock management practices in particular. There were 
a number of non-political responses to state intrusion. In particular, destocking resulted in 
changes in livestock ownership patterns and the cattle loaning system (kuronzera) as people tried 
to hide cattle from culling officers. Centralisation impacted on previously extensive grazing 
habits while livestock improvement practices reshaped the local idea of what a ‘good’ cattle 
breed was, and also the type of cattle Africans reared. Thus, by 1951 human-animal relationships 
in the reserves had changed significantly. 
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Chapter Six  
“Drought is an act of God but compulsory destocking is an 
act of government!”: African livestock management in the 
era of African nationalism, c.1950 – 1980. 
 
The previous chapter not only revealed how the hegemonic state-run veterinary services 
marginalised rather than suppressed local African livestock regimes (diagnostic, therapeutic and 
reproductive ideas), but also how African livestock owners questioned technocratic interventions 
in the reserves in diverse ways. In particular, Chapter 5 argued that by 1951 livestock 
improvement activies and the destocking policy had somewhat affected human-animal 
relationships in the reserves. Against this backdrop, this chapter discusses the changing nature of 
state veterinary and livestock policy from the passage of the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951) 
to independence from white minority rule in 1980. It will be argued that by the 1950s, state 
intervention notwithstanding, colonial policies had actually resulted in overstocking and 
overpopulation in the reserves. This incubated a rural political consciousness which began to 
adopt an increasingly nationalistic tone. Thus, this chapter focuses on  the ways through which 
this ‘rural nationalism’ manifested itself as an ideology actively opposed to state veterinary 
measures, and how, faced with the prospect of being replaced by versions of African vernacular 
veterinary system, the state veterinary bureaucracy sought to assert its control over African 
livestock regimes.  
 
In Zimbabwean historiography, the Native Land Husbandry Act (hereafter NLHA), as Munro 
has observed, is perhaps one of the most extensively discussed piece of legislation.
845
 There are 
two major historiographical analyses offered by Beinart and Phimister.
846
 Beinart considers the 
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Act as an exclusively conservationist measure, whereas Phimister’s interpretation suggests it was 
a segregationist measure meant to buttress white industrial capital, farmers’ and mining’s 
demand for cheap black labour. Using the Shurugwi case study, McGregor, like Beinart, has 
argued that conservation ideas and policies played an active part in the passage of this Act.
847
 
This chapter draws on the Beinart-McGregor argument that policies justified as conservationist 
provoked some of the most widespread rural resistance, and also created new environmental 
problems.
848
 Unlike Beinart, Phimister not only regards the NLHA as chiefly an instrument for 
segregation merely couched in conservationist camouflage, but also challenged an earlier view 
held by Machingaidze which suggested that the NLHA had been intensively implemented.
849
  
However, Phimister’s views tallied with those of Machingaidze who examined the relationship 
between land policy and African ‘proletarianisation.’850 In particular, Machingaidze argues that it 
was quite common in official circles and for commissions of enquiry to talk and write of areas 
‘suitable for Europeans,’ and by the same token meaning those areas not suitable for whites were 
the ones to be assigned to Africans.
851
 While it is an excellent study of how state policy failed in 
the reserve, Machingaidze’s study is mainly about land and centralisation in the reserves rather 
than how these methods impacted on human-animal relationships or how veterinary policy and 
state ideas on livestock management fared in the reserves. In a rejoinder to criticism levelled 
against him, Beinart later reworked his thesis which acknowledged that soil erosion had received 
attention from commentators at the expense of livestock.
852
 However, the major flaw with this 
otherwise robust rejoinder lies in Beinart’s synecdochic approach to the subject as he drew from 
South African experiences to portray the southern African situation.  
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At present, no study has looked at livestock management practices in the reserves in the wake of 
the NLHA. Passing reference has been made in one study by Anderson who, using Buhera as a 
case study, argues that the impact of this policy was reduced by the lack of implementation of 
stock regulations. This, he argues, diminished the long-term impact of the NLHA as simple 
evasions of the stock regulations became widespread.
853
 However, as this chapter will 
demonstrate, evasion of stock regulations was not the only form of resistance to veterinary 
policies in the reserves.
 
Thus, though the impact of this Act on agricultural activities had been 
subjected to historical analysis, general attitudes to veterinary, and livestock improvement 
activities by the Veterinary Department during this period are still largely unknown. These 
lacunae in literature raise further questions on the impact of conservation and segregatory 
policies on livestock management. There is need to shift attention from land issues to other 
aspects of rural life, such as livestock management, that have attracted less academic interest. 
 
Much more recently, some scholars have drawn syncretically on the Beinart-Phimister debate to 
argue that the NLHA appealed to both conservationist and segregationist concerns of the settler 
community. Thompson, who uses the Madziwa Communal Area in north-eastern Zimbabwe as a 
case study, discusses the origins and development of the NLHA in the colony’s complex post-
Second World War political economy. He highlights the economic challenges planners faced and 
the contradictory visions and interests of different groups within the white settler population and 
the government.
854
 However, though illuminating certain aspects of state intrusion, there is a 
clear methodological weakness emanating from the tendency to centre on destocking as the chief 
weapon for intrusion without showing how other subtle interventions that accompanied it 
impacted on African livestock regimes. Therefore, it is pertinent, as this chapter intends, to 
examine how Africans in the reserves drew upon ‘indigenous’ and often highly localised systems 
of production in the face of state efforts to promote farming models derived from European 
practice.
855
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The perception and reception of conservation policies in African areas have also been examined. 
Bessant examines the intrusive state conservation policies but more specifically at the historical 
context from which Chiweshe families approached land shortage and soil conservation.
856
 
Although Bessant emphasises that Africans in Chiweshe considered state policies a burden, his 
emphasis was on centralisation and forced labour (chibaro) not livestock. Using Runde and 
Chirumhanzu as case studies, Drinkwater not only discusses concepts of ‘rationality’ mobilised 
by colonial officials and how they justified them but also attempts to show how the schemes 
were opposed by Africans.
857
 Drinkwater’s study is important as it foregrounds the clash of 
civilisations. Building upon the conflicting positions of state technical experts and Africans in 
the reserves, research on the development of nationalism in Southern Rhodesia usually refers to 
the NLHA as having played a significant part in the development of African nationalism. Yet, 
there is also an inherent assumption that rural political consciousness was led by Africans who 
previously worked in urban areas where the Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers 
Union (RICU), and the British African Voice Association, led by Benjamin Burombo were 
active. However, as this chapter will contend, this ignores the ability of rural Africans to 
challenge and negotiate with the state in other ways.
858
 As Ranger and Munochiveyi have shown, 
many ordinary men and women in both rural and urban Rhodesia formulated their own critiques 
of colonialism, which led them to act in concert with those elite nationalists who formed and led 
African political organizations.
859
 Thus, this chapter seeks to contribute in a fresh new way to the 
argument that ‘in the process of political cross-fertilization and dialogue, ordinary Africans, 
whether urban workers or peasants, were not merely led from above, or outside, as objects 
participating in “African nationalism.’”860 Indeed, as Mulwafu has argued for a similar colonial 
context in Malawi, while nationalist feelings played an important role in peasant reactions, much 
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of their resistance emanated from the way policies interfered with household relations and 
everyday economies. This chapter will show how these quotidian local concerns were important 
in shaping initial community responses.
861
 
 
Notwithstanding the oft-made point that the NLHA resulted in widespread dispossession in the 
reserves, the scholarly silence on livestock is astounding. Besides destocking, scholars allude to 
the suffering in the African reserves without examining the position of livestock or the various 
ways destocking affected policies directed at livestock management and improvement. Thus, the 
sum effect of emphasizing African  suffering in the reserves through the lens of destocking alone 
(without any parallel discussion of how as a policy it affected human-animal relations in the 
reserves) and concomitant human relations over animals has had the effect of flattening an 
otherwise complex socio-environment history of the countryside during this time.  
The Native Land Husbandry Act (1951): Implications on African livestock management 
One of the recurrent themes of the previous chapters is the fact that since white occupation state 
attempts at reshaping African livestock regimes were not seamless as they faced several 
obstacles. In particular, the previous chapter demonstrated that, towards the end of the 1940s, it 
became clear to state planners that destocking alone would not change African practices and 
attitudes towards livestock in the reserves.  Thus, from around 1947 colonial experts began to 
argue that the solution to overstocking lay not only in restricting the right to hold stock, but also 
in restricting the right to farm land in the African rural areas.
862
 Therefore, the NLHA was not a 
break with the past but rather acted as an attempt to enforce conservation ideas that had informed 
centralisation and livestock improvement activities of the 1930s and 1940s. It reinforced the 
Natural Resources Act (1941) in that it also sought to provide for the ‘orderly’ and ‘economic’ 
occupation of land and use of pastoral resources in the reserves and Native Purchase Areas 
(NPAs).  However, there were two major differences. Firstly, a new principle buttressing this Act 
was the acceptance that not every African could hold land while working in town. It was 
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premised on the tentative acceptance of the idea that some Africans would become urbanised.
863
 
Secondly, unlike previous pieces of legislation, it gave security of tenure to the ‘good’ farmer, 
limited stock holdings to the perceived carrying capacity of the land, and provided ‘protection’ 
for land not individually held.
864
 As will be shown, these provisions had important ramifications 
for rural livelihoods. Considering these ambitious expectations, colonial officials viewed it as ‘a 
five year plan that will revolutionize African agriculture in the reserves.’865  
 
Although the NLHA clearly applied to a number of issues in the reserves, specific changes that 
touched upon African livestock regimes included providing for a reasonable standard of good 
husbandry and for the protection of natural resources by all Africans using the land; limiting the 
number of stock in any area to its carrying capacity, and, as far as practicable, relating stock 
holding to arable land holding as a means of improving farming practice; and allocating 
individual rights in arable areas and in communal grazing areas. Only registered landholders 
could receive stock rights, ranging from six cattle (or the equivalent in sheep and goats) in areas 
with reliable rainfall to twenty in dry regions.
866
 However, overcrowding in most reserves meant 
that people who did not own animals at the time the law was proclaimed did not receive grazing 
rights, and most stockholders had to reduce their herd below the prescribed standard individual 
holding.
867
  
 
As a legislation that was clearly meant to control land, livestock and people in the reserves, its 
fundamental weakness was the failure to appreciate ‘not only the structural connections between 
farming and migrant labour but also the increasingly central role of cattle in the local 
economy.’868 State-imposed stock control cut directly across emerging relationships of power, 
security and survival at the community and household level, and thereby exacerbated strains on 
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social and economic relations.
869
 This assault on livestock management  proved to be a check 
against ‘entrepreneurial individualism’870 and also had important repercussions on gender and 
generational dynamics as women and young men resisted new demands placed upon them by the 
implementation of the act.
871
 Most affected by this regulation were young males who were out 
working on farms and urban areas as they no longer had an opportunity to raise herds for 
marriage purposes and other economic activities.
872
 Furthermore, the demands of the fledgling 
economy which forced married males who worked in towns to abdicate their traditional 
household roles to their wives and children in the reserves. This resulted in the emergence of 
new human-animal relationships as women and children took a leading role in animal 
management. By 1980, the impact of the migrant labour economy which the colonial state had 
strove to produce to cater for the needs of white capital had resulted in 65-70 per cent of the 675 
000 households in the reserves being headed by women farming alone or with husbands away 
most of the time while in some reserves up to 60 per cent of the men were absent during the most 
productive periods of their lives.
873
 The cumulative development of a rural livestock economy 
largely in the hands of women simultaneously affected veterinary activities in the reserves 
especially extension services that often involved the explanation by veterinary officials (all male) 
of certain veterinary reproductive issues to women – a taboo in African culture.874  
 
The allocation of farming and grazing areas meant that certain spaces that had previous been 
used for grazing were no longer accessible. This resulted in either starvation of cattle in the 
reserves or their having to exist in semi-starvation conditions as extensive grazing practices were 
no longer possible. However, this paved way for the development of new strategies of cattle 
retention by Africans especially by the reserve entrepreneurs. In the face of this assault, livestock 
owners were constantly adapting their grazing practices to suit the conditions of the reserves.  
Furthermore, the cattle which the state targeted for destocking were a form of investment by 
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Africans into their children’s education hence their decimation also cut into their ability to invest 
in their children’s education. Not surprisingly the colonial officials reported widespread 
resistance to cattle destocking. For instance, the CNC reported in 1955:  
No person likes having to dispose of his property, and least of all the native cattle. This is 
one of the many problems, perhaps the most unpleasant of all, which faces the 
administrative officers of this department. But it has to be done in the interests of the 
natives and for the future.
875
 
 
Furthermore, the biggest irony was that the colonial state expected and required African farmers 
to practice intensive cultivation on land not suited for it.
876
 These concerns, notwithstanding, the 
state was eager to push forward the suggested changes which were hoped to transform African 
areas into ‘modern’ economic entities.   
 
Among a number of problems associated with the expected changes in the reserves during the 
imposition of the legislation was the issue of rotational grazing. The actual assessment of 
carrying capacity was based on guesswork as visits by pasture assessment officers were 
extremely cursory. For example, Dr West visited Belingwe Reserve with a total area of 375,000 
ha for a total of 6 days in the late dry season of 1948 to make his assessment.
877
 Pasture 
assessment officers did not delimit the country’s five ecological regions according to rainfall 
patterns. In measuring carrying capacity land classification, local soil and vegetation 
characteristics are important variables yet there was no attempt to adjust figures to the specific 
conditions of each reserve.
878
 While official calculations for ‘carrying capacity’ were fixed, 
rainfall patterns varied between and within seasons and areas.
879
 Thus, in Munro’s words, the 
formula for carrying capacity though technically neat, ‘actually imposed on farmers an 
unrealistic uniformity that took little account of  existing production systems or social  relations 
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already being transformed under the impact of the colonial economy.’880 In reference to the 
sweeping changes which this Act introduced into African areas in the 1950s were, indeed, ‘a 
time of dramatic economic, social and political change, not least in the countryside where the 
state embarked on a hugely ambitious programme to recast the prevailing patterns of African 
agricultural practice.’881  
 
The imposition of the NLHA happened in a specific historical context that is also worth 
disaggregating. Besides the passage of the NLHA, there were other political and economic 
developments which directly impacted on the territory but indirectly on African livestock 
regimes. The formation of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (1953-63) saw some 
sectors of the Southern Rhodesian economy becoming the responsibility of the new Federal 
Government while others remained territorial. In particular, the formation of the Federation did 
not result in changes in the skewed and segregatory access to veterinary services in the country. 
The major benefit to Southern Rhodesia accrued to white farmers since white agriculture became 
a responsibility of the relatively resource-endowed Federal Government. However, despite other 
agricultural-related services being operated as federal units, veterinary services remained 
essentially territorial.
882
 Thus, activities in respect of disease prevention and control, vaccine 
production and research remained essentially similar to those in the previous periods, though 
they began to be operated on a relatively larger scale as Southern Rhodesia retained some experts 
from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland who had worked in the Federal capital at Salisbury but 
decided to stay after the dissolution of the Federation in 1963.  
  
In 1952, a year after the enactment of the NLHA, there was a Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) 
outbreak which challenged the implementation of its livestock provisions (especially 
destocking). As has already been discussed in the previous chapter, FMD control measures 
adopted in the 1930s conflicted with the overarching state propaganda regarding soil 
conservation in the reserves. Nonetheless, two decades later, there were still continuities in the 
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implementation of such controversial policies.
883
 Just as in the 1930s, the disease’s direct effects 
were not as serious as the indirect ramifications. Quarantining of infected and adjoining districts, 
with consequent cessation of all movements and sales, and the concentration of large numbers of 
cattle in comparatively small areas to create cattle free belts round infected areas, resulted in 
tremendous damage to the veld and cattle fell off rapidly in condition.
884
 Later when sales could 
be resumed, the cattle from these areas were so poor that they were practically all rejected for 
sale.
885
 These challenges notwithstanding, state officials were determined to implement the 
provisions of the NLHA. However, an initial gradualist approach to the implementation of the 
act between 1952 and 1955 meant that veterinary regulations associated with FMD control 
dominated the countryside, and were, therefore, more strongly felt by African livestock owners 
than the land reclamation measures. Apart from FMD control measures, veterinary policy 
continued to be centred on dipping, and livestock improvement in the reserves.  
 
Moreover, there were no changes in the way state veterinarians viewed FMD control measures 
regardless of the fact that the Natural Resources Commission had found them detrimental to the 
environment as early as 1939.
886
 Similarly, in the 1950s statements from colonial officials were 
characterised by their concern over the fate of the destocking policy rather than the suffering it 
caused to both African livestock, and its owners. This inertia is typical of bureaucratic 
institutions. Although individuals may change their perspectives, institutions are slower so the 
opportunity for new ideas to spread is highly constrained, especially ‘if they [the new ideas] have 
the potential to fundamentally shake up the rationale for the existence of the organisation.’887 As 
the Superintendent of Natives complained: 
When this disease appears the cattle are immediately concentrated to prevent the disease 
spreading, the animals must stand around for most of the day once a week for veterinary 
inspection, grazing and land deteriorates, deaths from poverty increase, no movement is 
permitted and all destocking measures, sales and culling cease. The work of this Division 
suffers a most serious setback and “implementation of destocking regulations can never 
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be certain with this apparently endemic disease in the offing all the time” as once Native 
Commissioner says. Even after quarantine is lifted stock are generally in such inferior 
condition that sales are undesirable. It is not only the districts in which the disease appears 
but all neighbouring areas that are quarantined and during the year Nuanetsi, Chibi, Gutu, 
Ndanga, Bikita, Buhera, Melsetter, Chipinga, Umtali and part of Victoria were all at a 
standstill. These districts account for some 24% of all the African owned cattle in the 
country so the disease is a formidable obstruction in this division’s plans for soil 
conservation.
888
  
 
Whilst the official’s focus was on how concentration methods impacted on destocking, reading 
between the lines reveals how such policies amounted to a real problem for African livestock 
owners. Yet this also reflects another contradiction in colonial bureaucracy. While Native 
Department officials saw this as an impediment to the implementation of their policy, veterinary 
officials saw the challenges as evidence that the former’s policies were flawed. For instance, the 
District Veterinary Officer for Fort Victoria argued: 
It is noticeable that grazing was forcibly controlled in reserves by Foot and Mouth disease 
concentrations, the stock maintained superior condition when restored to the rested 
grazing areas. This is a strong pointer to the necessity of grazing control in Reserves by 
the Native Department officials instead of the customary free range. In my opinion this is 
more important than the seemingly endless destocking of valuable reserves.
889
  
 
Despite the apparent differences between vets and native commissioners, they generally shared 
one key attitude: an apocalyptic vision of the fate of reserves if no technocratic intervention took 
place. This resulted in the intensification of the implementation of the Act from 1955, and with 
this veterinary arguments were sometimes mobilised to justify destocking and livestock 
improvement measures.  
 
Veterinary challenges that stalked the reserves from the early 1950s when the NLHA was being 
implemented satisfied the stereotype that African livestock were diseased, and was cast as 
evidence to the necessity of state intervention. Where FMD was a challenge to destocking in the 
south-eastern parts, in other parts of the territory a pervasive problem facing the colonial 
bureaucracy in general (and the Veterinary Department in particular) was passive resistance to 
                                                 
888
 Report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, Director of Native Development (1953), 
9. 
889
 Annual report of the Assistant Director of Veterinary Services (Field) (1952), 2. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
210 
 
dipping which threatened to derail destocking efforts as non-dipping made it impossible for 
colonial officials to enumerate and control cattle herds.
890
 Although fundamental issues 
regarding African resistance to dipping that characterised the early colonial period (as discussed 
in Chapter 3) had subsided owing to general acceptance of the ritual among African livestock 
owners, problems faced in the early 1950s arose from tick resistance to the acaricides then in 
use.
891
 This resulted in some livestock owners (both white and black) losing their trust in 
dipping. In fact, among the worst ‘offenders’ were poor European livestock owners who 
procrastinated until either an official inspection revealed their shortcomings or their herd was 
reduced through tick-borne diseases.
892
 However, in African areas veterinary officials failed to 
deal with the suspected arsenical resistant tick problem because of their unwavering stance that 
where ordinary arsenical dips were used at correct strengths and under proper supervision there 
was no reason to suspect that this problem existed.
893
 Like the ticks themselves, veterinary 
officials had developed immunity to evident change in local conditions. By 1955, other than 
destocking ‘native’ herds, nothing had been done to deal with this problem but dipping continued 
across the country with the state making trials with spray races in certain areas.
894
  
Expanding ‘Native’ beasts 
As has been noted, the NLHA attempted to define and prescribe the type of beast which Africans 
could rear and how livestock could be pastured. This, as chapters 4 and 5 have shown, was not a 
new phenomenon as the ‘creation’ of ‘better’ breeds had driven livestock policy in African 
reserves from around 1912, and had been pursued much more vigorously in the 1940s. In the 
1950s, the most popular aspects of African livestock regimes which Native Commissioners 
appeared to emphasize were overstocking and overgrazing in the communal lands but livestock 
improvement strategies were still being pursued simultaneously as they were perceived as vital 
to a system of controlled cattle numbers. It was part and parcel of the colonial matrix of ensuring 
the economic sustainability of livestock production while maintaining ecological sustainability in 
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the reserves. Although playing an important counterbalancing act in the formula for checking 
environmental degradation in the reserves, pasture management and livestock improvement were 
two important policies intrinsic to the NLHA that have received little scholarly attention.  
 
Besides ‘improving’ the ‘Native’ beast, reforming African grazing practices was considered by 
colonial officials as a useful antidote to the mounting pressure in the overgrazed reserves. Thus, 
under the NLHA rotational grazing was tried in African areas. This was an extension of pasture 
improvement projects which had been introduced in the reserves in the late 1940s for example, in 
1948 in Southern Mashonaland (at Victoria, Zimutu and Western Gutu reserves), while in 
Midlands grazing areas had been created in Charter district.
895
 In Matabeleland, Inyati Reserve 
was paddock fenced and came under a system of rotational grazing as was Mzingwane and 
Ntabazinduna Reserve.
896
 This policy began to take shape in the 1950s but soon ran into 
operational problems which limited its impact on how Africans pastured livestock. Among the 
major problems was the fact that it relied on local voluntary labour to construct the grazing strips 
and this was not always forthcoming; stock could not be moved about easily due to the 
prevalence of FMD while grazing strips could not be found in all the quarantined areas; the 
success of the scheme depended on the compliance by locals, particularly herd boys.
897
 Rigorous 
awareness campaigns spearheaded by the Provincial Agriculturist targeting kraal schools to 
inform children did not bear positive results. Indeed, grazing problems in the reserves were 
related to land shortages and so could have been solved by availing more grazing land for 
Africans – a move that was not welcome to the state. 
 
Livestock ‘improvement’ had been introduced in tandem with pasture management in the first 
decade of the twentieth century but came to play a much more influential role in colonial 
livestock policy in African reserves from 1944 (see Chapters 4 and 5) as epitomised by the 
promotion of the ‘pure’ Sanga cattle type. The previous chapter revealed that by 1951 several 
bull camps had been established across the country and that in certain areas some ‘progressive’ 
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Africans had started experimenting with the new cattle type. However, in the 1950s Native 
Commissioners continued to face problems in convincing the majority of Africans of the need to 
cull and destock ‘scrub’ stock prior to the development of ‘better’ but smaller herds.898 Yet these 
difficulties did not stop the state from intensifying its efforts in 1953 as it introduced a nucleus 
Kuvuvu cattle herd at the Tjolotjo Experimental farm from cattle obtained in Gwanda. Kuvuvu 
‘dwarf’ cattle were perceived to thrive under most adverse conditions throughout the year, and 
were thus considered suitable for the extensive predominantly ‘gusu’ reserves of Gwaai, Lupani 
and Shangani.
899
 However, the state-imposed idea of ‘good’ herds yielded unexpected results 
mainly because of the manner certain Africans responded to changes in the economy especially 
the ‘proletarianisation’ of African males on farms and industry which shifted cattle herding to 
young boys. The new demand for education meant that the freshly minted herd boys could only 
pasture cattle after school with the result that these herd-boys ensured that the beasts did not 
meander far. Thus, the proximate area to settlements was grazed and re-grazed and quickly 
trampled out.
900
 The pasturing of cattle in overgrazed lands affected their nutrition and, therefore, 
increased the number of scrub beast which the colonial officials were trying to rid through 
destocking.  
 
Significantly, there were contradictory reports regarding the popularity of bull camps across the 
country. For instance, state propaganda was that by 1955 the bull camp established in the 
Semokwe Reserve in Matobo District was said to be popular among Africans.
901
 Similar reports 
were also raised with regards to star bull schemes in Manicaland, Selukwe and Lundi Reserves, 
and in the Melsetter District while new ones were established in Mtoko, Mondoro, Bushu, 
Madziva Reserves in northern Mashonaland.
902
 However, in 1956, despite the project having 
been in operation for over five years, the uptake of bulls supplied to Africans through these 
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camps suggests that many of these faced intractable difficulties in disposing stud bulls as a result 
of low public interest. For instance, in Matabeleland, there were 102 African stockholders using 
Tuli bulls while in the Midlands only 304 ‘star’ bulls in Selukwe, Lundi and Buhera-Sabi areas 
were in use.
903
 In a country with an estimated population of 2 073 592 head of African-owned 
cattle, this was a very tiny percentage to be of any significance.
904
 By 1958, the colonial officials 
awakened to the fact that the allocation of council bulls to villagers had not been a success. The 
major problem was that ‘responsible’ people could not be found to look after them hence, 
‘several of them (bulls) became wild, trespassed in gardens, and had to be slaughtered.’905 This 
meant that the state had not accomplished its ambition of destroying ‘scrub’ beasts while 
introducing smaller herds of better cattle through top-down livestock improvement policies.  
 
By the late 1950s, the human-animal ratio had risen, from one beast for every ten persons living 
in the reserves in 1901, to one beast for every man, woman and child.
906
 The frustration which 
colonial officials faced as a result of these increasing numbers meant that they became 
increasingly obsessed with destocking. This led to disparities in the rate at which new livestock 
breeds were being introduced into the reserves and the slaughter of ‘scrub’ beasts. Thus, 
destocking affected livestock ownership patterns in the reserves, and also affected many 
agricultural activities. By 1961, 37 per cent of the land holders were entirely without cattle while 
in some places like Mashonaland West the proportion was 49 per cent and elsewhere in 
Mashonaland it was 40 per cent.
907
 By 1965, it was estimated that 48 per cent of African farming 
families had no cattle.
908
  
 
During the same period, a livestock improvement scheme introduced in 1962 that centred on 
artificial insemination of cattle to remedy the effects of excessive destocking faced an uncertain 
                                                 
903
 Annual report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, Director of Native Development 
(1956), 38. 
904
 Annual report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, Director of Native Development 
(1958), 16. 
905
 Annual report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, Director of Native Development 
(1958), 15. 
906
 Annual report of the Secretary for Native Affairs, Chief Native Commissioner, Director of Native Development 
(1958), 16. 
907
 Machingaidze, ‘Agrarian change from above,’ 575. 
908
 Machingaidze, ‘Agrarian change from above,’ 575. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
214 
 
future owing to lack of popularity among Africans in the reserves. Of the estimated 2 225 273 
African owned cattle in the country in 1962
909
, only 105 cows belonging to 66 Africans had been 
subjected to artificial insemination.
910
 By 1964, for instance, out of over 300 breeding cows in 
Shumba Reserve, an average of only 24 cows were artificially inseminated each year between 
January and March, and colonial officials complained that there was no evidence that, given 
time, the numbers would increase to any appreciable extent.
911
 A contemporary official 
interpretation of its unpopularity was that Africans were simply organically unprogressive.
912
  
Writing about the discouraging history of artificial insemination in certain pilot African areas 
introduced between 1962 and 1965, Chavunduka concluded:  
at the present  time and stage of development, the prospects of artificial insemination 
being of practical value to livestock production in Tribal Trust areas [formerly Reserves] 
seems to be nil, however indications are that, at an appropriate time in the development  
of these areas, artificial insemination could play a vital role in promoting livestock 
production.
913
  
 
What this meant is that there were some Africans who faced challenges in their agricultural 
activities due to the absence of draught power. 
  
‘Drought is an act of God but compulsory destocking is an act of government.’  
State intrusion elicited diverse African response. Technocratic ideas of livestock improvement, 
pasture management, herd size and grazing techniques were abhorred by Africans as the previous 
section explained and, as this section shows, fuelled their alliance with the urban-based political 
organisations. At the national level, hardships as a result of racialised state policies proved to be 
a rallying point for both rural and urban-based nationalists. However, the popular thinking 
among colonial officials was that rural Africans were incapable of pursuing political agendas of a 
national outlook hence the argument that rural political consciousness was caused by the 
‘distortion of facts and deliberate falsehoods, to rural and unsophisticated people’ by African 
political leadership based on ‘imaginary grievances and hardships’ said to have been brought 
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about by the implementation of the NLHA.
914
 This thinking was also aligned to a longstanding 
debate between different state departments over policy matters regarding the extent to which 
Africans could be pushed into adopting perceived better agricultural practices without 
precipitating a backlash.  
 
In fact, the NLHA was framed with the partial objective of cultivating a culture of political 
consent in the reserves as colonial officials believed that: 
Rapid implementation of government policy by application of the Native Land Husbandry 
Act right through all the Native Reserves is vital to establish and ensure a contented and 
progressive Native peasant. Inevitably, he will disregard the political sirens of the urban 
areas who themselves are making no headway with their self-aggrandizement schemes.
915
 
 
Contra these aspirations, in the 1950s the NLHA drew a lot of attention from proto-nationalists 
campaigning against a plethora of colonial policies. Indeed, one African nationalist politician 
contended, ‘the Native Land Husbandry Act was the best recruiter we ever had.’916 Some 
Africans who were working in towns such as Mazvita Tsandukwa, who attended a 1952 rally 
addressed by Benjamin Burombo in Bulawayo in which he castigated the basis of the destocking 
policy, developed a political understanding of the challenges his people were facing in the 
reserves.
917
 By 1955, African opposition to the implementation of the NLHA had increased as 
African political activists began to undermine the authority of the chiefs and headmen who 
cooperated with government policy.
918
 From September 1957 onwards, the African nationalist 
political parties: African National Congress (ANC) and its successors, the NDP (National 
Democratic Party), ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples’ Union), and ZANU (Zimbabwe African 
National Union) became the chief organs through which African opposition to the Act was 
channelled. 
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Commenting on the formative years of African nationalism in Southern Rhodesia, Ranger argued 
that peasants became ‘conscious’ of themselves as a class after failing to exercise the various 
options available for their prosperity.
919
 Although this section draws from this framework, it is 
not about the development of nationalism per se but about how the context of resistance informs 
this analysis as it was affected by the NLHA and manifested itself in the manner Africans tended 
their livestock.  
 
One of the most remarkable results of the implementation of the NLHA was the peopling of the 
hitherto sparsely populated north-western parts of the territory, especially Gokwe (Sebungwe). 
The late 1950s and early 1960s were characterised by some landless Africans moving into the 
previously tsetse-infested areas Zambezi valley. Most of the new arrivals came from Rhodesdale 
Crown Land, where they had been evicted by the colonial authorities, and some from the 
southern part of the country where land pressure in the reserves had become untenable.
920
 
Ironically, these movements had tacit state support which was aware of the overcrowding and 
landlessness in other African reserves. The state arguably believed it could act as a safety valve 
to check incipient political activities arising from land shortages in many reserves.
921
  
 
As discussed, across the country Africans in the reserves came to view livestock policies through 
a heavily politicised lens. Veterinary reports from the late 1950s suggest that very few livestock 
improvement schemes were undertaken as a result of the above.
922
 Veterinary officials 
complained about pressure which the ANC was putting on the chiefs and headmen during rallies 
which began that year in the rural areas, and expressed relief that a state of emergency was 
declared on 26 February 1959 leading to a ban on the ANC’s activities and the detention of its 
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leaders would make their duties much easier.
923
 However, the banning of the ANC saw the rise 
of another African political outfit, the National Democratic Party (NDP), which exercised even 
more influence among both rural and urban Africans leading to:  
Irresponsible political activity which, hitherto, had been unknown in the tribal areas, 
where to insult a chief was unthinkable and where the Native Commissioner was trusted 
and known as a man of integrity and whose authority was recognised as just and fair. The 
tragedy of it all lies in the fact that, for most of the rural population, the economic and 
local government schemes, designed and implemented for their benefit and for which the 
Native Commissioner is responsible, and for the success of which the cooperation of the 
tribal leaders is essential, were gravely retarded and in some districts came almost to a 
standstill.
924
 
 
An attempt to stem opposition to state policies, in the form of the Native Land Husbandry 
Amendment Act (1959), which made it an offence for an African to refuse to move to a new 
dwelling site, and not to answer questions relating to information needed to grant farming rights, 
failed to yield the desired effect. Instead, Africans challenged state policies and propaganda even 
more openly. A particular point of contention was the 1959-60 drought which the state sought to 
repackage as a very visible and visceral example of the folly of African resistance to destocking. 
Cattle deaths attributable to the drought throughout the country amounted to 98 061, and the 
colonial officials took this heavy toll as justification for destocking and culling.
925
 They 
contented ‘the effect of the drought in these high mortality rates has much improved an 
extremely serious situation, brought about by continued overstocking.’926 However, Africans had 
a counter-narrative which they mobilised to resist the state’s official position. They reasoned, 
‘Drought is an act of God but compulsory destocking is an act of government.’927 Thus, the 
reshaping of livestock, land and people as envisioned by state bureaucrats continued to be 
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challenged, and, as the next subsection suggests, ‘progress’ made hitherto was reversed in certain 
instances. 
Freedom Ploughing 
By 1961, the colonial government was in a serious political crisis forcing it to suspend the 
NLHA. When this decision was made, state policy had been compromised severely such that the 
logic of technocratic policies was questioned increasingly. A large number of Africans who no 
longer had cattle could not manure their fields while even among those with cattle, many could 
not afford to own scotch carts with which to convey compost or manure to the lands.
928
 Besides 
the shortage of cattle was the shortage of land. For instance, by the early 1960s there were 79 
000 cultivators in South Mashonaland but only enough land for 32 000 ‘economic units’ while in 
Mashonaland West, there were 45 000 cultivators but only enough land for 34 000.
929
 Given 
these difficult circumstances and with the strong encouragement of nationalist leaders, Africans 
in the reserves abandoned technocratic policies, and began to farm in a way that undermined 
official policy.
930
 This was known as kurima madiro (freedom ploughing − an ideology of 
individual freedom to counter technocratic intervention) characterised by the indiscriminate 
opening up of new lands by individuals and households. In some reserves, Africans referred to 
kurima madiro as madiro aNkomo (Nkomo’s freedom), in reference to the influential role played 
by the nationalist leader Joshua Nkomo in encouraging this form of rural protest.
931
  
 
Having abandoned the NLHA, the state adopted a new policy of community development 
(discussed in the next section) which closely incorporated compliant chiefs – something which 
resembled the promotion of African self-government as reflected in South Africa’s Bantu 
Authorities Act (1951). African nationalists in Southern Rhodesia were quick to draw 
comparisons between community development with developments in the neighbouring South 
Africa arguing that the creation of African homelands promoted the segregation policy, and was, 
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therefore, to be resisted by Africans.
932
 Thus, the Southern Rhodesian state did not reap 
immediate results from its relaxation of the NLHA and subsequent attempts to implement 
technocratic policies through chiefs. Instead, some chiefs collaborated with their people in 
madiro farming with the prominent example being that of Chief Zambe Makoni while others like 
Chief Morame Chiendambuya were too weak to take effective action against dissenters.
933
  
 
Madiro farming also extended to how Africans tendered their livestock thus it impacted 
negatively on the state-preferred livestock regime in the reserves. In several reserves where 
‘progress’ had previously been reported by 1960, the situation had changed drastically or was 
perceived to be under threat from nationalist activities. For instance, paddocks that had been 
introduced in some African reserves from around 1948 were broken with fences being cut and 
redeployed around homes and vegetable gardens.
934
 When they were introduced, some colonial 
officials had considered the creation of paddocks as a ‘positive policy in contrast to the 
unpopular destocking approach.
935
 The state’s attempt to reshape the ‘native’ beast was also 
reversed as negative response to previously ‘popular’ livestock improvement activities was 
reported. For instance, in Chinamora Reserve prior to 1960 African were reportedly becoming 
more receptive to proposals for improving the nutrition and the type of stock especially in the 
Shumba area. Similarly, four livestock improvement areas established in Bikita and Victoria 
districts were also thought to attract significant attention from African livestock but soon faced 
problems during the period of kurima madiro.
936
 Thus, the frustrated Secretary for Internal 
Affairs reported:  
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Political pressures from African extremists have made themselves felt in the field of 
agriculture. Grass fires for example, were often left to rage through the tinder-dry grazing 
areas. Training centres were burned; accepted farming practices were abandoned: one 
District commissioner, for instance reports that farmers were advised to revert to the 
practice of broadcasting maize seed.
937
 
 
Some dip tanks were destroyed by political extremists while in some areas, drought, disease, 
deliberate veld fires and political agitation all contributed to a situation in which livestock 
production and management showed little improvement and in some areas deterioration.
938
 For 
instance, in the Chesa Purchase Area (Mashonaland East), where dipping facilities were 
inadequate, stock losses due to suspected Redwater occurred.
939
 In this area, there was no 
dipping tank for 305 new farms resulting in African farmers trying to overcome the dipping 
problem by hand-spraying their stock but this method was not approved by the Veterinary 
Department.
940
 In Matabeleland North, it was reported that the political situation in the province 
generally made any extension work extremely difficult.
941
 Livestock improvement schemes were 
treated with suspicion and even such measures as dosing, vaccinations and inoculations met with 
renewed resistance.
942
  
 
The temporary loss of state control over the reserves between 1959 and 1962 as reflected by 
madiro farming had important repercussions for both African livestock owners and veterinary 
officials especially those in the tsetse fly zones.
943
 By the end of 1962 overt resistance was 
subsiding, and yet mutual suspicion between Africans and colonial officials did not vanish. This 
mutual suspicion hampered efforts by the Vet Department to inoculate cattle in the reserves 
against Trypanosomiasis. The problem, as one district commissioner reported (after losses of 
10% in one area of his district), was that, ‘Every rumour is believed. Because the inoculation for 
Trypanosomiasis is not the same colour as that used for other diseases on European farms, these 
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people firmly believe that the Veterinary Department is trying to kill their cattle and dogs. 
Overcoming such ignorance is difficult.’944 So huge was the suspicion that veterinary officials 
across the territory carried out their activities in an atmosphere of obstruction and civil 
disobedience. In July 1964, civil disobedience and non-production of cattle had brought the 
Antricide prophylactic regime to a halt in Nyanga North and Gokwe Tribal Trust Lands 
(TTLs).
945
 The veterinary official for Nyanga North explained:  
We had either to continue trying to enforce production and treatment against growing 
opposition or to withdraw entirely until the inevitable losses from Trypanosomiasis 
brought the inhabitants to their senses. Since the latter course was the wish of the people, 
the only practical way of proving our case and preventing similar difficulties spreading to 
adjacent areas we withdrew almost entirely from Inyanga North TTL.… By November 
the condition of the cattle was pitiful and rotting carcases could be seen or smelt as one 
drove through the veld. Inspection of the area in January showed that the worst affected 
centres, Matisi, Mangesi, Ruangwe, Chifambe and Manwere had lost over 2000 herd and 
were left with 2 700 alive – 42% mortality.946 
 
Similar developments were recorded in regard to dipping and production of cattle for inspection. 
The Provincial Veterinary Officer (Salisbury) reported  
one of the main features has been the return to normal dipping in Tribal Trust Lands. It 
will be remembered that in November 1964 civil disobedience had reached a position 
where it was impossible to obtain any co-operation from stock owners, the most truculent 
were those centred on Mrewa. In November individual call up notices were served on 
stockowners in Mangwende TTL. These were completely disregarded, prosecutions 
followed and over 1000 stockowners elected to take imprisonment; intimidation had 
reached serious proportion and lawlessness appeared to be winning the day, BSAP 
[British South Africa Police] and Army Units moved into Mangwende TTL to protect our 
staff and enforce the law.
947
  
 
In Umtali Veterinary District, the Principal Veterinary Officer (PVO) also painted a similar 
picture as he reported that no cattle were dipping in the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs) in the Makoni 
District and that resistance to dipping had started in the Tandi TTL before spreading to Weya, 
Chikore, Chiduku and Makoni TTLs.
948
 In Chiduku and Makoni dipping began after intensive 
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supervision involving veterinary officials and all kraals. In Tanda, Weya and Chikore TTLs 
outward resistance collapsed after the police invaded the area in a show of force.
949
 The 
intervention of the police resulted in African cattle dipping for the first time in two years. 
However, the long period of non-dipping led to a very heavy infestation with blue ticks in the 
Tandi TTL and many deaths from tick-borne diseases.
950
 Tables 6.1
951
 and 6.2
952
 reveal the 
extent of resistance among African livestock owners during this time. 
 
Table 6.1: Animal Health Act Contraventions (mainly damage to dip tanks and facilities) 
District No. Of cases Fined Remarks 
Salisbury 35 Africans 
2 Africans 
£681 
- 
Or imprisonment 
3 years each 
Bulawayo 21 Africans £70  
Fort Victoria 2 Africans £60 £30 each 
Umtali 21 Africans £315 £105 collected 
Chipinga 57 Africans £208.10/-  
Sinoia 7 Europeans 
2 Africans 
£43 
£20 
 
Plus 4 months 
suspended 
Gwanda 124 Africans £664.5/-  
Total 7 Europeans 
264 Africans 
£43 
£2018.15/- 
 
Grand total 371 £2061.15  
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Table 6. 2: Cleansing Regulations: Contraventions 
District No. of cases Fined Remarks 
Salisbury 9 Europeans 
2559 Africans 
£107.10 
£26.567 
 
Or imprisonment 
Bulawayo 8 Europeans 
52 Africans 
£111 
£242 
 
Fort Victoria 3 Europeans 
85 Africans 
£25 
£175 
 
Gwelo 12 Europeans 
33 Africans 
£90.10 
£139.10 
 
Umtali 6 Europeans 
165 Africans 
14 Africans 
£80 
£441 
- 
 
 
18 months 
imprisonment 
Chipinga 2 Europeans 
14 Africans 
£40 
£34 
 
Sinoia 4 Europeans 
8 Africans 
£40 
£34 
 
Gwanda 2 Africans £6  
Totals 
 
Grand total 
44 Europeans 
2932 Africans 
2976 
£ 494 
£27 638.10 
£28 132.10 
 
 
These tables reveal that there were a number of Africans who were either fined or imprisoned for 
either vandalising dip tanks or flouting dipping regulations. However, what they do not show is 
whether these prosecutions involved the same culprits. There was also a very tiny number of 
Europeans who were prosecuted. These were mainly common among poor resourced whites who 
could not meet the requirements for building dip tanks. But what is clear is that the state took 
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these anti-veterinary activities seriously, and where necessary made regulations to forestall the 
propagation. In fact, resistance to dipping forced the Rhodesian Government to tighten tick 
eradication measures through the Notice No. 450 (1965) which extended compulsory dipping to 
the months of July, August, September and October at 14 day intervals – thereby making dipping 
mandatory throughout the year. This was expected to have beneficial effect on the long neglected 
control of the build-up of certain tick species in winter – particularly the immature stages of the 
brown tick. This legislation also closed gaps in the Department’s power to call up cattle for 
inspection. However, due to drought conditions then prevailing in the country, exemptions in 
many districts on account of lack of adequate water supplies became a major handicap to 
effective tick control.
953
 Furthermore, an acaricide known as toxaphene had superseded arsenic 
as the most used acaricide in plunge tanks as the veterinary officials were under pressure to 
increase the availability of non-arsenical dips because of an increasing tolerance of ticks to 
arsenic and as a security measure.
954
  
 
Community development and the changing nature of colonial livestock policy 
The previous section revealed that by 1961 the colonial state’s intrusive policies were being 
challenged overtly in many African reserves. This section discusses the impact of African 
resistance on the colonial state, and, more specifically, how state response in the context of 
livestock management was shaped by this resistance. At the political level, the period after 1961 
was characterised by the breakup of the Federation in 1963 which offered challenges to Southern 
Rhodesia (now called Rhodesia), and the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 
November 1965 which drew a lot of international attention leading to the imposition of 
sanctions. Economically, the breakup of the Federation meant staff losses to other countries but 
Rhodesia managed to recover from this loss through the investing in young white Rhodesian 
professional staff, and attracting personnel from the former members of the Federation.
955
 
Administratively, the early 1960s (as has been shown in the previous section) was marked by 
temporary loss of power of the state in the reserves (as shown by the prevalence of madiro 
farming) and brought a new political context and approach to colonial policy as Rhodesia shifted 
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from technocratic control to indirect rule involving chiefs and headmen in rural administration in 
implementing a policy known as community development.
956
 Colonial officials who worked 
directly with Africans in the reserves abandoned their longstanding logic which had pervaded the 
bureaucracy since the 1930s which considered soil conservation, and not the cooperation of the 
people, the ultimate objective to be realised even at the expense of widespread resistance.
957
    
 
Though it had been a popular form of governance in other former British colonies in the post-war 
period, in Rhodesia community development started in 1962 when elections in the then Southern 
Rhodesia brought to power the Rhodesian Front, and was to dominate policy after UDI.
958
 These 
changes reached their peak with the passage of the Land Tenure Act (1969) which legislated the 
devolution of power to African Councils in the former reserves now renamed Tribal Trust 
Lands.
959
 The timing of community development potrays the state’s ambition to deal with rural 
opposition by redefining its relationship to property rights in a way that was less confrontational 
but at the same time avoid relinquishing control over rural areas.
960
  
 
Community development saw the disbandment of the Native Affairs Department (NAD) with its 
agricultural functions being passed to relevant technical industries while in its place came the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs which now superintended district administration led by District 
Commissioners (DCs).
961
 However, this arrangement failed, as will be shown, since by 1977, at 
least 20 per cent of 241 councils were bankrupt. Some of them had to be placed under the direct 
management of district commissioners thereby reversing the stated goal of community 
development.
962
 Nonetheless, under this new dispensation, land allocation in African areas 
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became the responsibility of traditional leaders. It was up to them to decide whether to make an 
allocation and to determine the size and location of the allocation. Colonial officials now thought 
that ‘customary’ rights of access to land constituted an effective system of social control, and 
that individualising rights, as had been done under the NLHA, disturbed those relations.
963
 This 
shift from the promotion of individual to communal land and grazing rights had important 
repercussions on certain veterinary interactions in the reserves.  
 
Under community development, the state was more willing to investigate the source of resistance 
to veterinary measures in the reserves. This new approach was encapsulated in the increasing 
role given to the Department’s only black veterinary surgeon, Dr Dexter Chavunduka. 
Chavunduka took a leading role in the promotion of veterinary extension work in several African 
Purchase Areas and the Tribal Trust Lands through organising field days.
964
 The presence of 
Chavunduka at the forefront of veterinary interactions in African areas revealed an attempt to 
understand African livestock regimes, and also an attempt to win hearts and minds (WHAM 
strategy) through desisting from the overtly coercive way of leadership that had characterised 
veterinary policy prior to that time.
965
 
 
Chavunduka offers a complicated example of African response to state veterinary policy in the 
1960s. Though working for the state apparatus, his views were essentially revisionist. As an 
educated African vet scientist, he looked down upon the activities of Africans in the reserves 
whom he considered to be hanging on to ‘superstitions’, and yet he also castigated the white 
veterinary officials for not taking time to explain policy and understand the cultural context. That 
he harboured such thoughts is not a surprise at all as he joined the Veterinary Department during 
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the turbulent early 1960s, and as an African he was an insider to the genuine challenges (many of 
which were man-made) facing African livestock owners. However, in the long run 
Chavunduka’s efforts were doomed to failure since the NLHA had soured relations between the 
state and African communities that it was very difficult to build any trust in new state 
initiatives.
966
   
 
Although his work came to be questioned by many Africans, Chavunduka made interesting 
observations regarding veterinary policy in African areas, and how veterinary interactions could 
be improved. His observations are, thus, an important prism through which we can understand 
the nature of veterinary interactions in both African Purchase Areas and TTLs during the 1960s. 
Amongst his most important observations was the fact that the Veterinary Department had failed 
to introduce to the African livestock owner the ‘modern’ approach and technical knowledge in a 
way that was both understandable and acceptable. However, he potrayed the popular thinking 
among vet scientists that because the African methods were ‘unscientific’ it followed that they 
were irrational. For instance, he wrote ‘superstition is inherent and more deeply rooted in Tribal 
Trust Lands where the community tends to remain static, with strong tribal links and 
tradition.’967 Indeed, he had ‘concrete’ examples to back his argument such as taboos about 
mombe dzemudzimu/inkomo zamadhlozi (cattle dedicated to ancestral spirits) which were not 
produced for dipping if there was any likelihood for them being interfered with than the mere act 
of dipping.
968
 However, as has been shown already, it is not true that African livestock regimes 
in the reserves were static. His take on destocking particularly potrayed his ignorance of the 
position of livestock in rural livelihoods. He averred that destocking was on the whole a good 
policy though ‘in some quarters destocking is to them one of those evils introduced by the 
Veterinary Department. Therefore any endeavour by a member of the Veterinary Department to 
count cattle has been done cautiously.’969 What Chavunduka failed to grasp was that while 
destocking played an important role in reducing stress on the environment, implementing it 
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among a people whose lives depended on livestock was tantamount to robbing a ‘community’ 
bank. Keeping large herds enabled, among other things, Africans to cater for manure, fees for 
their children and taxes to the government. Thus, possession of large herds in that sense was a 
rational idea.  
 
His writings reveal that he genuinely supported the logic of received wisdom even though he 
thought it could be packaged in a manner more acceptable to Africans. Thus, he suggested that 
all the departments concerned with livestock production put concerted effort in teaching the 
individual farmer how to select better breeding animals, and the feeding of livestock, control of 
worms and ticks, vaccinations for quarter evil, contagious abortion, dehorning, castration and 
marketing livestock. He argued:  
These are not new ideas, for already a great deal of work is being done in this direction. 
Pamphlets are sent out, and radio broadcasts are made, aimed at instructing the African 
farming community. Field days are organised, but I’m here stressing the need of 
following up the work of the individual farmer, for the farmer will not tell you, at a field 
day, of his fears, beliefs or actual handicaps. The field day is of great importance in that it 
creates in him the general awareness of his responsibility as a farmer, but the actual 
practical demonstration is the only means of showing him the way.
970
 
  
He hoped to produce, through extension, radio and publications, a consciousness in the minds of 
African livestock owners for the need to adopt ‘better’ methods of livestock husbandry.971 
However, most of his ideas did not see light of day since in practice very little if anything 
changed after 1962. A few years after initiating his extension service in the African reserves 
(especially the artificial insemination service, a project meant to improve calving rates among 
‘native’ cows), his popularity began to wane. By 1967, the Assistant Director of Veterinary 
Services was reporting that, ‘the study of African extension work by Dr Chavunduka continues 
but it is evident that the cooperation offered to him initially is gradually falling off. Unless some 
immediate apparent benefit is on offer, then enthusiasm soon evaporates.’972 The intensification 
of the liberation struggle from 1966 coupled with the fact that the technocratic language which 
                                                 
970
 Chavunduka, ‘Veterinary extension work in African areas of Rhodesia,’ 8. 
971
 D.M. Chavunduka, ‘Veterinary teaching methods in African areas,’ Newsletter of the Veterinary Research 
Laboratory (Salisbury), 2, 1(1967) 7. 
972
 Annual Report of the Assistant Director of Veterinary Services (Field), 30/09/1967, 18. 
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
229 
 
Chavunduka communicated with meant that he was bound to be seen as not different from any 
other colonial official, and as a ‘sell-out’ as he spoke and seemingly promoted ‘exploitative’ 
veterinary policies. 
 
The shift from technocracy to community development improved neither the material conditions 
of African livestock owners nor the quality of veterinary services they received. This largely 
explains the failure of the state’s WHAM strategy through the utilisation of Chavunduka. If 
anything, the period after 1962 did not result in the decrease of the obligations of livestock 
owners to the state. For instance, there was an increase of dipping fees from 2s.6d. per head to 
3s. per head in 1964.
973
 This was a very unpopular move and resistance was stirred up against the 
payment of dipping fees while difficulties were encountered in its collection. After UDI and the 
resultant sanctions, the state faced difficulties in sourcing acaricides and when it did, the prices 
were expensive. This also entailed passing on the cost to the livestock owner through raising the 
dipping fee.
974
 A typical example of these difficulties is that of 1966 FMD outbreak in 1966 
where because of sanctions and payment difficulties the vaccine arrived very late, and when it 
did, it failed to have any effect on the disease.
975
  
 
An immediate response to the rising cost of dipping during community development was that 
there was an unprecedented increase in the number of applications by the then recently formed 
African Councils (now administering the former reserves) to take over dipping services. The 
official thinking fuelling this trend was the expectation that they (African Councils) would be 
able to operate dip tanks more cheaply.
976
 Indeed, in certain areas where transfers took place, the 
dipping service appeared to operate smoothly, and, this seemingly justified the thinking that with 
communal effort and co-operation dipping tanks could be operated more cheaply.
977
 However, a 
few years later problems were encountered. The major problem emanated from departmental 
wrangling as the Veterinary Department sought to recover power it had lost to African Councils 
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over livestock disease control. Veterinary reports reveal two popular views that held sway among 
veterinary officials. Firstly, veterinary officials thought tick control in African areas had 
deteriorated because Africans were dipping in under strength washes.
978
 Secondly, that African 
Councils were partly to blame for this. The second view is captured in the following statement, 
‘dipping services operated by African councils are not, generally, of the same high standard as 
those run by this Ministry. In this respect, to quote the Provincial Commissioner, Mashonaland 
North, they “leave very much to be desired.”’979 The Assistant Director of Veterinary Services 
argued that  
where dipping is being run by local councils the control has seriously deteriorated and 
legislative difficulty is being experienced in placing responsibility for such failures; 
therefore correction is difficult. It is obvious that a complete new approach will have to be 
formulated to regain our past efficiency in tick control in the African areas. The 
registration of organic dips has been considerably tightened and none will now be 
registered for use unless a free testing service is provided locally to give results of tests 
within four days of submission of samples of dip wash. Courses of instructions for dip 
attendants, Council secretaries and councillors responsible for dipping in African areas 
have been given with resultant improvements in several districts.
980
  
 
But this was mere propaganda as the official skirted yet another important issue that lay at the 
centre of veterinary conflicts between African livestock owners and the Veterinary Department. 
The quote above reveals not only a veterinary problem but the weakness of the community 
development policy, that is, it assumed that state experts would willingly hand over their 
responsibilities to African Councils, and assume a more indirect role in rural administration. In 
reality, administrators in technical ministries were reluctant to hand over functions to what they 
perceived as ‘immature’ and ‘irresponsible’ bodies.981 Thus, officials who felt that their jobs 
were being made redundant worked to jeopardise the smooth transition of state veterinary 
services to African Councils.  
 
However, the argument that some African Councils were failing to provide essential services to 
African livestock owners had substance. This holds true especially for the period after they were 
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weaned from state grants. The major challenge was that though the colonial state recognised the 
need to stimulate the rural economy through the provision of essential services including dipping 
tanks, it had no interest in committing resources to this task. Initially, the main source of 
development financing remained the African Development Fund (ADF) levy on African 
marketed produce, which Africans resented to pay.
982
 African Councils in the long run failed to 
self-sustain, thus, for African livestock owners, this period did not see any significant changes 
with regards to the availability of more dipping tanks. Instead the cash-strapped, overburdened 
rural councils failed to run existing infrastructure resulting in the deterioration of service. All this 
added to a sense of racial discrimination, and, thus, fomented rural resistance to the state rather 
than reduced it.  
 
Bureaucratic wrangling between Africans Councils and the Veterinary Department also 
precluded the search for solutions to tick resistance. As has been noted already tick control 
problems were seen by veterinary officials as an administrative issue rather than a scientific 
problem demanding the change of acaricides. While there may have been some truth in the 
allegation that certain African Councils were dipping in weak acaricides, paying a blind eye to 
tick resistance proved to be an exercise in futility. It is revealing that tick resistance was known 
to the veterinary officials, and yet it took them long to act upon it giving the excuse that Africans 
were not dipping regularly. Blue tick resistance to the non-arsenical dip – toxaphene – had been 
recognised for some years, and had also been confirmed in red-legged ticks (Rh. eversti) and 
brown ticks (Rh. appendiculatus).
983
 As early as 1947, some veterinary officials had, on account 
of tick resistance to arsenic, recommended the use of gammexine dipping fluid. However, this 
had not been followed through when it was discovered that: to maintain the tick destroying 
element of the fluid at sufficient strength to kill ticks, the fluid had to be replenished in the tank 
at a much higher rate than that recommended by the manufacturers, that the fluid was most 
effective when used with arsenic against the blue tick but was not effective against certain stages 
of tick life, especially the mouthing, larval and nymphal stages of the red legged tick.
984
 Among 
Africans, as oral interviews suggests, there was a general thinking that better services were 
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offered to European farmers and hence some stopped dipping seeing that ticks were not being 
eradicated. 
 
Surprisingly, the belated but important switch from arsenic to phosphatic dips – which were 
perceived as more efficient – in the late 1960s was followed by an increase tick infestation across 
the country. Fig. 6.1
985
 below shows the prevalence of quarantine orders for tick infestation 
between 1966 and 1970.  
 
 
Figure 6.1: Quarantine orders for tick infestation 
 
As can be seen in the table there was a gradual increase in tick prevalence in the country in both 
European and African areas over a four year period. The official explanation was that previously 
when arsenic was the standard dipping preparation, it took no less than five immersions at five 
day intervals to cleanse a herd of cattle infested with blue ticks (boophilids) because arsenic did 
not kill this tick at certain stages of development while it took only one dipping in a phosphatic 
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dip to cleanse the cattle.
986
 They argued that in African-owned cattle deaths from tick-borne 
diseases (Redwater, Gall sickness, Heart water and Theileriosis) were less in spite of gross tick 
infestation hence the practical significance of this was that dipping began to be neglected, and, 
therefore, cattle dipped less frequent. A further, scientific explanation to this paradox was that 
efficient dipping over the previous thirty to forty years had almost completely eliminated the 
carrier state in African-owned cattle.
987
 However, this carrier state, vets argued, had re-
established itself because veterinary duties had been put in the hands of inexperienced African 
Councils.
988
  
 
The major weakness of the ‘scientific’ explanations is that they failed to account for the 
simultaneous increase in the number of quarantine orders issued to white farmers (who were 
regarded as leaders in the farming industry) during the same period. Thus, as previous analysis 
has alluded to, the problem was bigger than the alleged dipping amnesia among African 
livestock owners. Two issues arise: one was that of the increasing cost of dipping due to 
expensive acaricides in the wake of international sanctions on Rhodesia, and secondly, political 
polarisation in the country resulted in the rise of competing versions of veterinary etiquette and 
political ideas which hinged on nationalistic views that challenged state policies.
989
  
 
Between 1964 and 1971, African dip tanks were subsidised from the African Development Fund 
but expenditure on dipping fluid following the shift to phosphatic fluid more than trebled forcing 
the state to effect a rise in the dipping fee of 30 cents per beast per annum in 1971.
990
 In areas, 
where a different tick-destroying agent, Delnav D.F.F, replaced arsenical dips, there was six-fold 
increase in the cost of dip concentrate to a service which was already heavily subsidised.
991
 Part 
of this increased expenditure was passed to the African owner by raising the annual dip fee from 
thirty cents to one dollar per beast, with a remission of fifty cents per beast if the fee was paid 
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promptly.
992
 By 1972, the switch from arsenic to phosphatic dip washes in tanks controlled by 
the African Development Fund (ADF) was virtually complete and had resulted in improvement 
in tick control.
993
 Although there was no overt resistance, this shift was accomplished at a heavy 
cost to African livestock owners.
994
 Furthermore, there developed a tendency among stock 
owners in the council area to think that, because the dips were council run, they could dip at any 
time that suited them.
995
 This impacted negatively on tick eradication efforts.  
 
Overall, as a result of the changes that had been carried in the 1960s into the early 1970s which 
this section has discussed, by 1972 important changes in African livestock regimes, and African-
veterinary official interactions were apparent. The cessation of coercion in 1962 had partly 
reversed the impact of the destocking policy. In particular, the increase of African herds caused 
concern among colonial officials who lamented that the end of the destocking policy had resulted 
in the number of African-owned cattle sold at state organised cattle sales crashing to ‘ridiculous’ 
figures resulting in  an increase of 796 000 head between 1966 and 1972 over the 1959 census.
996
 
They warned that environmental and ecological degradation would result from this situation. 
With regard to the reluctance of Africans to sell their livestock notwithstanding the efforts of the 
Vet Department in organising sales, one colonial official complained, ‘With all this assistance, it 
is most distressing to have to comment annually on the reluctance of the African to sell his stock. 
This year on organised sales they sold just 95 040 head out of a total of African holding of 2 843 
977 i.e. 3.34 per cent...’997  
The liberation war, c.1972-80 
The previous sections have demonstrated the deteriorating relations between Africans and 
colonial officials over the NLHA, the changing nature of livestock regimes in the reserves, and 
also attempts by the colonial state to devolve administrative power to local bodies. This section 
discusses the intensification of the liberation war in the early 1970s focusing on how it added 
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another dimension to the way African livestock owners related to their livestock and colonial 
officials. Administratively, 1972 was a very important year in the history of rural administration 
and rural resistance in the territory as it marked the rejection of the proposals to give Rhodesia 
independence under a modified version of the 1969 Constitution. This occurrence demonstrated 
that community development had failed to meet the aspirations of rural African.
998
 Politically, 
1972 saw the resuscitation of the armed struggle and this had important ramifications on 
veterinary interactions in the countryside.
999
 The official discourse of ‘modernity’ continued to 
be tainted by its association with the Rhodesian state, and was thus challenged overtly. In 
particular, advisory services broke down as extension officers fled and operated from the relative 
safety of the urban areas.
1000
 Council buildings, primary schools and forest plantations were 
targeted while dip tanks – icons of state intrusion into the African livestock economy – were 
destroyed. Government and council roads were landmined and other targets included beer halls 
and bottle stores, lucrative sources of revenue to government and councils which to guerrillas 
were symbols of peasant dependence. By 1977, in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 114 officials 
(both black and white) had been killed, 25 were either missing or abducted, and 243 had been 
wounded.
1001
  
 
Livestock owners (both white and black) in Rhodesia did not escape the effects of the war. 
However, in the TTLs the contending forces jostled to establish control over the rural populace 
through a combination of force and persuasion – with devastating effects on both animal 
husbandry and livestock disease management. Africans living in TTLs became the focus of 
liberation veterans who were strongly influenced by Maoist (in the case of ZANLA, Zanu’s 
military wing) and Soviet-style (in the case of Zipra, ZAPU’s military wing) mobilisation of the 
‘peasants’ into their guerrilla warfare. The Rhodesian security forces also utilised a combination 
of scotched earth policies and WHAM strategies on African peasants. Many African livestock 
owners came to identify with the guerrilla fighters hence they were sometimes caught in the 
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crossfire. Having failed to win hearts and minds, and in a desperate attempt to stem the 
overwhelming support guerrillas received in TTLs, the colonial state gave power to provincial 
commissioners in 1973 to impose collective fines on communities in which contact with 
guerrillas was suspected.
1002
 These fines were mainly in the form of the confiscation of cattle, as 
in Chiweshe and Mzarabani TTLs, and in the forced resettlement of communities (protected 
villages) in remote parts of the country (see Figure 6.2
1003
 below).
1004
 From around 1974, 
Africans were put into protected villages along main rural roads with the official argument being 
that they were being ‘protected’ from guerrillas, and secondly, that the guerrillas would then be 
isolated from sources of food, shelter, information and recruits.  
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 Figure 6.2: The location of protected villages in north –eastern Rhodesia 
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By 1977, there were a total of 159 protected villages in Mashonaland, 31 in Manicaland and 13 
in Victoria Provinces with a total population of 580 832 people.
1005
 The official number of 
protected villages had risen to 220 by mid-1978 while the total estimate for rural Africans 
affected by war and resettlement was between one and one and a half million.
1006
  
 
The burning of crops and wholesale sale of African cattle, which became the centrepiece of 
Rhodesian military strategy in the reserves, affected patterns of livestock production in the rural 
areas. In effect, the creation of protected villages limited grazing lands for livestock. This meant 
that some Africans left them unattended in the reserves while they moved into protected villages. 
In some instances, such as that of the Zambezi valley in the northeast, the state forced them to 
sell their cattle for Rh$5 or Rh$6 – a quarter of price normally paid for ‘native’ cattle.1007 
Chatwell Mumbamuchena, who was put into a protected village during the war, captures 
trenchantly the way the livestock economy was affected by the war. He reminisced: 
We were put into the kip during the war. We left our livestock here [Guruve, Zambezi 
Valley] alone and we had to get permission to come and tend our livestock… Because we 
could not get permission to leave the camps, most of our livestock went feral. When we 
finally came back to our village after the war we only recovered 3 of the 46 head of cattle 
we had prior to the war.
1008
  
 
 Rhodesian-era scholarship revealed how veterinary infrastructure was targeted for destruction 
during this time arguing that African livestock owners were being coerced by liberation fighters. 
For instance, Norval has brought forward an erroneous argument (as previous sections have 
revealed) that until the start of the political disturbances of 1972, tick control in African areas 
was extremely good while heavy tick infestations were rare and tick-borne diseases were 
virtually eradicated.
1009
 However, it is true that with the resumption of the guerrilla war in 1972, 
the activities of veterinary officials in TTLs were curtailed leading to increases in the levels of 
tick infestation. Until the end of 1975, this problem was confined to north-eastern Mashonaland 
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where the war first broke out. The reluctance meant that many Africans resented compulsory 
dipping. A number of reasons affecting dipping included inability to pay exorbitant dip fees, 
intimidation, lack of administration and impaired freedom of movement as result of the war. In 
fact, the collapse of normal dipping followed the spread of  the armed conflict, that is, initially 
(1973-5) it was restricted to the North East and then spread along the eastern border (1976), from 
where it moved into the south and western parts of the country (1977) and finally into the central 
area (1978).
1010
 By 1977, as shown in Table 6.3
1011
, throughout Rhodesia there was a large 
number of dip tanks that had been vandalised, and this worsened the tick problems that had first 
manifested in the late 1960s. 
 
Table 6.3: The number of dip tanks not operating in African Areas in Rhodesia (1977) 
Province Total no. of dip 
tanks 
No. of dip tanks not 
operating 
% of dip tanks not 
operating 
Manicaland 259 204 79 
Victoria 315 234 74 
Matabeleland South 133 125 94 
Matabeleland North 273 30 11 
Midlands 392 76 19 
Mashonaland 388 43 11 
Totals 1 760 712 41 
 
 
Oral history reveals, with interesting detail, the reason for this countrywide destruction of dip 
tanks. For instance, Robert Rakabopa explained: 
Guerrillas inculcated into us this simple thinking: no one should tell me what to do with 
my livestock because they are mine. The beasts are mine but then why must I pay the 
government for the cattle that I own? We needed to show the government that we were 
not happy. We stopped doing a lot of things during the war including going to church. We 
were too afraid to go to church. No one could go against the guerrillas. Dip attendants 
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were killed during the war because we were made to believe that it was for our own good. 
The problem I think lay with the whites themselves. They never told us the reasons 
behind most of their programmes. They wanted to monopolise knowledge. It’s just like 
the contour ridge story. We only got to know at a later stage how good it was.  
Agricultural demonstrators had little time to explain these policies. Mashaya was killed 
because he was a dip supervisor and many kraal heads were killed because they 
encouraged people to contour ridge. They (African civil servants) were not told how to 
approach people. They were just told to make people to contour ridge. Kraalhead Mujaho 
was killed during the war. Even the dip supervisors were hated because they sometimes 
coerced.
1012
  
 
The destruction of dipping tanks, the shepherding of people and their livestock into protected 
villages, and first stage phosphatic resistance in blue ticks first noticed in 1975, worsened tick 
propagation throughout the country.
1013
 Veterinary officials reported the prevalence of Blue ticks 
and their resistance to organophosphate dips (first introduced in 1972) in TTLs. This type of 
resistance could have been dealt with easily in a non-conflict situation through using alternative 
dips but the absence of veterinary officials in many TTLs precluded this.  
 
In the Lowveld, where game such as kudu and impala occurred in the TTLs, populations of 
certain tick species built up more rapidly, after the collapse of dipping, than in Highveld TTLs or 
in Lowveld TTLs in which there was no game. Redwater was restricted to the Southern Lowveld 
and western Matabeleland and Theileriosis to one locality in central Mashonaland. Sweating 
sickness was restricted to Manicaland and tick-associated screw-worm to the southern Lowveld 
and adjoining areas.
1014
 In the absence of veterinary control, tick-borne diseases such as 
Redwater, Gall sickness, Heartwater, Theileriosis and other tick-associated factors such as 
sweating sickness and screw worm became a bane of African livestock owners at an estimated 
loss of half to a million head by 1976.
1015
  
 
In European farms, where the breakdown in veterinary control occurred much later, the major 
sources of livestock loss were stock thefts promoted by guerrilla fighters. Cattle thefts from 
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commercial famers, however, had the unforeseen result of importing FMD to TTLs where in the 
absence of veterinary control the disease spread unabated. For instance,  the cutting of fences and 
the carrying of infected meat saw localised foci of the SAT2 infection spreading on farms in 
Victoria East and the bordering Wedza and Sabi North TTLs.
1016
 A similar state of affairs 
occurred in the Midlands Province with infection spreading in a westerly direction with foci 
occurring in the Que Que District.
1017
 Unsurprisingly, a cattle census carried out soon after the 
end of the liberation war in 1980 revealed a significant reduction in the national cattle stock.
 1018
 
When one considers the impact of tick-borne diseases and that of anthrax, it is safe to argue that 
the net effect of all these was the impoverishment of Africans. This is because, ‘there is always 
hardship but if cattle die the family loses its source of wealth; without motive power for 
ploughing, crops cannot be planted, leading to no food,  no money to purchase food, pay school 
fees, taxes, or buy the essentials of life.’1019   
 
Besides, the disasters arising from lack of veterinary control, biological warfare started by the 
state security forces during this time also added to the range of man-made veterinary disasters. 
Although most disease outbreaks were discussed in the context of poor veterinary control, 
serious outbreaks of anthrax (between 1978 and 1980) which occurred only among African 
owned cattle have been traced to biological warfare tactics. Prior to these outbreaks, Anthrax had 
been a very rare disease in country thus both its occurrence in a very atypical form at the most 
critical stage of the long-drawn liberation war was not mere coincidence. These outbreaks spread 
from area to area until six of the country’s eight provinces were affected yet anthrax often 
appears ‘at a point source of contact without any geographical spread.’1020 Although the 
breakdown of dipping facilities during the war contributed to tick-borne diseases, the same 
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reason cannot be used to account for the outbreak of anthrax when it did because livestock 
dipping does not contribute to anthrax prevention.
1021
  
 
During these outbreaks, the state mounted a strong propaganda campaign through the 
distribution of pamphlets written in vernacular languages in an effort to persuade Africans to 
produce cattle for voluntary vaccination. However, despite being availed with the vaccine by the 
Veterinary Department, Africans did not take up the offer.
1022
 Instead, they bought vaccines from 
private sources such as chemists rather than from veterinary officials as 10 000 doses were sold 
that way.
1023
 Seeing that state assistance was not being taken up even amidst heavy cattle 
casualties, veterinary officials began to issue cataclysmic statements from the comforts of their 
urban hideouts. For instance in 1979, one veterinary official remarked, ‘it will never be fully 
appreciated by those who instigated the process of lawlessness and the abandonment of sensible 
prophylactic disease control measures, just how much misery they have inflicted upon their own 
people and the country as a whole.’1024 
 
Oral history captures African suspicions over the spontaneity of this disease, and also the 
devastation that it left in its wake.
1025
 For instance, one informant from the north-east, where the 
war was fought most viciously and was, therefore, a target area for biological warfare, remarked 
even if you were to walk in the forests where their cattle were during the war, there are 
many skeletons that can be seen to this day. Very few people even as few as four people 
were left with cattle. The disease was known as tungundu [anthrax]. Its effects were so 
devastating that healthy cattle would suddenly get sick and die. It gave us no chance even 
to experiment with traditional remedies. This disease came for a short time hence we 
suspect that it was caused by our enemy. We only got livestock from farms after the 
war.
1026
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After the war ended in 1979 and a new government was inaugurated in April 1980, the true 
extent of the war became apparent. The Zanu government quickly assumed the coercive 
instruments of colonial state while also introducing a free compulsory dipping service to 
livestock owners in the communal areas.
1027
 However, war-time resistance to veterinary methods 
also spilled into the post-independence era as it was reported that the level of non-cooperation in 
certain communal farming areas precluded effective vaccination.
1028
 The return to comparative 
normality in the TTLs (now christened communal farming areas) was only after the elections in 
February and independence in April 1980. This enabled the state to resume large scale mass 
vaccination programmes against foot and mouth, anthrax, rabies and quarter evil with no 
hindrance from combatants.
1029
 This made it possible for the Department of Veterinary Services 
to reduce losses from tick-borne diseases. By 1981, some white veterinary officials felt 
vindicated that the breakdown of dipping in African areas had led to losses arguing that owners 
of cattle who had been ‘understandably’ quite unaware of the benefits of efficient dipping at a 
cost of 1 000 000 cattle, had through extreme loss tragically learnt the wisdom of adequate tick 
control.
1030
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the changing nature of state veterinary and livestock policy from the 
passage of the Native Land Husbandry Act (1951) to the attainment of independence in 1980. 
This discussion has delineated how the NLHA impacted not only on human-animal relationships 
in the reserves but also veterinary interactions. From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the NLHA 
represented a concerted state effort to define and prescribe the type of beast which Africans 
could rear and how livestock could be pastured. This was in line with notions of livestock 
improvement that had driven livestock policy in African reserves from around 1912.  Scholarly 
obsession with the most conspicuous state intervention in the form of overstocking and 
overgrazing has obscured how livestock improvement strategies were still being pursued 
simultaneously to destocking. Thus, they were part and parcel of the colonial environmental 
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matrix of ensuring the economic sustainability of livestock production while maintaining 
ecological sustainability in the reserves. However, in practice the matrix was a dismal failure 
with serious political repercussions to the state. Technocratic ideas of livestock improvement, 
pasture management, herd size and grazing techniques were abhorred by Africans and fuelled 
their alliance with the urban-based political organisations. Rural nationalism also manifested 
itself against veterinary measures, as rural Africans resuscitated debates, among other things, on 
veterinary issues in their interactions with the African nationalist leadership.  
 
These events occurred in a colonial context characterised by the colonial state’s intention to 
reassert its control over the rural populace in circumstances where its authority came under 
intense scrutiny. Administratively, the temporary loss of power of the state in the reserves in the 
early 1960s brought a new political context and approach to colonial policy as the state shifted 
from technocratic control to community development. These changes, however, failed to sooth 
peasant-state relations over livestock in the rural areas. Instead, community development resulted 
in the development of new forms of resistance against the veterinary apparatus as cash-strapped 
African Councils struggled to maintain veterinary infrastructure in the reserves. Thus, the 
intensification of the liberation war in the early 1970s added yet another dimension to the way 
African livestock owners related to their livestock and colonial officials. During the liberation 
war, the jostling for political control amongst the feuding military forces resulted in the 
breakdown of veterinary control in the reserves. In particular, advisory services broke down as 
extension officers fled and operated from the safety of the urban areas.  Council buildings, 
primary schools and forest plantations were targeted while dip tanks – icons of state intrusion 
into the African livestock economy – were destroyed. The creation of protected villages entailed 
limited grazing lands for livestock. This meant that some Africans left them unattended in the 
reserves while they moved into protected villages or were forced to sell.  By 1980, veterinary 
diseases had increased due to both tick infestation, and also biological warfare perpetrated by the 
Rhodesian security forces. 
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Chapter Seven 
Conclusions 
 
This thesis casts new light on the relationship between African livestock regimes and state 
veterinary services in Zimbabwe during the colonial period. Though located in veterinary 
history, this study has applicability to the histories of medicine and colonialism as it connects 
with the broader debate regarding the experiences of local healing practices under colonial set 
ups. It has discussed veterinary challenges which affected African livestock owners, how 
(together with the colonial state) they reacted to them and attempted to deal with them. It has 
examined how veterinary medicine, conservation policies, and the outbreak of hitherto unknown 
epizootics and the spread of biomedical approaches enforced by veterinary officials impacted on 
African livestock regimes.  
 
It has responded to a wider debate in the sub-region regarding the importance of veterinary 
science in the development of livestock economies (both African and settler). It has challenged 
the Beinart-Brown-Gilfoyle theory which states that state veterinary services in Africa were 
formed to eradicate epizootics and enzootics rather than to push the interests of empire. It has 
demonstrated that state veterinary services expanded within a racial context and did not 
challenge the colonial state’s perception of modernity which placed settler farming interests 
ahead of those of African livestock owners. Although there were changes in veterinary policy 
during the colonial period, the way state vets operated revealed their dual mandate: ‘to serve the 
state and to serve science.’1031 In fact, changes in veterinary policy, as has been shown, first took 
into consideration their potential impact on white livestock owners, and how negative effects on 
the white cattle economy could be mitigated. Furthermore, while white livestock owners took an 
active role in the making and remaking of veterinary policy and thus ensured that their interests 
were secured, African livestock owners’ veterinary strategies hardly influenced policy. African 
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traditional livestock management ideas were either brushed aside or where unpopular policies 
pursued by state vets were reversed or modified, these changes were rarely made out of a 
genuine appreciation of the predicament of African livestock owners and the efficacy of this 
knowledge but mainly out of security concerns of the colonial state. It marks a major break with 
previous literature that has not addressed the therapeutic and reproductive experiences of African 
livestock owners despite acknowledging that cattle were an essential socio-economic aspect of 
Africans. 
 
Notwithstanding marginalisation, both deliberate and unintentional, African traditional livestock 
regimes remained useful for Africans in the resource-poor reserves since they were easily 
available, inexpensive and often effective especially in the reserves where veterinary services 
were expensive, often absent or else irregular. Since quasi-veterinary activities in the reserves 
were performed by Native Commissioners, the reasons for state veterinary intervention were not 
communicated properly. As a result, state veterinary activities were eschewed. The majority of 
veterinary officers in Southern Rhodesia were white and often self-styled specialists in Africans 
and their customs. However, they often had a poor command of the local language and an 
arrogant attitude toward African traditional livestock regimes. The criticism of traditional 
livestock regimes at a time when there were no adequate veterinary facilities inadvertently 
helped to perpetuate non-Western forms of veterinary healing and livestock management 
practices.
1032
 As shown in Chapters 2 and 3, the labelling of African traditional livestock 
management systems by state veterinarians and other public officials played a much bigger role 
in obfuscating an otherwise rich relationship that existed between African and white farmers in 
meeting the challenges they faced.  
 
Moreover, as this thesis has shown, the responses of African livestock owners illustrates that 
they understood the multiple roles performed by state vets in availing therapeutic and livestock 
reproductive knowledge on the one hand, and also how they promoted colonial interests on the 
other. Indeed, the way veterinary services were extended throughout the territory reveal that they 
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were based on an assumption that local livestock regimes were wrong and that Africans had to be 
recruited into a certain version of modernity. In an attempt to coexist with a veterinary system 
that was neither homogenous nor static and that, at times, vilified African livestock regimes, 
Africans selectively embraced perceived beneficial aspects of biomedicine while rejecting those 
that projected colonial power. This thesis has shown how the shifting, contradictory relationship 
involving three groups within the colonial state: the state which aimed at promoting a capitalist 
economy; the settler community which aimed at the impoverishment of the Africans for its 
benefits and native commissioners who were seen by the first two as the ‘black sheep of the 
family.’1033  
 
Veterinary policy and its implementation were closely influenced by the conflicts (which were 
shifting but maintained the ultimate goal of insulating whites from black competition) within the 
colonial state. Three different broad epochs can be identified. Firstly, the period before 1930 
when different white interests in the colonial state were interested in converting Africans into a 
proletarian class and also a capitalist society. Secondly, the period between 1930 and 1962, 
dubbed the technocratic phase, was characterised by efforts to convert African livestock regimes 
along intensive lines for the creation of a detribalised African. Thirdly, the creation of a 
‘tribalised’ African and the emphasis on the state taking an indirect role in rural administration 
while leaving direct administration to local chiefs.  
 
In explaining the changing, complex relationship between state veterinarians and African 
livestock owners in the reserves, this thesis started by interrogating firstly how the local disease 
ideas were influenced and at times shaped by the changed disease environment following 
colonisation, and also how state veterinarians operated in African reserves. To set a platform for 
the discussion of these issues, the thesis also discussed the period immediately leading to the 
occupation of Southern Rhodesia and how pre-colonial livestock owners first interacted and dealt 
with epizootics and enzootics introduced from abroad especially through both adaptation and 
transformation. It has shown that modes of African traditional livestock management were 
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immediately challenged by the new colonial order which was characterised by the 
discouragement of local livestock management practices, and sustained state efforts to change 
livestock regimes in the reserves. Although the interaction of African livestock disease 
management practices and quasi-veterinary medicinal ideas (introduced by explorers and 
missionaries) started long before the white occupation of Southern Rhodesia, the attention of the 
colonial state to epizootics and enzootics increased substantially towards the end of the 
nineteenth century following the outbreak of Rinderpest in 1896.  
 
This, thesis has argued that the creation of state veterinary services was closely related to the 
outbreak of Rinderpest in 1896. This marked the beginning of state veterinary services and also 
the first interaction of African livestock disease management and state-preferred biomedical 
ideas about livestock disease control. Unlike, the contention by Gilfoyle, Beinart and Brown that 
veterinary services arose as a result of the contribution of the contribution of blacks, whites and 
veterinary scientists and that they were meant to benefit livestock owners in a non-racial manner, 
in Southern Rhodesia as this thesis has shown, the distribution of veterinary facilities was highly 
racialised as there was no corresponding tendency by the administration to provide Africans with 
veterinary services in the reserves. Indeed, despite providing a very large proportion of state 
revenue, both in direct and indirect taxation, little, if any, was spent the provision of affordable 
veterinary facilities for the benefit of African livestock. Instead, like their owners, were driven to 
unfriendly environments. As is clear throughout this thesis, the state veterinary services were 
motivated by the desire to protect commercial herds from epizootics and therefore expanded 
state vet services to African reserves to serve that end. 
 
Fuelled by misused Darwinian ‘scientific’ arguments to the effect that certain racial groups were 
superior to others, state veterinarians mobilised these arguments to mount an attack on local 
veterinary ideas, and attempted to change the African livestock regimes. This official position 
was affected by the limits of early state governments. For lack of professional vets and also to 
placate the British colonial Office, state veterinary services to African livestock owners were 
placed in the hands of Native Commissioners. However, as this thesis has shown these officials 
were not veterinary specialists by training thus the envisaged diffusion of western veterinary 
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ideas neither occurred at the desired pace nor was it smooth as many Africans generally retained 
their socio-cultural views of what constituted diseased and ‘clean’ animals. In the absence of 
epizootics, the state did not take a coercive stance in the promotion of veterinary control 
measures but the outbreak of Rinderpest in 1896 revealed in a telling way the limits of local 
veterinary knowledge and livestock regimes. 
 
As was shown in Chapter 2, black people in Southern Rhodesia possessed a large body of 
effective veterinary remedies and that some of these were not entirely inimical to biomedical 
ideas. The interaction with Europeans before and after colonisation brought a variety of diseases 
which, prior to the advent of European occupation, were unknown to Africans. Notable examples 
are contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, a bacterial disease, which was brought by missionaries 
from South Africa into Matabeleland in 1861, Rinderpest in the 1890s and tick-borne East Coast 
Fever in the early twentieth century. The outbreaks of new diseases impacted on how African 
viewed and dealt with epizootics and enzootics which local therapeutic and livestock 
management practices were unable to deal with. Many Africans generally linked such diseases 
with European occupation and the expansion of capitalist production. This was not entirely 
wrong as research has since shown that most of the diseases were imported from other continents 
by European visitors to the region.  
 
While the Rinderpest outbreak necessitated the creation of a state veterinary services department, 
the outbreak of a tick-borne disease, ECF, in 1902 resulted in a more systematic control of 
epizootics and enzootics through regular dipping of cattle. The introduction of dipping offered an 
opportunity for state control of African livestock both for disease and taxation purposes. As a 
form of disease control, dipping became a conspicuous weekly activity which resulted in the 
decrease of tick-borne diseases, and this partly explains the exponential growth of livestock herds 
across the territory from this time. As has been discussed already, dipping also performed another 
function as it came as an integral part of the growth of the capitalist economy offering an 
opportunity for herds across the country to be enumerated for taxation purposes, and for 
suggesting ways through which African livestock regimes could be kept in check from offering 
competition to the commercial cattle owners. However, as shown in Chapter 2, the process 
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through which dip tanks spread across the country was both non-linear and haphazard for the 
practical reason that some areas were not tick-infested, and veterinary policies were applied 
idiosyncratically in different areas. Dip tanks were not introduced in African reserves at the same 
time. There were differences in policy implementation as it usually bowed down to the 
personality if the native commissioner concerned. While the imposition of dipping signified an 
intrusion African livestock regimes, Africans did not resort to overt forms of resistance as 
happened in the Transkei and Zululand in 1905-6 because they were aware of their inferior 
military power, and were loosely organised nationally.  
 
Though dip tanks were first introduced in 1904 failure to dip became a punishable offence with 
the passage of legislation in 1914 and 1918. However, the absence and inadequacy (or both) of 
dip tanks in certain reserves and farms precluded the enforcement of dipping regulations, and this 
also placed them in a conflict situation with some settler farmers, who believed that African-
owned livestock were essentially pathogenic. In the reserves, land shortages occasioned as a result 
of colonial land policies meant that Africans sought grazing pastures in contiguous farms, and at 
times entered into grazing agreements with settler farmers. Grazing agreements and arrangements 
to dip at private dipping tanks on white farms in the era of compulsory dipping exposed African 
livestock owners to exploitation. By 1930, dipping had become a very important tool of both 
social and livestock disease control, and in the years after continued to be an important point of 
state entry into African traditional livestock regimes. 
 
As is shown in Chapter 4, besides tick control measures another intrusion into African economy 
involved livestock improvement activities. This thesis has shown that the colonial state took an 
interest in African livestock management much earlier than is assumed, and that this interest 
began much earlier than the more pronounced betterment policies of the 1930s. After years of 
prevarication, from 1912, the Veterinary Department came to play a leading role in the 
promotion of exotic breeds and the subversion of the African livestock regime. Initially, state 
rhetoric emphasised need for the promotion of exotic breeds but the influence of conservation 
ideas among vets and NCs from the beginning of the twentieth century finally forced officials to 
mobilise both veterinary and conservation arguments in pursuing this cause. However, attempts 
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at ‘taming’ the local environment through the introduction of better breeds were accompanied by 
disease outbreaks. Such outbreaks were particularly virulent among imported cattle or cross-
breeds, while efforts to control them through either breeding or development of inoculants were 
futile as exemplified the failure to treat quarter evil and contagious abortion.  In their dual 
capacity – as tools for subjugating epizootics and enzootics to pave way for colonial domination 
– state animal scientists and veterinarians played a leading role in influencing opinion and 
creating conditions under which perceived better, scientific forms of livestock management 
could be imposed in both African and European areas. The desire to rear pedigree animals fitted 
very well into the intentions of the colonial state to participate in the world beef market. 
Africans, among whom the ‘better, bigger and fewer’ argument was encouraged, also had a set of 
reasons for not adopting ‘better’ breeds hence by 1930 no significant change had occurred in 
African livestock management systems.  
 
Despite coming as part and parcel of a segregatory system that disenfranchised African livestock 
regimes, as this thesis has shown, veterinary interactions in the reserves were at conflict with 
certain colonial policies. In the 1930s, as is shown in Chapter 5, other pressing needs fuelled by 
increased environmental awareness and Foot and Mouth Disease outbreaks also led to further 
intrusion in to the reserves. However, the centralisation policies, pursued most actively by 
Alvord in the 1930s, were at variance with the state’s own veterinary policies. The state failed to 
deal with contradictions as a result of the popular belief amongst colonial experts that problems 
faced in the colony were entirely caused by African ‘primitive’ farming practices. The 
concentration method intrinsic to efforts to eradicate FMD, encouraged overgrazing, and thus 
contributed to environmental degradation. The location of dip tanks – introduced in the wake of 
East Coast Fever and other tick-borne diseases – and the manner livestock were driven to the 
tanks were partly responsible for gulley erosion across the country. The inability to settle the 
conflicting positions of the conservationists and veterinarians resulted in the state looking 
elsewhere in its search for solutions hence the resuscitation of the livestock improvement idea in 
the 1940s as well as the compulsory destocking from 1945. All these intrusive measures, as this 
this thesis has shown, had a significant impact on the African rural landscape in general and 
livestock management practices in particular. Destocking resulted in changes in livestock 
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ownership patterns and the cattle loaning system (kuronzera) as people tried to hide cattle from 
culling officers. Centralisation impacted on previously extensive grazing habits while livestock 
improvement practices reshaped the local idea of what a ‘good’ cattle breed was, and also the 
type of cattle Africans reared. Thus, by 1951 livestock management – indeed, human-animal 
relationships – in the reserves had changed significantly. 
 
From the 1950s to the early 1960s, the NLHA represented a concerted state effort to define and 
prescribe the type of beast which Africans could rear and how livestock could be pastured. This 
was in line with notions of livestock improvement that had driven livestock policy in African 
reserves from around 1912. By the 1950s, colonial policies had resulted in overstocking and 
overpopulation in the reserves, and had incubated rural political consciousness which assumed a 
nationalistic outlook. Scholarly obsession with the most conspicuous state intervention in the 
form of overstocking and overgrazing has obscured how livestock improvement strategies were 
still being pursued simultaneously to destocking. Thus, they were part and parcel of the colonial 
environmental matrix of ensuring the economic sustainability of livestock production while 
maintaining ecological sustainability in the reserves. However, in practice the matrix was a 
dismal failure with serious political repercussions to the state. Technocratic ideas of livestock 
improvement, pasture management, herd size and grazing techniques pushed by the colonial 
experts were abhorred by Africans and fuelled their alliance with the urban-based political 
organisations. Rural nationalism also manifested itself against veterinary measures, as rural 
Africans resuscitated debates, among other things, on veterinary issues in their interactions with 
the African nationalist leadership. These events occurred in a colonial context characterised by 
the colonial state’s intention to reassert its control over the rural populace in circumstances 
where its authority came under intense scrutiny.  
 
Administratively, the temporary loss of power of the state in the reserves in the early 1960s 
brought a new political context and approach to colonial policy as the Rhodesian government 
shifted from technocratic control to community development. These changes, however, failed to 
sooth peasant-state relations over livestock in the rural areas. Instead, community development 
resulted in the development of new forms of resistance against the veterinary apparatus as cash-
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strapped African Councils struggled to maintain veterinary infrastructure in the reserves. Thus, 
the intensification of the liberation war in the early 1970s added yet another dimension to the 
way African livestock owners related to their livestock and colonial officials. From this time, the 
official discourse of ‘modernity’ was tainted by its association with the Rhodesian state, and was 
thus challenged overtly while the jostling for political control amongst the feuding military 
forces resulted in the breakdown of veterinary control in the reserves. In particular, advisory 
services broke down as extension officers fled and operated from the safety of the urban areas.  
Council buildings, primary schools and forest plantations were targeted while dip tanks – icons 
of state intrusion into the African livestock economy – were destroyed. The creation of protected 
villages entailed limited grazing lands for livestock. This meant that some Africans left them 
unattended in the reserves while they moved into protected villages or were forced to sell. By 
1980, veterinary diseases had increased due to both tick infestation, and also biological warfare 
perpetrated by the Rhodesian security forces. 
 
Having highlighted the major findings made by this thesis, I bring the study to a close by 
offering history-sensitive policy recommendations, and suggestions for further studies. The role 
of professional historians in policy making, as Gavin has argued, is a contested notion. Yet a 
profound and understanding of the past remains important for policy makers.
1034
 Since, ‘it is the 
past which forms the frame of reference by which [human beings] perceive the issues that 
confront them,’1035 a comprehensive understanding of the local veterinary history, which this 
thesis offers, develops a ‘historical sensibility’1036 useful to policy makers, veterinary scientists, 
administrators and farmers as they grapple with the contemporary challenges of veterinary 
diseases. Besides dismissing the seemingly ignorant farmers as being impervious to scientific 
advice as is currently the case in post-colonial Zimbabwe, veterinary policy makers and 
practitioners need to accept that the apparatus they oversee has a long history which remains 
                                                 
1034
 F.J. Gavin, ‘History and policy,’ International Journal, 63, 1 (2007), 162-177. 
1035
 R. Rennie, ‘History and policy-making,’ International Social Science Journal, 50, 156 (1998), 289.  See also M. 
Grzechnik, ‘Making use of the past: The role of historians in Baltic Sea region building,’ Journal of Baltic Studies, 
43, 3 (2012), 329-343; V. Johnson and C. Williams, ‘Using archives to inform contemporary policy debates: History 
into policy,’ Journal of the Society of Archivitists,32, 2 (2011), 287-303; P. McCrary and J.G. Hebert, ‘Keeping the 
courts honest: The role of historians as expert witnesses in Southern voting right cases,’ Southern University Law 
Review, 16 (1989), 101 - 128.  
1036
 Gavin, ‘History and policy.’ 
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engrained in the minds of many livestock owners some of whom were victims of colonial state 
veterinary coercion. The Veterinary Department needs to transform itself and begin to adopt a 
consciously post-colonial approach rather than the present perpetuation of colonial style 
intrusion and coercion in African communal areas. Other than the current rhetoric that they 
recognise alternative medicine, veterinary officials need to practically appreciate and to support 
certain enduring methods in African traditional livestock regimes. This shows the importance of 
new studies that trace how the post-colonial state has grappled with the legacy of the colonial 
system (including veterinary legislation which buttresses it) it inherited at independence, and 
how African livestock owners relate with the state in the post-colonial context. Indeed, at a time 
when prices of veterinary drugs are increasing and income earnings are depressed, this history is 
important as it offers possibilities for proposing animal health practices that are inexpensive, 
effective and environmentally friendly. Whereas the impact of FMD on the post-colonial cattle 
economy has drawn scholarly attention, very little is known about the history of specific diseases 
such as Heartwater, Lungsickness and Redwater in Zimbabwe.    
 
An intriguing theme that emerged in this thesis also concerns the partial application of veterinary 
and livestock regulations by colonial state officials hence the studies related entirely to colonial 
veterinary legislation may unearth useful information on how they came into being and also how 
they compared with other regional contexts. This is pertinent given the fact that focus has been 
mainly on South African veterinary experiences. Academic silence on how the various colonial 
veterinary institutions (in Angola, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique, and BNLS countries) dealt 
with regional veterinary challenges underscores the urgent need for regional comparative studies. 
Such perspectives are bound to bring out interesting nuances on, for instance, how the informal 
intrastate cattle trade impacted on the veterinary landscape, and how the different forms of 
colonial administration affected the way the colonial state approached veterinary challenges. 
 
As the evidence in this study suggests, suspicion between vets and livestock owners is 
understandable given the colonial past, but at present communal livestock owners need to 
understand that their relationship with state veterinary services is not simple but is so complex to 
be dismissed as merely predatory. There exist a number of state veterinary services that may also 
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improve their herds which they need to consider. When this is appreciated by both parties, it will 
become clear that the success of any veterinary regulation does not lie in enforcement only but 
also acceptance, and compliance by livestock owners. Furthermore, there is need for further 
research both on the role played by women in African livestock regimes, and how they were 
affected by the hegemonic veterinary policy pursued by both the colonial and post-colonial state. 
At present, gender-sensitive historical studies have discussed women’s experiences during 
colonial rule in general terms. The often made point is that the absence of men in villages due to 
their employment in the capitalist sector saw women playing roles previous done by men. 
However, very little, if any, has been written about their specific experiences with veterinary 
challenges and veterinary policy. Equally, it is important for scholars to examine how the 
reconfiguration of the Zimbabwean landscape by the Land Reform programme has impacted on 
women and African traditional livestock regimes.  
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